Drainage District No. 1, Richardson County v. Richardson County
Decision Date | 28 March 1910 |
Docket Number | 16,372 |
Citation | 125 N.W. 796,86 Neb. 355 |
Parties | DRAINAGE DISTRICT NO. 1, RICHARDSON COUNTY, APPELLEE, v. RICHARDSON COUNTY, APPELLANT |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the district court for Richardson county: LEANDER M PEMBERTON, JUDGE. Affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Amos E Gantt and Clarence Gillespie, for appellant.
Kelligar & Ferneau, A. R. Keim, A. R. Scott and E. Falloon, contra.
A majority of the owners of about 30,000 acres of swamp, overflowed or submerged lands situated in Richardson county formed a drainage district for the purpose of draining such lands under the provisions of article IV, ch. 89, Comp. St. 1909 (Ann. St. 1909, secs. 5561-5597), and after its organization the district, in carrying out the purpose for which it was formed, apportioned the benefits, assessed the cost of the improvement, and required the county of Richardson to pay the sum of $ 18,600 as its share thereof on account of special benefits accruing to the 53 miles of public roads or highways situated and maintained within its boundaries. From a hearing before the board of drainage supervisors the county appealed to the district court, where a trial resulted in a judgment confirming and approving the order above mentioned, and from that judgment Richardson county has brought the case here by appeal.
The record presents many important and interesting questions, which will be stated and determined in the order in which they have been discussed by counsel.
1. Appellant's first contention is that the drainage district is not a public, but is a private, corporation engaged in the promotion of a private enterprise for the betterment of private property, and therefore the county cannot be required to contribute to the cost of the construction of its drainage system. That question was decided by this court in the case of Neal v. Vansickel, 72 Neb. 105, 100 N.W. 200. It was there said: Supporting this doctrine are many authorities, among which are Mound City Land & Stock Co. v. Miller, 170 Mo. 240, 60 L. R. A. 190, 70 S.W. 721; Morrison v. Morey, 146 Mo. 543, 48 S.W. 629; Tide-water Co. v. Coster, 18 N.J.Eq. 518, 90 Am. Dec. 634, and other well-considered cases. We see no reason at this time to depart from that opinion, and therefore this contention must be considered foreclosed so far as this court is concerned.
2. Appellant attacks the power of the drainage district to assess and collect from any political subdivision of the state any sum of money for benefits accruing to a highway from the improvement in question, and contends that such power cannot be granted by the legislature. In support of this contention appellant cites section 2, art. IX of the constitution, exempting the property of the state, counties and municipal corporations from taxation. The theory of that provision is that all such property belongs to the state, and it would be an idle proceeding for the state to collect a tax levied and assessed upon its own property. It has long been settled in this state that this section has reference only to taxes assessed by general valuation for general purposes, and has no reference to special taxation of property benefited by the creation of local improvements. City of Beatrice v. Brethren Church, 41 Neb. 358, 59 N.W. 932.
The argument of appellant's counsel, however, is that the county is the sole owner and proprietor of the highways assessed, and therefore it should not be required to assess and collect taxes upon its own property. We think this idea is a mistaken one. In Krueger v. Jenkins, 59 Neb. 641, 81 N.W. 844, it was said: We can see no reason why the county acting for the general public should not be required to pay for the benefits accruing to the public roads. It is charged with the duty of constructing and maintaining such roads in a suitable condition for public travel, and, if the improvement contemplated by the drainage district materially aids in the performance of that duty, there would seem to be no good reason why the county should not pay for the benefits thus conferred upon it.
Our attention is also invited to section 6, art. IX of the constitution, by which it is provided that the legislature may authorize the corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages to make local improvements and pay for the same by special assessment of the property benefited. As early as 1879, in construing this section, we said: "The constitution of a state not being a grant, but a restriction upon the power of the legislature, therefore a provision in the constitution, that 'the legislature may vest the corporate authorities of cities, towns, and villages with power to make local improvements by special assessments, or by taxation of property benefited', merely prescribes the rule of apportionment of such special taxes, and does not prohibit the legislature from conferring the power to make local improvements by special assessments or taxation * * * upon other municipal corporations than those designated." State v. Board of County Comm'rs, 8 Neb. 124. Darst v. Griffin, 31 Neb. 668, 48 N.W. 819; Dodge County v. Acom, 61 Neb. 376, 85 N.W. 292. We have adhered to this construction for more than 30 years, and it has had an important bearing upon the development of the state. It is by virtue of this construction placed upon section 6, art. IX, that the appellee and other public corporations are empowered to advance the welfare and prosperity of the state.
In Heffner v. Cass and Morgan Counties, 193 Ill. 439, 58 L. R. A. 353, 62 N.E. 201, the supreme court of Illinois said: " * * *
The effect of the enactment of section 19, ch. 161, laws 1905, was simply a declaration of the legislature that any public corporation engaged in a work of public utility shall have the right and power to collect, by way of special assessment, benefits which are found to accrue to public property from another public corporation. Under the rule laid down by the legislature, however, the benefits assessed must not exceed the benefits conferred, and a procedure is provided by which this issue may be determined, and a right to a review of such decision by the courts is preserved to both parties. No provision of the constitution has been pointed out which denies such power where the assessments do not exceed the benefits, and we have not succeeded in finding any such. To drain a large tract of land and render it fit for habitation and use, and to facilitate the interchange of communication across it, is the proper use of the taxing power, and was so held in the leading case of Tide-water Co. v. Coster, supra.
The constitution of Illinois is in many respects like the constitution of this state, and the supreme court of that state has said: ...
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