Dristy v. Waterford School Dist.

Decision Date22 January 1986
Docket NumberDocket No. 76682
Citation379 N.W.2d 428,29 Ed. Law Rep. 774,146 Mich.App. 217
PartiesRoss DRISTY and Diana Dristy, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WATERFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee. 146 Mich.App. 217, 379 N.W.2d 428, 29 Ed. Law Rep. 774
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

[146 MICHAPP 219] Fried & Morse by Marc S. Morse, Southfield, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Puleo & Noeske by William D. Kahn, Troy, for defendant-appellee.

Before MAHER, P.J., and BRONSON and WALSH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This tort action arises from Diana Dristy's slip and fall on the premises of a building owned and operated by defendant Waterford School District. Diana Dristy sued for medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering. Her husband sued for loss of consortium. A jury in the Oakland County Circuit Court found no cause of action. From the denial of plaintiffs' motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, plaintiffs appeal.

On January 16, 1979, Diana Dristy visited Mason Junior High School to attend a luncheon sponsored by her daughter's home economics class. Around 1:30 p.m. she exited from the building, walking on a sidewalk covered with light snow. She walked approximately 10 to 14 feet before slipping and falling. While lying on the ground, she observed ice on the walk. Her leg was broken in several places, requiring surgery.

During the trial, plaintiffs' attorney cross-examined the assistant principal in charge of maintenance as to whether "it would be a good idea, or a [146 MICHAPP 220] reasonable idea, a safe idea" to ask for additional staff during periods of heavy snow. Over plaintiffs' objection as to relevance, defendant's attorney then questioned the assistant principal concerning the operating budget and how it was allocated. On recross-examination, plaintiffs' attorney asked the assistant principal if there had ever been any discussion about using emergency discretionary resources to call in additional maintenance personnel or asking the school district, which controlled the budget, for such help. The assistant principal explained that the school had no permission to hire outside help with its emergency discretionary resources, and that it was occasionally able to have a plow or a tractor from central maintenance to assist it, although not on the day on which plaintiff was injured.

In objecting to this testimony on appeal, plaintiffs first assert that testimony as to budgetary matters was not relevant. Plaintiffs suggest that the defendant's statutory duty existed regardless of finances.

While generally immune from tort suit, school districts remain liable for negligent maintenance of entrance walks to buildings under their control. Tilford v. Wayne County General Hospital, 403 Mich. 293, 300, 269 N.W.2d 153 (1978). A governmental agency is liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from a dangerous or defective condition of a public building if the agency had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect and, for a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge, failed to remedy the condition or to take action reasonably necessary to protect the public against the condition. M.C.L. Sec. 691.1406; M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(106). Evidence of budgetary matters had a bearing on whether the school district acted within a reasonable time and took action reasonably[146 MICHAPP 221] necessary to alleviate the condition. The evidence was, therefore, relevant. MRE 401.

Plaintiffs further argue that, even if relevant, the evidence of budgetary matters was more prejudicial than probative. Plaintiffs contend it was highly prejudicial because it focused on each juror's ultimate responsibility to pay any sums assessed against the district. Nothing in the assistant principal's testimony even alludes to the fact that taxpayers would ultimately bear responsibility for any sums awarded. Plaintiffs suggest that the evidence focused the jury's attention on governmentally immune activities, i.e., allocation of the budget, but, even if this is true, plaintiffs were not prejudiced by this, as the jury specifically found that the condition of the sidewalk was a dangerous condition. Finally, the evidence was first interjected as a result of plaintiffs' questioning. Plaintiffs cannot claim prejudice where the defendant...

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2 cases
  • Horace v. City of Pontiac
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 7 Abril 1998
    ...areas immediately adjacent to a public building, the Court of Appeals statements have conflicted. In Dristy v. Waterford School Dist., 146 Mich.App. 217, 379 N.W.2d 428 (1985), the plaintiff slipped and fell on a snowy sidewalk approximately ten to fourteen feet from the entrance of the bui......
  • Wing v. City of Detroit
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 30 Agosto 1989
    ...Mich. 818 (1979) (school playground adjacent to public school fits within the public building exception); Dristy v. Waterford School Dist., 146 Mich.App. 217, 379 N.W.2d 428 (1985) [178 MICHAPP 631] (school entrance walk included in the public building We reject plaintiffs' claim that the p......

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