Dress v. Wash. State Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 14 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 66262–7–I.,66262–7–I.
• Citation: 168 Wash.App. 319,279 P.3d 875
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Christina DRESS, aka Christina Larcom, Respondent, v. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant.

168 Wash.App. 319

279 P.3d 875

Christina DRESS, aka Christina Larcom, Respondent,

v.WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant.

No. 66262–7–I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

May 14, 2012.

Ronda Denise Larson, Assistant Attorney General–Corrections Division, Olympia, WA, for Appellant.

David Bruce Koch, Nielsen Broman & Koch PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

COX, J.

[168 Wash.App. 322]¶ 1 The Department of Corrections (DOC) is not authorized to either correct or ignore a final judgment and sentence that may be erroneous.¹ It may petition the court of appeals for review of an alleged error of law in a judgment and sentence within 90 days of having knowledge of the terms of such a sentence.²

¶ 2 Here, DOC never petitioned for review of what it characterizes as an error of law in the final judgment and sentence of Christina Dress. It then refused to release her from confinement when the final judgment and sentence, with credit for time served, required. The Snohomish County Superior Court properly granted Dress's petition for a writ of mandamus directing DOC to release her. We affirm.

[168 Wash.App. 323]¶ 3 On April 19, 2006, the Snohomish County Superior Court sentenced Dress on six counts, the longest term of which was for 84 months of confinement. Preprinted language in the judgment and sentence form states that “[a]ll counts shall be served concurrently,” with two exceptions that are not at issue in this case.³ The State did not appeal the judgment and sentence.

¶ 4 Dress was incarcerated at the Washington Corrections Center for Women. By letter dated May 10, 2006, DOC advised the sentencing judge, the deputy prosecuting attorney, and Dress's defense counsel that it believed the sentences imposed by the court should run consecutively to a prior sentence in King County Superior Court.⁴ This was based on the assertion that Dress's recent crimes were committed while she was under a suspended King County Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (DOSA) sentence.⁵ DOC requested that the court amend its judgment and sentence to have the April 2006 sentences run consecutively to the King County DOSA sentence. It appears that there was no response to this letter.

¶ 5 Despite the provisions of RCW 9.94A.585(7), which provides for relief where DOC claims that there is an error of law in a judgment and sentence, the Department never petitioned the court of appeals for review of the April 19, 2006, sentence. There is no explanation in this record why DOC failed to pursue this statutory remedy.

¶ 6 By letter dated August 11, 2006, which DOC sent to the court and all counsel, it stated again that Dress's sentences should be corrected to run consecutively to her DOSA sentence in the King County action. In this letter, DOC cited RCW 9.94A.589(2)(a) as legal authority for its position. We note that in this letter, DOC stated that the deadline for it to seek review of Dress's sentence under RCW 9.94A.585(7) had passed. DOC also acknowledged that “the Department is bound by the plain language of a judgment and sentence, even if legally flawed.” ⁶ Nothing happened as a result of this letter.

¶ 7 Over four years later, a week before her scheduled early release date in October 2010, DOC told Dress that her sentences were to run consecutively to her prior suspended DOSA sentence. Thus, she would not be eligible for release for at least 11 more months. It appears that DOC based this decision on the arguments set forth in its May and August letters, written over four years earlier. No court has ever approved of DOC's view that the final judgment and sentence was erroneous.

¶ 8 Dress moved for an order compelling her release. She did so before the sentencing judge under her original criminal case cause number in Snohomish County Superior Court. DOC responded by letter to the court and counsel. It stated that it was not a party in that criminal case, arguing that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over DOC.⁷ Additionally, DOC argued that the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide how DOC applied RCW 9.94A.589(2)(a).⁸ Further, it argued that Dress's motion was untimely and without merit.

¶ 9 Dress then petitioned for a writ of mandamus, naming DOC as the respondent. DOC responded, primarily arguing that the Snohomish County Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because Dress was imprisoned in Pierce County. The sentencing court rejected this and the other DOC arguments, granted the writ, and ordered DOC to release Dress. The court deferred her release for over six weeks, giving DOC the opportunity to seek appellate review and a stay of the writ.

[168 Wash.App. 325]¶ 10 DOC appealed. It also sought a stay of the writ, which this court denied.

DOC's AUTHORITY

¶ 11 A threshold issue in this appeal is whether DOC has the authority to either “correct” or disregard the provisions of an allegedly erroneous final judgment and sentence. We hold that it does not have that authority.

¶ 12 DOC argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that it is barred from correcting an inmate's sentence structure. This is not the law.

¶ 13 Several cases have directly addressed the question whether DOC has the authority to alter a prisoner's final judgment and sentence. None has found that such power exists, even where the judgment and sentence was erroneous.

¶ 14 In In re Personal Restraint of Davis.⁹ Davis pled guilty to a charge of cocaine possession.¹⁰ Though former RCW 9.94A.120(8) provided that any person convicted of a felony must be sentenced to a one-year term of community placement, nowhere in Davis's plea agreement or judgment and sentence was community placement imposed.¹¹ Despite the judgment and sentence, upon release, Davis was transferred by DOC to community placement. ¹² The Davis court concluded DOC's actions were unauthorized. It held that a trial court must amend the judgment and sentence before DOC can impose community placement not specified in the original sentencing documents. ¹³

[168 Wash.App. 326]¶ 15 The supreme court in State v. Broadaway¹⁴ echoed the impropriety of DOC's “correction” of sentences. Citing Davis, the court held that “the Department of Corrections is not authorized to correct an erroneous judgment and sentence.” ¹⁵

¶ 16 Indeed, RCW 9.94A.585(7) provides a mechanism whereby DOC may appeal errors of law in a sentence, demonstrating an acknowledgment by the legislature that DOC cannot alter a judgment and sentence on its own. RCW 9.94A.585(7) states:

The department may petition for a review of a sentence committing an offender to the custody or jurisdiction of the department. The review shall be limited to errors of law. Such petition shall be filed with the court of appeals no later than ninety days after the department has actualknowledge of terms of the sentence. The petition shall include a certification by the department that all reasonable efforts to resolve the dispute at the superior court level have been exhausted.

¶ 17 The Davis court highlighted this statute, noting that the legislature “recently created a new statutory procedure for DOC to challenge and correct erroneous sentences in court.... [O]ne of the purposes clearly underlying enactment [of this legislation] was to provide an efficient and formal procedure for the Department to challenge an erroneous sentence....” ¹⁶

¶ 18 Furthermore, as Division Two of this court has held, RCW 9.94A.585(7) “is designed to alleviate the dilemma previously facing DOC: enforcing what it considers to be an unlawful sentence, or ignoring the sentence imposed by the trial court.” ¹⁷ The court went on to hold that the statute's requirements “should be strictly observed.” ¹⁸

¶ 19 Here, DOC knew of what it characterizes as an erroneous April 2006 sentence in May 2006. It wrote to the trial court and to all counsel in the criminal action, explaining its concerns and requesting that the sentencing court amend its judgment and sentence. No one responded.

¶ 20 For reasons that are unexplained in this record, DOC chose to ignore RCW 9.94A.585(7)'s express statutory mechanism for review of alleged errors of law in Dress's judgment and sentence by failing to petition for review within 90 days of its May 2006 letter.

¶ 21 After expiration of the 90 day deadline for seeking review of the judgment and sentence specified by RCW 9.94A.585(7), DOC sent to the court and counsel its August 2006 letter. This letter acknowledged the expiration of the time for DOC to seek review of the judgment and sentence. Significantly, it also stated that “the Department is bound by the plain language of a judgment and sentence, even if legally flawed.” Given this statement by DOC, it is unclear why it chose to take the actions that we now describe.

¶ 22 In October 2010, just before Dress's early release date, DOC informed her that she would not be released for another 11 months. There is nothing in this record to explain why DOC changed its view of its authority from that stated in its August 2006 letter: that it was “bound by the plain language of a judgment and sentence, even if legally flawed.”

¶ 23 In any event, DOC now argues that while “[t]he trial court reasoned that the DOC does not have the legal authority to correct a sentence structure on the eve of an inmate's release[,][t]his is incorrect.” ¹⁹ DOC is wrong.

¶ 24 As the cases make clear, and as DOC correctly acknowledged in its August 2006 letter, even if a sentence is clearly erroneous, it is not the role of DOC to “correct” this error.²⁰ That is the role of the courts.²¹ DOC cites no persuasive authority to contradict these well-established principles, which it correctly acknowledged in August 2006. Instead, it argues that there is no due process liberty interest in “early release.” It also argues that it need only “follow its own legitimately established procedures regarding early release into community custody.” ²² We are not persuaded by these...