Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong

• Decision Date: 19 September 1932
• Docket Number: 13078.
• Citation: 14 P.2d 1098,91 Colo. 334
• Parties: DRIVERLESS CAR CO. et al. v. ARMSTRONG, Secretary of State.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

14 P.2d 1098

91 Colo. 334

DRIVERLESS CAR CO. et al. v. ARMSTRONG, Secretary of State.

No. 13078.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

September 19, 1932

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Henley A Calvert, Judge.

Suit by the Driverless Car Company and others against Charles M Armstrong, as Secretary of State. To review a judgment dismissing their suit, plaintiffs bring error.

Affirmed.

James R. Hoffman, of Denver, for plaintiffs in error.

Clarence L. Ireland, Atty. Gen., and E. J. Plunkett, Asst. Atty. Gen for defendant in error.

BUTLER J.

The Driverless Car Company and five other corporations engaged in the business of renting driverless cars sought to restrain the secretary of state from enforcing against them subdivision (c) of section 29, subdivision (c) of section 31, and section 103, chapter 122, Session Laws of 1931. To secure a reversal of the judgment dismissing their suit, they prosecute this proceeding, contending that those portions of the Motor Vehicle Act are unconstitutional.

Section 27 of the act requires motor vehicles, with certain exceptions, to be registered and forbids the operation of unregistered motor vehicles upon the highway. Subdivision (c) of section 29 provides that, if the owner rents, or intends to rent, the vehicle without a driver, it shall not be registered unless and until the owner shall agree to carry insurance, or cause insurance to be carried, as provided in section '129' of the act; or unless the owner shall demonstrate his financial ability to respond in damages for injury or death; or unless the owner shall furnish a surety bond in the same amount as that required in case of insurance. The number '129' is a mistake. Possibly the section intended is 103. That section provides, among other things, that the owner of a driverless car shall carry, or cause to be carried, public liability insurance in the amounts specified, insuring the renter against liability arising out of the renter's negligence. Subdivision (c) of section 31 provides that there shall issue for every passenger motor vehicle, rented without a driver, the same type of number plates as that issued for private passenger vehicles.

1. Section 21, art. 5, of the state Constitution, provides: 'No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.' Counsel for the plaintiffs in error contends that, by virtue of that section, the provisions in question are void because not clearly expressed in the title to the act. That title reads: 'An Act relating to motor and other vehicles, providing a penalty for the violation thereof and repealing all acts and parts of acts in conflict therewith.'

If legislation in the body of a statute is germane to the general subject expressed in the title; if it is relevant and appropriate to such subject, or is a necessary incident to the object of the act, as expressed in the title, it does not violate this provision of the Constitution. One test is 'whether the legislation in the body of a bill is upon matters properly connected with its subject, as expressed in its title, or proper to the more full accomplishment of the object so indicated.' In the title, particularity is neither necessary nor desirable; generality is commendable. In Edwards v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 13 Colo. 59, 65, 21 P. 1011, 1013, we said: 'The purpose of this constitutional provision is to prevent surprise and deception through legislation pertaining to one subject, under a title relating to another. But it would be unreasonable as well as dangerous to require that each and every specific branch or subdivision of the general subject of an act be enumerated by its title. In reciting the several subordinate matters referred to, the hazard of violating that part of the provision which prohibits the treatment of more than one subject in the act is incurred; and, as a rule, it is wiser and safer not to attempt such enumeration, but to select an appropriate general title, broad enough to include all the subordinate matters considered.'

The title to the act is sufficiently broad to cover the provisions challenged in this suit.

2. Counsel for the plaintiffs in error contends that the provisions in question offend against section 25, article 5, of the state Constitution, forbidding the passage of a special law where a general law can be made applicable. The point is not well taken. The law is general, and is uniform in its operation upon all in like situation, and therefore is not special within the meaning of that section of the Constitution. Rifle Potato Growers' Co-operative Association v. Smith, 78 Colo. 171, 240 P. 937; People v. Earl, 42 Colo. 238, 94 P. 294; Allen v. Bailey (Colo.) 14 P.2d 1087 (just decided).

3. It is urged that the provisions in question offend against the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States forbidding a state to make or enforce any law denying any person the equal protection of the laws. The argument in support of this objection challenges the classification adopted by the Legislature. But, to constitute class legislation within the constitutional prohibition, the classification must be unreasonable. The question of classification is primarily for the Legislature. Courts will not interfere with the legislative...