Dries v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 05 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:08-cv-1286-T-23TGW |
| Parties | THOMAS J. DRIES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Dries petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) and challenges his conviction for "D.U.I.-Manslaughter," for which conviction Dries serves ten years. Numerous exhibits ("Respondent's Exhibit ____") support the response. (Doc. 9) The respondent admits the petition's timeliness. (Response at 14 Doc. 9) The petition lacks merit.
Shortly before midnight on May 3, 2000, Dries turned his vehicle from a side-road onto a main road in Lakeland, Florida, and was immediately involved in a "head-on" collision with a vehicle driven by Joseph Long, who died as a result of the accident. Dries had a blood-alcohol level of .234, nearly three times greater than the legal limit of .08. Dries was charged with "D.U.I.-Manslaughter." Two years after the accident Driespleaded nolo contendere without a plea agreement and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment and five years probation.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states in pertinent part:
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied--the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application"clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 694. "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, ____ U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412.
The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the state case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Federal courts must afford due deference to a state court's decision. "AEDPA prevents defendants—and federal courts—from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, ____ U.S. ____, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1866 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, ____ U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) () (citations omitted).
In a per curiam decision without a written opinion the state appellate court affirmed Dries's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. (Respondent's Exhibit 7) Similarly, in another per curiam decision without a written opinion the state appellate court affirmed the denial of Dries's subsequent Rule 3.850 motion to vacate. (Respondent's Exhibit 12) The state appellate court's per curiam affirmances warrant deference under Section 2254(d)(1) because "the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due." Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 278 F.3d 1245 (2002), cert. denied sub nom Wright v. Crosby, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). See also Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85 ().
Review of the state court decision is limited to the record that was before the state court.
We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that "resulted in" a decision that was contrary to, or "involved" an unreasonable application of, established law. This backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time, i.e., the record before the state court.
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. Dries bears the burden of overcoming a state court factual determination by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to a finding of fact but not to a mixed determination of law and fact. Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1046 (2001). The state court's rejection of Dries's post-conviction claims warrants deference in this case. (Order Denying Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, Respondent's Exhibit 9 at 139-44 and 301-03)
Dries asserts ten grounds for relief. The respondent recognizes that three of the grounds are entitled to a review on the merits but contends that seven of the grounds are barred from review on the merits because Dries failed to properly present each ground to the state court.2 The respondent's procedural argument is correct.
A petitioner must present each claim to a state court before raising the claim in federal court. "[E]xhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners 'fairly presen[t]' federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the 'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995), quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). Accord Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982) (), and Upshaw v. Singletary, 70 F.3d 576, 578 (11th Cir. 1995) ().
Dries presented his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his state Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief. The circuit court summarily rejected seven of the claims and granted an evidentiary hearing on the remaining three claims. On the appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Dries asserted only the three claims that were the subject of the evidentiary hearing. (Respondent's Exhibit 10) Because Dries received an evidentiary hearing and he failed to include all of his claims in his appellate brief (Respondent's Exhibit 10), Dries failed to "fairly present" the seven claims to the state courts.
Duest also seeks to raise eleven other claims by simply referring to arguments presented in his motion for post-conviction relief. The purpose of an appellate brief is to present arguments in support of the points on appeal. Merely making reference to arguments below without further elucidation does not suffice to preserve issues, and these...
To continue reading
Request your trial