Driscoll v. Karroo Land Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-3-A,90-3-A
• Citation: 600 A.2d 722
• Parties: Joseph DRISCOLL v. KARROO LAND CO., INC. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 722

600 A.2d 722

Joseph DRISCOLL v. KARROO LAND CO., INC.

No. 90-3-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Dec. 17, 1991.

Armando Monaco, Cranston, for plaintiff.

Patrick T. Conley, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This dispute arises because the defendant, Karroo Land Co., Inc. (Karroo), appeals from an order by a Superior Court justice to pay the plaintiff, Joseph Driscoll (Driscoll), a certain sum of rents Karroo collected as owner of tax title of Driscoll's property pursuant to G.L.1956 (1980 Reenactment) § 44-9-12.

The facts are undisputed. Until May 1979 Driscoll, a resident of Seekonk, Massachusetts, owned real estate located at 451-453 Pine Street in Providence. During that time Driscoll failed to pay the property tax for the years 1976 and 1977 and as a result the city of Providence acquired tax title to the property.

On July 23, 1980, Karroo, a Rhode Island corporation with its principal place of business in Providence, Rhode Island, purchased the realty at a tax sale. By doing so, Karroo paid the statutory monetary amount required to bring the tax status of the property current and in return received an assignment of tax title from the city. From the time of its purchase in July 1980 to June 1984, Karroo actively managed the property, which included negotiating rental agreements, collecting rent from tenants, and instituting three eviction actions for the nonpayment of rent.

Driscoll collected rents in the amount of $200 per month from July 1980 until August 1981. At this time Karroo raised the rental fee and collected rents in a sum totaling $10,800 until May 1984. In June 1984 Karroo attempted to foreclose on Driscoll's right of redemption, at which time Driscoll paid the sum necessary to reclaim the property.

In October 1984 Driscoll initiated an action asserting that Karroo owed him all rents it had collected during its tenure as manager of his property. In fashioning an equitable remedy, the trial justice found that Driscoll was entitled to reimbursement of rents in the sum of $200 per month, the amount Driscoll collected prior to the tax sale. Additionally the trial justice debited Driscoll for several actions performed by Karroo, including the costs of three eviction actions undertaken during Karroo's possession. Driscoll was awarded $4,567.18 plus interest.

Although no separate judgment was entered, ¹ Karroo appealed the order, contending that § 44-9-12 allows a purchaser of realty at a tax sale to collect and retain rents from said property after the expiration of the one-year statutory period following the collector's sale. Driscoll contends that the same statutory provision permits him the right to rents collected by Karroo during the two-year-and-nine-month period following Karroo's purchase of tax title.

We do not subscribe to Driscoll's sentiments. Accordingly we reverse the trial justice's decision and remand.

The parties take issue with the rights conveyed to a purchaser of tax title delineated in § 44-9-12. ² This entire dispute hinges upon the interpretation of the word "until" in one particular portion of the statute. Specifically that statutory provision provides, "No sale hereafter made shall give to the purchaser any right to either the possession, or the rents, or profits of the land until the expiration of one (1) year after the date of the sale." (Emphasis added.) Section 44-9-12.

In examining a statute's unambiguous language, we give its words their plain and ordinary meaning. McGee v. Stone, 522 A.2d 211, 216 (R.I.1987). Consequently we shall not delve into legislative history to determine the intent of this provision. See United States v. Melucci, 739 F.Supp. 79, 81 (D.R.I.1990); Bleau v. Hackett, 598 F.Supp. 727, 731 (D.R.I.1984).

Section 44-9-12 states that a deed delivered to a purchaser at a tax sale conveys the realty to the purchaser as security for the repayment of the purchase price, subject to one of two conditions. The original owner may redeem the realty, ³ or the purchaser may exercise the right to foreclose upon this right of redemption. ⁴ Upon the first condition, whereby the original owner redeems the property, the parties are placed in the position they would have been in prior to the tax sale, subject to the original owner's paying a penalty plus interest to the purchaser of tax title for the period in which the purchaser held the property. The right to redeem the property exists up to the time a petition to foreclose is pending in Superior Court. Picerne v. Sylvestre, 113 R.I. 598, 324 A.2d 617 (1974).

Should the second of the two conditions occur, the holder of tax title may initiate foreclosure proceedings in Superior Court. Once the foreclosure decree has been entered, the title conveyed by the tax collector's deed becomes "absolute." ⁵ Picerne, 113 R.I. at 600-01, 324 A.2d at 618; see also Hefner v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 123 U.S. 747, 8 S.Ct. 337, 31 L.Ed. 309 (1887); Whiteman v. Mattson, 167 Colo. 183, 446 P.2d 904 (1968); Greene v. Esquibel, 58 N.M. 429, 272 P.2d 330 (1954); Broadhurst v. American Colloid Co., 85 S.D. 65, 177 N.W.2d 261 (1970). The holder of tax title is prohibited from commencing such an action for a one-year period from the date of the collector's sale. Picerne, 113 R.I. at 600, 324 A.2d at 618. Until the expiration of the statutory time, the purchaser has the right to hold and manage property as "trustee" of the original owner, providing the original owner with a twelve-month grace period. Previously we have characterized this one-year period afforded the delinquent taxpayer as "permissive," believing that in its generosity the General Assembly intentionally precluded the purchaser of such title from rent or possession for one year. Picerne v. Sylvestre, 122 R.I. 85, 91, 404 A.2d 476, 479...