Dromiack v. Warden, Nevada State Prison
| Decision Date | 08 July 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 13023,13023 |
| Citation | 630 P.2d 751,97 Nev. 348 |
| Parties | Michael Aleck DROMIACK, Appellant, v. WARDEN, NEVADA STATE PRISON, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Once again this court is faced with an appeal from an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Michael Dromiack. At least seven other such appeals have preceded this one.
In this particular proceeding, Dromiack, an inmate in the state prison, petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus contending he was being denied statutory good time credits. The district judge ruled that Dromiack was barred from asserting such grounds for relief because he offered no reasonable explanation for his failure to include the grounds for relief in one of his numerous prior habeas petitions. This appeal followed.
We have held that a court need not consider successive petitions for statutory post-conviction relief under NRS 177.315 et seq., Rogers v. Warden, 86 Nev. 359, 468 P.2d 993 (1970), or pretrial habeas corpus, Craig v. Sheriff, 92 Nev. 741, 557 P.2d 710 (1976), which contain grounds for relief which could have been raised in a prior petition. Here, Dromiack argues that this rule does not apply to post-conviction petitions for habeas corpus and that to apply such a rule would violate the anti-suspension clause of the Nevada Constitution. Art. 1, § 5. 1 We disagree.
The rule announced in Rogers and Craig also applies to post-conviction petitions for habeas corpus. Cf. Junior v. Warden, 91 Nev. 111, 532 P.2d 1037 (1975) (). As we stated in Rogers, supra, 86 Nev. at 362, 468 P.2d at 994:
Many petitions for habeas corpus or other post-conviction relief are repetitious; others often are specious. This places an unnecessary burden upon the courts. It is highly desirable that a petitioner be required to assert all of his claims in one petition. His failure to assert them constitutes a waiver. The way is left open, however, for a subsequent petition if the court finds grounds for relief that could not reasonably have been raised in the original petition.
The prohibition against the filing of successive petitions does not violate the anti-suspension clause of the Nevada Constitution. The rule is a reasonable...
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Bargas v. Burns
...default in failing to raise in his previous appeal the claim and issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Dromiack v. Warden, 97 Nev. 348, 630 P.2d 751 (1981). 2. Petitioner has failed to show cause and prejudice for the procedural default. Dromiack v. Warden, 97 Nev. 348, 630 P.2d 751 P......
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Koerner v. Grigas
...have been raised in previous collateral proceedings but were not. See Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.810 (West 1993); see also Dromiack v. Warden, 97 Nev. 348, 349-50, 630 P.2d 751 (1981) (holding that the failure to assert claims in one petition is a waiver absent a showing that the claims could not rea......
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Washington v. State
...case has become final, and that appellant cannot relitigate those claims by filing successive petitions. See, e.g., Dromiack v. Warden, 97 Nev. 348, 630 P.2d 751 (1981). Thus, this court will not necessarily, as appellant asserts, be obligated ultimately to examine the propriety of the deni......
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White v. Demosthenes, No. 92-16640
...district court did not err in denying summarily appellant's present claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Dromiack v. Warden, 97 Nev, 348, 630 P.2d 751 (1981) (district court need not consider successive post-conviction petitions that contain grounds for relief that could have bee......