Dreyer v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare

• Decision Date: 20 April 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:19-cv-00211-DCN
• Citation: 455 F.Supp.3d 938
• Parties: Erika DREYER, as parent and natural guardian of B.B., et al., Plaintiffs, v. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, an agency of the State of Idaho, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho

455 F.Supp.3d 938

Erika DREYER, as parent and natural guardian of B.B., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, an agency of the State of Idaho, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:19-cv-00211-DCN

United States District Court, D. Idaho.

Signed April 20, 2020

Charlene K. Quade, Sean R. Beck, C.K. Quade Law, PLLC, Boise, ID, Mark R. Azman, Pro Hac Vice, Shamus P. O'Meara, Pro Hac Vice, O'Meara, Leer, Wagner & Kohl, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs.

Emma C. Nowacki, Trudy Hanson Fouser, Gjording Fouser PLLC, Megan Ann Larrondo, Cynthia Lin Yee-Wallace, Office of Attorney General, Boise, ID, for Defendants Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Southwest Idaho Treatment Center Director, Jamie Newton, State of Idaho, Corbin Burkett, Billy King, Luke Brisbane, Debra Luper, Deborah Combs.

Cynthia Lin Yee-Wallace, Office of Attorney General, Boise, ID, for Defendant John and Jane Does 1-100.

Emma C. Nowacki, Trudy Hanson Fouser, Gjording Fouser PLLC, Megan Ann Larrondo, Cynthia Lin Yee-Wallace, Office of Attorney General, Shannon Marie Graham, Kelly Law, PLLC, Boise, ID, Michael Edward Kelly, Kelly Law, PLLC, Garden City, ID, for Defendants Jason Miller, Leondre Edwards.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

David C. Nye, Chief U.S. District Court Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is Defendants State of Idaho, Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Southwest Idaho Treatment Center, Jamie Newton, Billy King, Debra Luper, and Debra Combs' (collectively "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 37), as well as Jason Miller and Leondre Edwards (collectively "Joining Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 38). The Court held oral argument on February 20, 2020, and took the matters under advisement.

Upon review, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in PART and DENIES in PART both Motions.

II. BACKGROUND

On June 12, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint and Request for Injunctive Relief. Dkt. 1. On July 8, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Class Action Complaint and Request for Injunctive Relief. Dkt. 7. In their Amended Complaint, seven named Plaintiffs assert twenty cause of action against eleven named Defendants and 100 "John and Jane Does." Dkt. 7, at 1-2.

Plaintiffs explain that the purpose of this case is to address "widespread abuse, neglect and mistreatment inflicted on current and former residents, including Plaintiffs and others similarly situated, of the Southwest Idaho Treatment Center ("SWITC"), a program operated by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("DHW"), by known and unknown SWITC staff and condoned by SWITC administrators and DHW." Dkt. 7, at 3.

SWITC is a state-run institution that offers short-term crisis care for individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities ("I/DD") who also have some combination of medical, behavioral, and mental health needs. It is not a hospital, it is not a penal institution, it is not a psychiatric care center. It is its own unique program.

SWITC has been in existence since the early 1900s. SWITC's campus was originally a 600-acre long-term placement facility that could house 1,000 residents. In 2009, however, Idaho developed and implemented an Olmstead plan¹ aimed at transitioning SWITC's residents, some of whom had lived at SWITC for years, into the community.

All of the individuals at SWITC have an I/DD, which is a cognitive impairment. Some residents have been committed to the care of DHW due to criminal activity or because they have been found to be a threat to themselves or others. Other individuals are at SWITC because there is no other available community-based support that can successfully provide them care. Some residents have unusually high medical needs, and/or significant mental health diagnoses.

In 2017, SWITC resident Drew Rinehart committed suicide. That same year, SWITC failed two surveys performed by DHW, and six staff members left or were fired following substantiated abuse allegations by SWITC residents.

When SWITC became aware of the abuse allegations in 2017, it alerted DisAbility Rights Idaho ("DRI"), an advocacy and protection group with federal authority to monitor and investigate conditions in facilities that serve individuals with I/DD. SWITC shared thousands of pages of documents with DRI in an effort to be transparent. DRI reviewed those documents and drafted a report on its "findings." The Idaho Office of Performance Evaluations ("OPE") also completed a report on SWITC's operations, which was conducted in response to a legislative inquiry in March of 2018.

Relying on these reports, Plaintiffs' family members and guardians filed this lawsuit, asserting federal law claims and a number of individual state law claims against Defendants. Defendants and Joining Defendants assert Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint lacks factual and legal plausibility.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a claim if the plaintiff has "fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." "A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’ " Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP , 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 554, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "This is not an onerous burden." Johnson , 534 F.3d at 1121.

A complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," but it must set forth "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. If the facts pleaded are "merely consistent with a defendant's liability," or if there is an "obvious alternative explanation" that would not result in liability, the complaint has not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 682, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations made in the pleading under attack. Id. , at 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A court is not, however, "required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors , 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In cases decided after Iqbal and Twombly , the Ninth Circuit has continued to adhere to the rule that a dismissal of a complaint without leave to amend is inappropriate unless it is beyond doubt that the complaint could not be saved by an amendment. See Harris v. Amgen, Inc. , 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009).

IV. ANALYSIS

Defendants asserts that Counts II through IX, Counts XII, XIII, and Counts XVI through XVIII should be dismissed in their entirety, with prejudice, because they are not legally plausible. Defendants assert that other counts, including the claims alleged by Plaintiff B.B., Counts III and IV (against the State of Idaho, DHW, and Jamie Newton), and Counts X, XI, and XV, should be dismissed because they suffer from factual deficiencies which fail to put Defendants on notice of such claims. Finally, Defendants assert Count XIX should be dismissed for a lack of standing, and that all claims against Luke Brisbane should be dismissed because no such person has been served. Joining Defendants agree in all respects with Defendants and move for dismissal on like grounds.

Neither Defendants nor Joining Defendants move for dismissal of Count I (violations of 1983), Count XIV (Negligence), or Count XX (Injunctive relief).

For organizational purposes the Court will group the claims in the manner the parties have. Additionally, unless otherwise noted, "Defendants" includes the individual Defendants outlined in docket 37 and Joining Defendants identified in docket 38. The Court will specify particular Defendants where appropriate.

A. Count II – Violation of the Constitution of the State of Idaho

In Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege Defendants deprived them of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by [ ] Article I, Section [1] of the Constitution of the State of Idaho[.]" Dkt. 1, at ¶ 195.

Defendants collectively argue that the Idaho Constitution does not provide a private right of action under which a Plaintiff could allege violations of the Constitution of the State of Idaho. Defendants are correct.

Plaintiffs claim there is a lack of statutory authority to support a conclusion one way or the other and cite limited Idaho Supreme Court cases and Federal District Cases for the proposition that Idaho state constitutional claims are in fact legitimate in Federal Court.

The cases cited by Plaintiffs do not clearly establish Plaintiffs' point, are limited in application, and do not change the fact that this Court has consistently held that no cause of action for monetary damages exists under the Idaho Constitution based on an alleged violation of a person's civil liberties.

As Judge Edward J. Lodge recently held: "this question has been clearly decided in this District. There is no ‘direct cause of action for violations of the Idaho Constitution.’ " Hamell v. Idaho Cty. , No. 3:16-CV-00469-EJL, 2017 WL 2870080, at *5 (D. Idaho July 5, 2017) (citing Kangas v. Wright , 2016 WL 6573943, at *6 (D. Idaho Nov. 4, 2016) ). See also Thomas v. Cassia Cty., Idaho , No. 4:17-CV-00256-DCN, 2019 WL 5270200, at *10 (D. Idaho Oct. 17, 2019) ("No Idaho authority suggests the existence of statutory or direct causes of action for violations of the Idaho Constitution.") (citing Campbell v. City of Boise , 345 Fed. Appx. 299, 300 (9th Cir. 2009)) ; McCabe v. Gonzales , No....