Drake v. Yawn
Decision Date | 19 January 1923 |
Docket Number | (No. 921.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> |
Citation | 248 S.W. 726 |
Parties | DRAKE et al. v. YAWN et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Tyler County; D. F. Singleton, Judge.
Suit by John Yawn and others against Rod Drake and others. From a judgment and injunction in favor of plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Reversed, and injunction dissolved.
Coe & Combs, of Kountze, for appellants.
Coleman & Lowe, of Woodville, for appellees.
O'QUINN, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court of Tyler county, Tex., adjudging that common school district No. 2 of Hardin county and common school district No. 40 of Tyler county be and compose consolidated common school county line district No. 40 of Tyler and Hardin counties, and that the management and control of the school in said district be vested in the board of county school trustees of said Tyler county, and said judgment permanently restrained the trustees of said common school district No. 2 of Hardin county and the board of county school trustees of said Hardin county, and the county superintendent of said Hardin county, from in any manner interfering with said consolidated common school county line district No. 40, and commanded the county depository of said Hardin county and its officials to transfer the funds coming into its possession belonging to the territory designated as common school district No. 2 of Hardin county to the proper depository and officials of said Tyler county for the benefit of said consolidated common school county line district No. 40, and that no school be maintained in any part of said district and no funds expended except on order of said county school trustees of said Tyler county.
The record discloses that in the year 1915, the local trustees of common school district No. 2 of Hardin county and the local trustees of common school district No. 40 of Tyler county, the said districts adjoining, mutually agreed in writing that the two districts should be consolidated for school purposes, and that the school therein should be conducted in the Tyler county school building in district No. 40, and the management of the school to be in the hands of the authorities of Tyler county; that an additional room should be built to said schoolhouse, another teacher employed, and a transfer wagon bought and operated for the purpose of transferring the children in the territory of district No. 2 of Hardin county to and from school. The room was built to the schoolhouse, an additional teacher was employed, and a transfer wagon bought and used in the transportation of children to and from school. The school money belonging to district No. 2 of Hardin county was transferred to Tyler county and the school operated under this agreement for five years. The agreement of the local trustees of said two districts to consolidate was reduced to writing, approved by the county superintendents of both Hardin and Tyler counties, and filed with the superintendent of Tyler county, but was never placed of record at any place and could not be found at the trial. The written agreement did not contain any stipulation as to how long the agreement was to last. It was contended by appellants that it was only temporary, that the arrangement was brought about by the fact that the schoolhouse in district No. 2 of Hardin county had burned, and there being no place for them to have a school was the cause of the agreement, and that the arrangement was to continue only until they were so situated as to rebuild and have a school of their own; while the appellees contended that the consolidation was to be permanent. After five years the trustees of district No. 2 of Hardin county proceeded to make arrangements for a building and a resumption of their own district school, and gave notice of such fact to the Tyler county authorities; but the Tyler county authorities refused to recognize their right to do so, and brought this suit to restrain them, resulting as above stated.
As we view the record and construe the law, the determining question is: Was there a valid and legal consolidation of the two common school districts into a consolidated common school county line district?
Common school county line districts were first authorized by Act of the Twenty-Ninth Legislature in 1905 (Acts 1905, § 55, p. 277). This act required that a petition setting forth the boundaries of the proposed district, signed by a majority of the qualified voters within said boundaries and approved by the county superintendent of public instruction of each county in which any part of the proposed district lay, should be presented to the commissioners' court of any one of said counties, and that said commissioners' court should have authority to establish such school district according to said petition. This remained the law as to the creation of common school county line districts until 1911, when same was amended, or rather superseded, by the Act of 1911 (Acts 1911, p. 200 [Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 2815a]). This act provided:
Thus the law remained until the Act of 1917, chapter 196, § 1 (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, art. 2815a), which reads:
"Board of county trustees" was created by Act of 1911, p. 34, § 4, and made a body corporate. This act was amended in 1915 (Acts 1915, c. 36, p. 68, § 2, now article 2749a, Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918) by completely re-enacting and amending the whole subject covered by the original act. It vested the management and control of the public free schools in each county of the state in five county trustees. It also gave them the powers theretofore vested in the commissioners' courts to subdivide the county into school districts, make changes in district lines, and to consolidate two or more districts for the establishment of rural high schools. It required the county superintendent, who was made ex officio...
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