State v. Santos

• Decision Date: 16 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2001-516-C.A.,2001-516-C.A.
• Citation: State v. Santos, 870 A.2d 1029 (R.I. 2005)
• Parties: STATE v. Idalio Fernandes SANTOS.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

870 A.2d 1029

STATE v.Idalio Fernandes SANTOS.

No. 2001-516-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 16, 2005.

Christopher R. Bush, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Janice M. Weisfeld, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

ROBINSON, Justice.

At issue in this case is whether a person convicted of sexual assault and incarcerated before July 1, 1992, but released after that date, was required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to the registration statute that was in existence at the time of the prisoner's release (viz.,G.L.1956 § 11-37-16(since repealed by P.L.1996, ch. 108, § 3)).¹The defendant, Idalio Fernandes Santos, maintains that, because he was convicted before § 11-37-16 went into effect, he was under no duty to register.Accordingly, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his "Motion to Dismiss Notice of Duty to Register."The state disputes this argument and maintains that, because Santos was released after July 1, 1992, he is required to register as a sexual offender.

Facts/Travel of the Case

On May 9, 1990, defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual assault.²He was sentenced to serve a thirty-year term of imprisonment at the Adult Correctional Institutions, with fifteen of those years being suspended with probation.After serving a portion of his sentence, defendant was scheduled to be released on parole.Before his proposed release date of January 24, 2001, defendant was given notice that he had a duty to register as a sexual offender pursuant to § 11-37-16and§ 11-37.1-18.³The defendant complied with the mandate implicit in that notice, but then he subsequently filed a "Motion to Dismiss Notice of Duty to Register."⁴

In the memorandum of law filed in support of his motion, defendant asserted that, by its explicit terms, § 11-37-16(a)(entitled "Duty to register") imposes the registration duty only upon those who were convicted of sexual assault after July 1, 1992.Accordingly, he maintains that he is not required to register because he was convicted before that date.

The state countered that defendant is required to register pursuant to the next subsection of the statute, § 11-37-16(b)(entitled "Notice of duty to register — Prisoner or inmate"), because, under that subsection, sexual offenders who are released after July 1, 1992, (as Santos was) must be informed of their duty to register.

After considering the submissions of the parties, the motion justice denied defendant's motion.He based his decision on his understanding of the meaning and scope of § 11-37-16(b).He summarized his thinking as follows:

"Based upon that portion of the statute, which I'm paraphrasing, if a defendant is serving a sentence for first degree sexual assault or one of those charges requiring registration prior to their release, they must be informed they have to register.

"That language, as far as I was concerned — understanding your argument, of course — that language was clear and concise.Based upon that language is the reason why I denied your motion."

The defendant appealed, and the parties appeared before this Court on May 13, 2003, to show cause why the case should not be summarily decided.Because the Court was evenly divided, the appeal was denied and dismissed.The defendant then petitioned for reargument and reconsideration before the full Court pursuant to Article I, Rule 25 of the Supreme CourtRules of Appellate Procedure.We granted the petition, and the full Court has now carefully considered the contentions of the parties and concludes that the appeal should be sustained.

Standard of Review

When faced with questions of statutory interpretation, this Court approaches the matter on a de novo basis.Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v. Bowen Court Associates,763 A.2d 1005, 1007(R.I.2001)("Questions of law and statutory interpretation * * * are reviewed de novo by this Court.");see alsoKeystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson & Wales University,850 A.2d 912, 918(R.I.2004);In re Abby D.,839 A.2d 1222, 1224(R.I.2004);Mottola v. Cirello,789 A.2d 421, 423(R.I.2002).

Analysis

Santos asserts that the trial justice misinterpreted the plain meaning of the language contained in the fairly complex statutory scheme that is set forth in § 11-37-16.He maintains that § 11-37-16(a) specifies the classes of individuals who have a duty to register as sexual offenders and that § 11-37-16(b) merely creates certain ministerial duties by requiring certain specified officers to inform those individuals who have a duty to register of the existence of that duty.

We begin our consideration of the pertinent statutory language with a restatement of some basic principles.

As we have often noted, "[i]t is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings."Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc.,674 A.2d 1223, 1226(R.I.1996);see alsoKeystone Elevator Co.,850 A.2d at 918;Driscoll v. Karroo Land Co.,600 A.2d 722, 724(R.I.1991).⁵It is similarly well established that "when we examine an unambiguous statute, `there is no room for statutory construction and we must apply the statute as written.'"State v. DiCicco,707 A.2d 251, 253(R.I.1998)(quotingIn re Denisewich,643 A.2d 1194, 1197(R.I.1994));see alsoIn re Abby D.,839 A.2d at 1224;Arnold v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training Board of Review,822 A.2d 164, 168(R.I.2003).

The plain statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent.Martone v. Johnston School Committee,824 A.2d 426, 431(R.I.2003)("When interpreting a statute, our ultimate goal is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent.* * * The best evidence of such intent can be found in the plain language used in the statute.Thus, a clear and unambiguous statute will be literally construed.");see alsoCaminetti v. United States,242 U.S. 470, 490, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442(1917)("[T]he language being plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent.");Hathaway v. Hathaway,52 R.I. 39, 40, 156 A. 800, 801(1931)("`It is an elementary proposition that courts only determine, by construction, the scope and intent of a law when the law itself is ambiguous or doubtful.If a law is plain, and within the legislative power, it declares itself, and nothing is left for interpretation.'")(quotingState v. Duggan,15 R.I. 403, 409, 6 A. 787, 788(1886)).

Moreover, in approaching a statute, it is axiomatic that "this Court will not broaden statutory provisions by judicial interpretation unless such interpretation is necessary and appropriate in carrying out the clear intent or defining the terms of the statute."Simeone v. Charron,762 A.2d 442, 448-49(R.I.2000).

These venerable principles of statutory interpretation have guided our approach to this case.

It is undisputed that, by virtue of an explicit savings clause (discussed in footnote 1, supra), § 11-37-16 is applicable to the instant case.The most pertinent portions of § 11-37-16 provide as follows:

"(a)Duty to Register.Any Person who since July 1, 1992, has been, or shall hereafter be, convicted of any offense in violation of this chapter, or convicted in another state of first degree sexual assault which if committed in this state would constitute a violation of this chapter, shall, within sixty (60) days after July 21, 1992, or within thirty (30) days of coming into any city or town in which the person shall reside, register with the chief of police of the city or town.

(b)Notice of duty to register — Prisoner or inmate.Any person who, after July 1, 1992, is discharged or paroled from a jail, prison, or other institution where he or she was confined because of the commission or attempt to commit one of the above mentioned offenses or is released from a state hospital to which he or she was committed as a mentally disordered sex offender shall, prior to discharge, parole, or release, be informed of his or her duty to register under this section by the official in charge of the place of confinement or hospital and the official shall require the person to read and sign such form as may be required by the attorney general stating that the duty of the person to register under this section has been explained to the person.The official in charge of the place of confinement or hospital shall obtain the address where the person expects to reside upon his or her discharge, parole, or release and shall report the address to the attorney general.The official in charge of the place of confinement or hospital shall give one copy of the form to the person, and shall send one copy to the attorney general and one copy to the appropriate law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the place the person expects to reside upon discharge, parole, or release.If the conviction which makes the person subject to this section is a felony conviction, the official in charge shall, not later than forty-five (45) days prior to the scheduled release of the person, send one copy to the appropriate law enforcement agency having local jurisdiction where the person expects to reside upon discharge, parole, or release; one copy to the prosecuting agency which prosecuted the person; and one copy to the attorney general.The official in charge of the place of confinement shall retain one copy.All such forms shall, if the conviction which makes the person subject to this section is a felony conviction, be transmitted within such times as to be received by the local law enforcement agency, and prosecuting agency thirty (30) days prior to the discharge, parole, or release of the person."

It seems clear to us that § 11-37-16(a)defines the universe of those who were, or are, under a...