Driscoll v. Bd. of Com'rs of Ramsey Cnty.

• Citation: 201 N.W. 945,161 Minn. 494
• Decision Date: 23 January 1925
• Docket Number: No. 24461.,24461.
• Parties: DRISCOLL et al. v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF RAMSEY COUNTY et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

161 Minn. 494
201 N.W. 945

DRISCOLL et al.
v.
BOARD OF COM'RS OF RAMSEY COUNTY et al.

No. 24461.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 23, 1925.

Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; Charles Bechhoefer, Judge.

Suit by Walter J. Driscoll and another against the Board of County Commissioners of Ramsey County and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal from an order denying motion for new trial. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

The assessed valuation alone is not a proper basis for classification of counties for the purpose of legislation authorizing certain counties to acquire land and equip the same for recreation purposes.

Such classification is not germane to the subject of the law involved.

Chapter 258, Laws 1923, is unconstitutional.

An action was brought by one taxpayer to restrain the officials from acquiring one or more tracts of land for recreation grounds and issuing and negotiating bonds under chapter 258, Laws 1923, claiming that the statute was unconstitutional. Defendants demurred. It was sustained. No appeal was taken. Another taxpayer brought this action against same defendants to restrain them from purchasing a particular tract of land for the purposes mentioned on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional. Held, that the causes of action were not identical and that the doctrine of res adjudicata did not apply.

The determination in an action brought by one taxpayer binds other taxpayers the same as it binds the plaintiff. It does not bind a taxpayer who has a special interest. It must be prosecuted in good faith.

A judgment upon the matter in issue as presented in the complaint and confessed by a general demurrer is upon the merits and is as effectual as if there had been a verdict upon the same matter.

The rule is that the judgment in the former action will be a bar if the evidence necessary to sustain a judgment for the plaintiff in the present action would have authorized a judgment for the plaintiff in the former action.

Former adjudication is conclusive not only as to questions actually and formally litigated, but it is conclusive as to all questions within the issue whether formally litigated or not.

[201 N.W. 945]

J. P. Kyle, of St. Paul, for appellants.

Harry H. Peterson and R. A. McDonald, both of St. Paul, for respondents.

WILSON, C. J.

This is an appeal from an order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

Plaintiffs are taxpayers and brought this action to restrain the defendants, constituting the board of county commissioners of Ramsey county, from acquiring land for the purpose of establishing a bathing beach pursuant to the authority of chapter 258, Laws 1923. The title of this act reads:

‘An act authorizing the county board of any county, now or hereafter having property of an assessed valuation of not less than $125,000,000, and not more than $250,000,000, to acquire, improve, and equip one, or more tracts of land within such county but outside the limits of any city or village located within said county, for use as a park, bathing beach * * * or recreational ground and to pay for same out of any moneys in the county treasury not otherwise appropriated or by issuing, not to exceed $50,000 bonds of any such county.’

Plaintiffs contend that this law is unconstitutional, in contravention of article 4, §§ 33 and 34, of the state Constitution.

Ramsey county is the only county that has an assessed valuation within the prescribed limits, and therefore the only county to which the law if or can be applicable. The assessed valuation of Ramsey county for the year 1922 was $154,482,193.00. Two other counties in the state, namely, Hennepin county and St. Louis county, have assessed valuations in excess of $250,000,000. Hennepin county in the year 1922 had an assessed valuation of $296,672,941. St. Louis county for the same year had an assessed valuation of $363,279,422. All other counties in the state have assessed valuations of less

[201 N.W. 946]

than $30,000,000. The average assessed valuation of such other counties being approximately $15,000,000. The assessed valuation of Ramsey, Hennepin, and St. Louis counties for the year 1923 were as follows, respectively: $160,152,262; $306,032,606; $368,732,310.

The fact that at present Ramsey county is the only county that may operate under this law is not fatal. State v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540, 58 N. W. 150;Wall v. St. Louis County, 105 Minn. 403, 117 N. W. 611;State v. Cloudy & Travers (Minn.) 198 N. W. 457;State v. Delaware Iron Co. (Minn.) 200 N. W. 475. It brings within its scope all counties similarly situated and treats all counties, which come within the class, alike. In this respect it meets the requirements of the Constitution. Lodoen v. City of Warren, 146 Minn. 181, 178 N. W. 741;Stevens v. Village of Nashwauk (Minn.) 200 N. W. 927;Johnson v. St. Paul & Duluth Ry. Co., 43 Minn. 222, 45 N. W. 156,8 L. R. A. 419;State v. Pocock (Minn. filed Jan. 2, 1925) 201 N. W. 610. It also properly permits other counties to come within the classification when they have the proper assessed valuation. Roe v. City of Duluth, 153 Minn. 68, 189 N. W. 429. It embraces the necessary prosent and prospective operation. The criticial questions in this case are as to whether the classification is germane to the subject of the law, and is there a relation between the assessed valuation and the public necessity or propriety of recreation grounds?

The Legislature is the lawmaking power of the state. It the necessity for this law calls for the exercise of discretion in the classification of particular subdivisions of the state for the purpose of legislation, we cannot review such discretion and substitute the views of the court as to the properiety of the classification. ‘It is only when the classification is so manifestly arbitrary as to evince a legislative purpose of evading the provisions of the Constitution that the courts may and must declare the classification unconstitutional.’ State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N. W. 175,57 L. R. A. 297, 89 Am. St. Rep. 571;State v. Brown, 97 Minn. 402, 407, 106 N. W. 477,5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 327. A valid classification should be based upon some natural reason. The counties put in the particular class should require different legislation than those counties omitted therefrom. This court in State v. Brown, 97 Minn. 402, 106 N. W. 477,5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 327, said:

‘The general principles which underlie and control the theory of permissible classification are now well settle in this state. The basis of classification must not be arbitrary or illusory. Having reference to the particular legislation, there must be some substantial distinction which suggests a reasonable necessity or properiety for different laws for the objects or places embraced within or excluded from the class. There must be something suggested by a difference in the situation and circumstances of the subjects placed in different classes, which discloses the necessity or propriety for different legislation in respect thereto. The classification must be founded upon legitimate differences in situation, population, or inherent condition. The places or things included must have some characteristics or peculiarities distinguishing them from those which are excluded. The basis must be sufficiently broad to include all subjects whose conditions and wants render such legislation equally appropriate. Unless the statute is curative or remedial, and therefore temporary, the classification must not be based upon existing conditions only, but provision must be made for future acquisitions to the class as other subjects acquire the characteristics which form the basis of the classification.’

A law is uniform in its operation if it operates equally upon all the subjects within the class of subjects to which it is applicable; but the Legislature cannot adopt an arbitrary classification even though the law may operate equally upon each subject of each of the classes adopted.

Chapter 130, Laws 1907...