Driscoll v. Floyd

• Decision Date: 28 February 1914
• Citation: 104 N.E. 473,217 Mass. 33
• Parties: DRISCOLL et al. v. FLOYD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

217 Mass. 33

104 N.E. 473

DRISCOLL et al. v. FLOYD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

February 28, 1914

COUNSEL

Patrick O'Loughlin, of Boston, for petitioners.

Eaton & McKnight, of Boston, for respondent.

OPINION

DE COURCY, J.

The respondent asked the trial court to rule as follows: 'The description of the land in the statement of lien does no contain a description of the property intended to be covered by the lien sufficiently accurate for identification, and the petition must be dismissed.' The requirement of the lien statute on this subject is that the statement, which must be filed in the registry of deeds, shall give 'a description of the property intended to be covered by the lien sufficiently accurate for identification'; and it further provides that 'the validity of the lien shall not be affected by an inaccuracy in the statement relative to the property to which it attaches, if such property can be reasonably recognized from the description.' R. L. c. 197, §§ 6, 7. It was said by this court in Dodge v. Hall, 168 Mass. 435, 47 N.E. 110: 'A description is sufficient which will enable one who is familiar with the locality to identify the land with reasonable certainty; and inaccuracies will not vitiate the lien if the land can be so identified.' In that case the question arose under the petition to enforce the lien, which the statute required to contain 'a description of the premises subject to the lien.' P. S. c. 191, § 13; R. L. c. 197, § 9. In Cleverly v. Moseley, 148 Mass. 280, 79 N.E. 394, the statement identified the lot by the house thereon, 'the first two stories being of stone and the third story of wood the same being the first house on Englewood avenue from Roxbury avenue.' In fact the house was not on the line of Englewood avenue, but about 300 feet northerly thereof, and another house was being erected nearer to Roxbury avenue. In that case the limits and boundaries of the lot were not set out in the statement, but this the court said was 'immaterial if, upon identifying the place, they could with reasonable effort have been otherwise ascertained,' as from 'the way in which the land was used, or from recorded deeds, or in some other way.' And it was further said that it was for the jury 'to interpret the evidence and apply the description to it, and determine upon the facts, as they might find them, whether the lot could have been reasonably recognized from the description taken as a whole.' See also York v. Barstow, 175 Mass. 167 55 N.E. 846; Lays v. Hurley, 215 Mass. 582, 103 N.E. 52.

In the case at bar the lot of land on which the labor and materials were furnished and used in the construction of buildings, was...