Drake v. Airhart, 13842

• Decision Date: 14 July 1978
• Docket Number: No. 13842,13842
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: James N. DRAKE v. C. E. AIRHART, Sheriff, etc.

Page 853

245 S.E.2d 853

162 W.Va. 98

James N. DRAKE v. C. E. AIRHART, Sheriff, etc.

No. 13842.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

July 14, 1978.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Whether a prisoner has been the subject of cruel and unusual punishment must be determined from the circumstances in each case.

2. The maintenance of discipline in a jail is essential to the effective and proper operation of a penal system and is an executive function with which courts ordinarily will not interfere.

3. Prison officials are vested with wide discretion in disciplining prisoners committed to their custody and unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion, resulting in infringement of basic constitutional rights, their actions will not be disturbed.

David M. Finnerin, Parkersburg, for plaintiff in error.

Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen., Pamela Dawn Tarr, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for defendant in error.

CAPLAN, Chief Justice:

James N. Drake was indicted by the grand jury serving the Circuit Court of Wood County and was tried and convicted of the offense of armed robbery. He was sentenced to a term of ten years in the penitentiary, but the execution of the sentence was stayed to afford him an opportunity to appeal his conviction. During the pendency of his appeal he remained in the Wood County jail where the events occurred which gave rise to this proceeding.

On January 29, 1976, Drake herein sometimes called petitioner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court, alleging that he had been the victim of cruel and unusual punishment while a prisoner in the Wood County Correctional Institution. This Court granted the writ, making it returnable before the Circuit Court of Wood County. After a full evidentiary hearing, the petitioner's prayer for relief was denied and this appeal was prosecuted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals that the petitioner, on the evening of January 19, 1976 while in jail awaiting his appeal, somehow gained his release from his jail cell and was moving freely about the cell block. The evidence discloses that he engaged in an argument with an inmate in another cell, threw water on him, attempted to urinate on him and threatened to kill him. The recipient of this abuse began "hollering" and a deputy, summoned by the uproar, returned the petitioner to his cell. At this time his possessions, other than a blanket, mattress and his writing materials, were removed from the cell. The petitioner began to beat on the light fixtures with his shoe, shouting that he was going to destroy them.

By reason of this disturbance the deputy secured the cell door with leg irons. Checking on the petitioner two or three hours later, the deputy discovered that the leg irons had been removed from the cell door, were badly bent and were thrown out into the aisle. The jailer then, believing that the petitioner might escape, handcuffed him in a sitting position to the cell bars or door. Approximately two hours later it was discovered that the petitioner had freed himself from the handcuffs but not from the cell.

Thereafter, at about 10:30 P.M. the petitioner was handcuffed with his hands through the bars at a height which required him to remain in a standing position. According to the jailer, the petitioner could better be kept in view on the "scanner" when he was in a standing position; also, the petitioner was handcuffed for "his protection and the protection of the other prisoners." Jail property, too, was in jeopardy by reason of his cantankerous actions.

At approximately 2:30 A.M. on January 20, 1976 the petitioner was permitted to lie on his mattress but was handcuffed with his hands behind him and his legs through the bars. He remained in that position until 8:30 that morning. The petitioner contends that the above described treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment and that by reason thereof he should be discharged from further confinement, or, in the alternative, be given a reduction in his sentence commensurate with the wrongful treatment to which he was allegedly subjected.

As noted in State ex rel. Pingley v. Coiner, 155 W.Va. 591, 186 S.E.2d 220 (1972), "The phrase 'cruel and unusual punishment', as used in the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and in Article III, Section 5, of the Constitution of West Virginia, is difficult to define." Many cases were cited and analyzed therein demonstrating that difficulty. Worthy of comment in this regard are the words of the United States Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958): "The exact scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by this Court . . . The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards." In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910) the Court said that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment has not been decided, but added: "It has been said that ordinarily the terms imply something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like." See Anderson v. Nosser (5th Cir.) 438 F.2d 183 (197...