Dressler v. United States

• Docket Number: CIVIL 3:21cv1055 (JCH)
• Decision Date: 03 August 2022
• Parties: LAWRENCE DRESSLER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

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LAWRENCE DRESSLER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

CIVIL No. 3:21cv1055 (JCH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

August 3, 2022

RULING RE: PETITIONER'S PRO SE CORAM NOBIS MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION (DOC. NO. 1)

Janet C. Hall United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In this case, pro se petitioner Lawrence Dressier (“Dressier”) has filed a writ of error coram nobis to vacate his conviction. For the reasons set forth below, Dressier's Motion (Doc. No. 1) is denied.

II. BACKGROUND

On February 14, 2013, a grand jury indicted Dressler on charges of conspiracy to commit fraud and making a false statement in connection with several fraudulent real estate transactions in which he acted as a closing attorney. See Second Superseding Indictment, 11cr192 (Doc. No. 148). On October 3 of the same year, Dressler pled guilty before this court to Count One of the Indictment for conspiracy to commit fraud, stipulating that he conspired to defraud mortgage lenders and financial institutions. See Plea Agreement, 11cr192 (Doc. No. 285). In his Plea Agreement, Dressler waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction or sentence if his sentence did not exceed fifty-one months of imprisonment, a five-year term of supervised release, a $2.5 million fine, a $1.6 million order of restitution, and a $6 thousand order of forfeiture. See id. The court ultimately sentenced Dressler to twenty months of incarceration, three years of supervised release, and joint and several restitution totaling $403,450.75, entering judgment on March 25, 2014. See Dressier Judgment, 11cr192 (Doc. No. 459).

Shortly after Dressler was sentenced, two of his co-defendants, Andrew Constantinou and Jacques Kelly, were tried in a two-week jury proceeding. See Minute Entry, 11cr192 (Doc. No. 471). At Constantinou and Kelly's public hearing, a defendant in a related case, Jeffrey Weisman, testified as a cooperating defendant. The jury found Constantinou guilty of conspiracy and Kelly guilty of conspiracy, wire fraud, and making a false statement to a financial institution. See Constantinou Judgment, 11cr192 (Doc. No. 680); Kelly Judgment, 11cr192 (Doc. No. 600). The two were sentenced to 60 months and 15 months imprisonment, respectively. See id. Weisman was sentenced on September 25, 2015, after having previously waived indictment and pled guilty. See Weisman Judgment, 12cr155 (Doc. No. 49).

Dressler was released from custody on November 2, 2015. See Inmate Locator, BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited July 21, 2022). After his release, he filed several post-conviction motions which the court denied. See Mot. for Discovery (Doc. No. 779); Mot. for Relief from Restitution (Doc. No. 795); Mot. for Reconsideration (Doc No. 800). He filed the instant Motion for Coram Nobis Relief pro se on August 2, 2021. See Mot. for Coram Nobis Relief (Doc. No. 1). In his Coram Nobis Motion, he argues that the government violated his right to due process by withholding exculpatory and impeachment evidence from his defense counsel prior to his plea and sentencing.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The writ of error coram nobis “provides a way to collaterally attack a criminal conviction for a person . . . who is no longer ‘in custody.'” Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 345 n.1 (2013). In the interest of finality, the writ is available only in “‘extraordinary' cases presenting circumstances compelling its use ‘to achieve justice.'” United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 911 (2009) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507 (1954)). Relief under the writ is therefore appropriate only where “errors of the most fundamental character have rendered the proceeding itself irregular and invalid.” Foont v. United States, 93 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that “it is difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where a writ of coram nobis would be necessary or appropriate.” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996).

Courts considering a petition for the writ must “presume that the proceedings were correct, and the burden of showing otherwise rests on the petitioner.” See Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 524 (citation omitted). Ordinarily, courts are “particularly solicitous” of pro se litigants. See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 102. However, where, as here, the self-represented litigant is an attorney, the court typically affords no such benefit. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

Dressler argues that the government “failed to provide crucial exculpatory information” to his attorney before he pled guilty in 2013. See Mot. for Coram Nobis Relief at 2.^[1]

First, he contends that the government did not inform his attorney of two purportedly exculpatory statements that Weisman had made about the circumstances surrounding the transactions at issue in the mortgage fraud conspiracy. Id. Dressler did not learn of Weisman's statements until Weisman's September 2015 sentencing- nearly two years after Dressler's October 2013 plea. Id. At Weisman's sentencing, the government represented to the undersigned that: (1) Weisman had “referred certain fraudulent files to another attorney because he knew that this attorney would not have problems doing the deal so he was putting other people in danger”; and (2) “Mr. Weisman thought that [the closing of co-defendant Jacques Kelly] was a red flag to him because he didn't want to get caught.” Id. at Ex. A. Dressler asserts that, if he had known about Weisman's statements, he would have had “second thoughts” about pleading guilty rather than going to trial. Id. at 2.

Dressler also argues, in his Reply,^[2] that the government failed to disclose certain medical information from Weisman's Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) from his 2015 sentencing.^[3] See Dressier Reply at 2. Dressier contends that Weisman's PSR, along with his later testimony at his bar reinstatement proceedings, reveals that Weisman was suffering from mental health conditions and excessive alcohol use. See id. at 1-2; see also Weisman Bar Reinstatement Transcript, 11cr192 (Doc. No. 818). Dressler contends that this could have been useful impeachment evidence, as it was “highly relevant to Mr. Weisman's ability to recollect”, and Weisman would have been the “only witness of any substance” who could have testified against Dressler at trial. Dressler Reply at 2.

In opposing Dressler's Motion, the government argues, first, that Dressler waived his right to challenge his conviction in his Plea Agreement. See Gov't Opp'n at 1. Even if the waiver were not effective, they contend, he could not meet the stringent standard to obtain a writ of coram nobis. Id. The court agrees with the government on both grounds.

A. Whether Dressler Waived His Right to Seek Coram Nobis Relief

The government argues that Dressler's Plea Agreement waiver of the right to “appeal or collaterally attack” his sentence “in any proceeding” bars him from seeking coram nobis relief. Dressler offers no counterargument to the government's assertion that the waiver applies to his coram nobis Motion.

“It is well-established that, absent certain exceptions, a defendant's waiver of the right to appeal or collaterally attack a sentence within an agreed-upon Sentencing Guidelines range is enforceable.”^[4] Held v. United States, No 3:08-CV-1189, 2009 WL 179820, at *2 (D. Conn. Jan. 2009) (citing Garcia-Santos v. United States, 273 F.3d 506, 509 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1998)). Such waivers are valid where the record demonstrates that they were made knowingly, voluntarily, and competently. United States v. Coston, 737 F.3d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 2013). Courts in this Circuit have repeatedly held that waivers of the right to appeal or collaterally attack apply with equal force to petitions for coram nobis relief. See Shen v. United States, No. 12-CR-00068 (DLI), 2022 WL 229371, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2022) (holding that a waiver of the right to collateral attack bars a petitioner from coram nobis relief); United States v. Beckish, No. 17 CR. 569 (ER), 2020 WL 4500178, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2020) (determining that appeal waiver applied to petition for writ of coram nobis); United States v. Bastien, 111 F.Supp.3d 315, 318 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (collecting cases for the proposition that a plea agreement appeal applies to petitions for writ of aurita querela or coram nobis); United States v. Sanchez, No. 03 CR. 965 SHS, 2010 WL 5222131, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010) (stating that a collateral attack waiver barred petitioner from seeking coram nobis relief, although the writ was unavailable to petitioner, who was still in custody).

In his Plea Agreement, Dressler waived his right to “appeal or collaterally attack in any proceeding . . . the conviction or sentence” if his sentence did not exceed fifty-one months of imprisonment, a five-year term of supervised release, a $2.5 million fine, a $1.6 million order of restitution, and a $6 thousand order of forfeiture. See Dressler Plea Agreement, 11-cr-192 (Doc. No. 288). Dressler's sentence of twenty months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and $403,450.75 of restitution did not exceed the threshold of his appeal waiver. See Dressler Judgment, 11cr192 (Doc. No. 459). Thus, Dressler's appeal waiver is effective, and he is barred from “collaterally attack[ing]” his conviction or sentence through “any proceeding”, including the instant petition for a writ of coram nobis. See Plea Agreement; see also Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 345 n. 1 (characterizing the writ of coram nobis as a "way to collaterally attack a criminal conviction”).

B. Whether Dressler Merits Coram Nobis Relief

Even if...