Drake v. Sweet
| Decision Date | 30 March 1950 |
| Parties | DRAKE v. SWEET. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Argued Jan. 6 1950.
V. R. Brogna Boston, for plaintiff.
K. C. Tiffin Boston, for defendant.
Before QUA, C. J and RONAN, WILKINS, SPALDING and COUNIHAN, JJ.
In this action of contract for a broker's commission the plaintiff had a verdict, which was recorded under leave reserved. The case comes here on the defendant's exceptions to the denial of his motions for a directed verdict and for the entry of a verdict in his favor under leave reserved.
A finding of the following facts would have been warranted: In December, 1943, the plaintiff, a real estate broker, upon learning that the defendant had 'listed' his house with several brokers, asked the defendant if he also could 'list' the property. The defendant assented, saying 'if you can find me a customer that will pay me $25,000 net to me, irrespective of your commission, you may list it and show it.' In March, 1945, the defendant informed the plaintiff that the selling price had been increased to $30,000. On March 29, 1945, the plaintiff informed the defendant that he had found a buyer, one Chernis, who would pay $30,000 for the property. The defendant at that time told the plaintiff that he would have 'to find a place to live before he would sell his house.' On the following day, March 30, the plaintiff accompanied by Chernis went to defendant's office with a purchase and sale agreement, but the defendant stated that he would not execute the agreement until he had found a house for himself. [1] The plaintiff understood that this condition had been imposed. On May 12, 1945, the defendant told the plaintiff that he had 'found a house' and expected on May 15 to enter into an agreement to purchase it. At the defendant's request the plaintiff communicated with Chernis again but the latter said that he was not interested in the property and the defendant was informed of this fact. The defendant then told the plaintiff to find another customer. Sometime in July, 1945, the defendant told the plaintiff that the selling price had been increased to $35,000, including commission, and that he would pay the plaintiff the usual brokerage fee if he sold the property.
On November 14, 1945, one Kostick, who through the efforts of the plaintiff had become interested in the defendant's property, went to see it with the plaintiff. On the following day, November 15, Kostick signed a purchase and sale agreement which the plaintiff, without the defendant's knowledge, had drawn up, and gave the plaintiff a check for $500 payable to the defendant. The agreement called for an additional deposit on December 1, 1945, and the balance was to be paid in cash when the sale took place. The agreement was to be performed on or before December 17, 1945, and the purchase price stated therein was $35,000. By the terms of the agreement the firewood, if any, was to be sold and the defendant was to paint the kitchen and the maid's room and bath. The plaintiff admitted that these terms, namely, the painting of the rooms and the sale of the firewood, were never discussed with the defendant. The plaintiff, however, had previously heard the defendant state in the presence of other customers that he intended to paint the kitchen and the maid's room and bath regardless of whether he sold the house. On November 16 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant setting forth the terms of the proposed sale to Kostick which, together with the agreement and the check, he delivered to the defendant. The defendant refused to execute the agreement, stating that he had no house to go to, and handed the papers back to the plaintiff. During the latter part of November the plaintiff endeavored to induce the defendant to enter into an agreement with Kostick by which papers would not pass for seven months, but the defendant refused to do so. At no time between May 12, 1945, and November 16, 1945, did the defendant ever tell the plaintiff that he had not bought the house that he had referred to on May 12. Nor did the plaintiff ever ask the defendant if he had ever acquired another house. On November 29 the plaintiff sent the defendant a bill for a commission, the amount of which, if one was earned, is not in dispute.
The plaintiff's position is that he was employed to procure a customer ready able, and willing to purchase the property for $35,000 and that when he submitted Kostick's offer he had done all that was necessary to earn his commission. It is familiar law that to recover a commission a broker ordinarily is required to prove only that he produced a...
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