Drews v. Gobel Freight Lines, Inc.

• Citation: 144 Ill.2d 84,161 Ill.Dec. 324,578 N.E.2d 970
• Decision Date: 20 June 1991
• Docket Number: No. 70365,70365
• Parties: , 161 Ill.Dec. 324 Jane DREWS, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Randall Drews, Deceased, and Indiv., Appellee, v. GOBEL FREIGHT LINES, INC., Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Page 970

578 N.E.2d 970

144 Ill.2d 84, 161 Ill.Dec. 324

Jane DREWS, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Randall Drews, Deceased, and Indiv., Appellee, v. GOBEL FREIGHT LINES, INC., Appellant.

No. 70365.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 20, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 30, 1991.

James T. Ferrini, Clausen, Miller, Gorman, Caffrey & Witous, Richard L. Berdelle, Pretzel & Stouffer, Chtd., Chicago, for Gobel Freight Lines.

Hofeld and Schaffner, Albert F. Hofeld, Chicago, for Jane Drews.

David B. Mueller, Cassidy & Mueller, Peoria, for amicus Ill. Association of Defense.

George M. Elsener, George M. Elsener & Associates, Chicago, for amicus Ill. Trial Lawyers Assoc.

David B. Mueller, Cassidy & Mueller, Peoria, for Illinois Assoc. of Defense.

Justice THOMAS J. MORAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Jane Drews, individually and as special administrator of the estate of her husband, Randall Drews (decedent), brought this lawsuit in the circuit court of Cook County against the defendant, Gobel Freight Lines, Inc., seeking recovery under the Survival Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110 1/2, par. 27-6), the Wrongful Death Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 70, par. 2), and the Rights of Married Women Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 40, par. 1015). Decedent was killed in August 1985, when his rented camper-van and one of defendant's tractor-trailer trucks collided. Prior to trial, defendant conceded liability, and the case proceeded to a jury trial solely on the issue of damages. The jury returned a verdict of $150,000 for decedent's pain and suffering, $7,100 for decedent's medical and funeral expenses, and $8,336,000 for wrongful death.

The trial court entered judgment on the verdict for $8,493,100, and denied defendant's motion for a new trial or, alternatively, a remittitur. The defendant then appealed from the wrongful death award, and the appellate court affirmed the verdict (197 Ill.App.3d 1049, 145 Ill.Dec. 533, 557 N.E.2d 303). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 316 (134 Ill.2d R. 316), the appellate court certified the following question of importance for direct appeal to this court:

"Whether in an action for wrongful death pursuant to Chapter 70, Section 1 and 3 (Ill.Rev.Stat.) the jury should be instructed that loss of society, which according to the dictate of the Illinois Supreme Court constitutes 'pecuniary injuries' within the purview of the statute, should be reduced to present cash value."

The three issues on appeal are whether: (1) damages for future loss of society should be reduced to present cash value; (2) the jury award is excessive; and (3) the amount of the jury award was inflated due to errors that occurred during trial.

As the only issue at trial was damages, there was no evidence presented concerning the nature of the accident. There was however, extensive testimony about the character and life of the decedent from his wife, friends, neighbors, parents, professional associates, and others. He was described as an outstanding young man who was a loving husband and a devoted father. The decedent's mother testified: that he would use his own truck to help strangers in a snowstorm; that he once helped a pregnant woman; and that he sometimes helped widows. Decedent's friends and neighbors described him using terms such as "eager to help others--the all-American guy," "most memorable person," and "all you were looking for in young America * * * a great neighbor and friend."

Decedent's wife testified that he was a romantic husband and caring father, and that they participated in many activities together (e.g., they built their house together). The decedent was 32 years old at the time of his death, and his two sons were approximately three years old and three months old. Videotapes and photographs were admitted showing the decedent participating in family activities, as well as teaching his son how to swim and hit a golf ball.

The first person who arrived at the accident scene, and the paramedic who attended to the decedent, described the pain and suffering the decedent endured during the 30-minute period, in which, while he was conscious, "he was being cut from the car." Dr. Robert Kirschner, a forensic pathologist who performed an autopsy on the decedent's body, testified that the decedent had blunt trauma injuries to his head, trunk, and extremities, that there was a "deep gaping laceration" on the rear portion of the left thigh, a "mangling injury to the right leg at the knee region," hemorrhaging on and under the surface of the brain, bleeding within the lung and chest cavity, a laceration of the liver, and that there were fractures to numerous bones throughout the body. He further testified that the injuries would cause severe pain and suffering in a conscious person. Over defendant's objections, the trial court admitted certain photographs of the accident scene, and morgue photographs of the decedent's injuries.

The plaintiff also presented testimony concerning decedent's abilities as an insurance salesman, as well as the potential future earning he would have made after he completed his purchase of his parent's insurance agency (planned for January of 1986).

As the only issue in this trial was the plaintiff's damages, the defendant offered the testimony of two witnesses to educate the jury about the time-value of money. The defendant initially presented the testimony of an employee of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, who testified that at the time of trial the last issue of a United States Treasury 30-year bond had a 9.125% rate of interest. Additionally, a professor of mathematics at the Illinois Institute of Technology testified for the defendant concerning the concept of present cash value.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court, finding that an award for loss of society "should not be reduced to present cash value" (197 Ill.App.3d at 1058, 145 Ill.Dec. 533, 557 N.E.2d 303), and that the verdict was not based on sympathy and prejudice, and therefore was not excessive (197 Ill.App.3d at 1059, 145 Ill.Dec. 533, 557 N.E.2d 303). It also found that none of the alleged trial errors were sufficient to lead to a presumption that the verdict was excessive. The court then granted defendant's petition to issue a certificate of importance (134 Ill.2d R. 316), and this appeal followed. The Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel and the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association filed amicus curiae briefs, in support of the defendant and the plaintiff, respectively.

The first issue to be resolved is whether an award for loss of society in a wrongful death case should be reduced to present cash value. The trial court gave an instruction (see Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 31.04 (3d ed. 1990)) (hereinafter, IPI Civil 3d) stating that pecuniary loss includes:

"society, companionship, conjugal relationship, money, goods and services the decedent might reasonably have been expected to contribute to the widow and two sons."

The trial court also instructed the jurors that "[d]amages for loss of society, companionship and conjugal relationship are not reduced to present cash value." (See, e.g., IPI Civil 3d No. 34.02.) The trial court additionally refused to give defendant's tendered jury instruction which, contrary to the aforementioned instructions, would have instructed the jury that all pecuniary benefits, including loss of society, are to be reduced to present cash value.

In pertinent part, section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act states that "the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, to the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 70, par. 2.) The Act additionally states that "the jury shall determine the amount of damages to be recovered without regard to and with no special instruction as to the dollar limits on recovery * * *." Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 70, par. 2.

In Elliott v. Willis (1982), 92 Ill.2d 530, 541, 65 Ill.Dec. 852, 442 N.E.2d 163, this court held that a jury may consider the loss of society, companionship and conjugal relationship that constitute loss of consortium as compensible pecuniary damages for wrongful death. The court also noted that "[a]ll of the elements that comprise what is considered to be loss of consortium may not be the most tangible items, but a jury is capable of putting a monetary worth on them." (Elliott, 92 Ill.2d at 540, 65 Ill.Dec. 852, 442 N.E.2d 163.) Loss of consortium is thus appropriately considered as part of this court's interpretation of "pecuniary injuries" under the Wrongful Death Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 70, par. 2.

The defendant and amicus Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel argue that since damages for loss of society are pecuniary in nature, the damage award must be reduced to present cash value so that it conforms with sound economic and public policy principles. Essentially the defendant and amicus argue that all damages compensible under the plain wording of the Act are "pecuniary," and therefore "economic," damages which should be reduced to present cash value.

The issue of whether or not damages for loss of society in a Wrongful Death Act case should be reduced to present cash value is a matter of first impression before this court. However, the appellate court has previously examined the issue. (See Singh v. Air Illinois, Inc. (1988), 165 Ill.App.3d 923, 117 Ill.Dec. 501, 520 N.E.2d 852; Exchange National Bank v. Air Illinois (1988), 167 Ill.App.3d 1081, 118 Ill.Dec. 691, 522 N.E.2d 146; Lorenz v. Air Illinois, Inc. (1988), 168 Ill.App.3d 1060, 119 Ill.Dec. 493, 522 N.E.2d 1352; (collectively referred to as the Air Illinois cases); Goad v. Evans (1989), 191 Ill.App.3d 283, 138 Ill.Dec. 523, 547 N.E.2d 690.) All of the previous appellate court decisions have held that, in a wrongful death action, damages for loss of society should...