Driver v. Independent School Dist. of Sioux City
| Decision Date | 16 November 1937 |
| Docket Number | 44002. |
| Citation | 276 N.W. 37,224 Iowa 393 |
| Parties | DRIVER v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. OF SIOUX CITY. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Woodbury County; F. H. Rice, Judge.
This is an action in equity for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant district to re-employ the plaintiff as a teacher in its public schools, and to save to the plaintiff her alleged rights to share in a pension or annuity retirement fund system, which system was adopted by the defendant district in May, 1927. The opinion states the facts. There was a decree holding that the discretionary power of the board of directors of the defendant district in the re-employment of plaintiff as a teacher could not be interfered with by the court, and dismissing count 1 of plaintiff's petition the court, however, holding that plaintiff had substantially complied with the rules of the annuity system, and giving her a decree entitling her to share in said pension fund. Both parties have appealed.
Reversed on defendant-appellant's appeal.
Affirmed on plaintiff-appellee's appeal.
Shull & Stilwell, of Sioux City, for appellant.
Brackney & Burington, of Sioux City, for appellee.
This is a suit in equity wherein plaintiff asks for a mandatory injunction to compel the defendant to re-employ her as a teacher in its public schools, in order to enable her to complete the requisite number of years of teaching to be eligible to participate in a pension or annuity retirement system.
The petition is in two counts or divisions. In division 1 plaintiff sets forth the fact that she has been continuously teaching for nearly 30 years, 18 years of which were spent in continuous employment as a teacher in the public schools of the Independent School District of Sioux City; that such employment was under annual contracts, the last of which expired in June, 1936; that she is of the age of 55 years and holds a life certificate to teach; that during all the time she had been teaching in the public school system of the defendant no complaint or objection was made as to her ability or qualification; that on or about April 28, 1936 she had a communication from the superintendent of schools of said defendant, advising her that her name would be omitted from the list of teachers submitted for re-election for the following school year, and stating that the superintendent would be glad to discuss the matter with plaintiff at her convenience; that, being qualified to teach, and there having been no complaints made concerning her teaching, by reason of her age and long connection with the public school system of the defendant, it was unjust, unreasonable, and unfair, and an unwarranted action, on the part of the defendant and its superintendent to dismiss plaintiff from its employment; that she has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law; that the action of the board was in bad faith and done maliciously and willfully, and that she will suffer irreparable loss if the board is not compelled to re-employ her; and plaintiff prays that the court enter an order for immediate hearing upon her application to have the contract for her employment renewed or extended, that a mandatory injunction issue upon such notice as the court may fix, requiring the defendant to enter into such reasonable contract with the defendant as the court may dictate, and that she be given such other and further relief as may be just and equitable.
By division 2 of her petition she incorporates the allegations of division 1 and further alleges that her employment since May 16, 1927, has been under a contract providing for annuity retirement benefits, setting forth a copy of such contract and the articles by which the pension system was established and adopted, and alleges that under the terms of said retirement benefit system, when she as a teacher complying with said requirements had completed 30 years of teaching, of which 10 years or more should be in the school system of the defendant, she would be entitled to a pension or annuity retirement of $600 a year, payable $50 a month, as set forth in said contract; that, in pursuance of the rules adopted, a certain percentage of plaintiff's salary, amounting in all to $150.39, had been taken out of her salary and paid into this fund. She then alleges that she is " advised and believes and states upon information the fact to be that when she has paid the balance of $49.61, into said retirement fund hereinbefore mentioned, that she is entitled to all the provisions under said retirement benefit, and, therefore, tenders to the defendant and the court the sum of $49.61, which sum the defendant has stated is the balance due under said fund." She then charges that the defendant district, through its officers and agents, was aware of the fact that the plaintiff was within 6 months of being entitled to the retirement under said annuity benefit provisions and that, in bad faith and in derogation of the rights of the plaintiff, the defendant deliberately, maliciously, and without excuse refused to employ her for a further period of time for the express purpose of avoiding any liability to the plaintiff under said pension or retirement benefits, as incorporated in plaintiff's contract of employment, and that in equity and good faith the defendant should be compelled to keep the plaintiff in its employ so that she will be entitled to retirement benefits upon completing the years of teaching required under said contract, and that the action of the defendant in dismissing the plaintiff or releasing her from its employment was in bad faith and unjust. Plaintiff therefore prays that the court order the defendant to enter into such contract of employment with the plaintiff as may be just and equitable and such as will adequately preserve her rights under said retirement benefit provisions of the contract, and that she be given such order and further relief as may be just and equitable, and that as she is unable to get further and other employment, that the court set the matter of the mandatory injunction for hearing upon such terms as the court may in justice and equity require.
It will thus be observed from the allegations of the petition and the prayer for relief that the thing sought for was reemployment so that the plaintiff could complete her necessary years of service to enable her to receive benefits under the pension system. The trial court held that the question of the continued employment of the plaintiff was a matter wholly and solely within the discretion of the board of education of said district and that the court is without power or authority to direct the manner in which said discretion shall be exercised, and as we view the pleadings and issues presented thereby this should have ended the lawsuit. However, the trial court, in an effort to do what he conceived to be the duty of the board of education to do, went entirely outside of the pleaded issues in the case and held that plaintiff had substantially complied with the requirements under said system and was only prevented from completing full compliance therewith by the acts of the board of education in failing to re-employ her, and that she was therefore entitled to participate in said fund, and entered judgment and decree accordingly. The court said: ...
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