Rogers v. Warden, Nev. State Prison
Decision Date | 11 May 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 6024,6024 |
Citation | 468 P.2d 993,86 Nev. 359 |
Parties | Walter L. ROGERS, Appellant, v. WARDEN, NEVADA STATE PRISON, Respondent. |
Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
In this appeal we are asked to rule on the effective application of NRS 177.375 of our Post-Conviction Procedure Act to repetitive petitions filed thereunder. NRS 177.375 provides:
(Emphasis added.)
Appellant Walter L. Rogers was charged with murder. He was tried to a jury convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. We sustained his conviction on a direct appeal, in Rogers v. State, 83 Nev. 376, 432 P.2d 331 (1967).
In 1968 Rogers filed his first post-conviction application under our Post-Conviction Procedure Act (NRS 177.315--177.385). In that application Rogers claimed that his conviction was void because the jury that tried him had not been selected in accord with the mandates prescribed in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The State answered that the ruling in Witherspoon was applicable only in those cases where the jury had returned the death penalty. The district judge agreed, and the application was dismissed. Rogers filed a notice of appeal from the court's order of dismissal, but he never perfected the appeal.
In 1969 Rogers filed his second post-conviction application, asserting this time that his conviction was void on the ground that the physical evidence offered by the State and received during his trial was illegally obtained. 1 The district judge denied Roger's second post-conviction application on the ground that he had failed to raise the issue in his first post-conviction application and, under the provisions of NRS 177.375, supra, was barred from doing so in successive petitions. We agree, and we affirm the order of the district court dismissing the second post-conviction application.
It is clear from the language of NRS 177.375, supra, that successive post-conviction applications are not prohibited in every case, but only in those cases where the petitioner 'knowingly and understandingly' waived the ground for which he now seeks relief, or had no 'reasonable cause' for omitting the ground in his 'original, supplemental, or amended petition.' NRS 177.375 was drawn from the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act's 'Waiver of claims' section. § 8, 9B, U.L.A. (1966). The Note, thereunder, of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws explains with clarity the reason for the rule:
Criminal appeals must be given finality. It the absence of a subsequent court decision of constitutional dimension that bears on a defendant's right to a fair trial, the court need not entertain petitioner's successive applications for relief unless petitioner's failure to assert the grounds for relief in his original application may be excused under the provisions of NRS 177.375. The question is not how many writs the applicant may file, but whether or not he can compel the court to entertain them. We hold that, even though a petitioner may file successive writ applications under the Act, the court is not required to entertain such petitions unless the petitioner satisfactorily explains in his later application for relief why he failed to assert the grounds that he had available to him in his 'original, supplemental or amended petition.' Other jurisdictions have so held.
In Tiller v. Warden, 1 Md.App. 286, 229 A.2d 600, 603, 604 (1967), it was held that a petitioner was barred from filing successive post-conviction applications unless he showed 'special circumstances' for his omission on prior applications. Relying upon a provision substantially similar to our own NRS 177.375, the court held:
'* * * (A)pplicant asserts no facts other than the mere conclusory statement that he was not present at all stages of his trial. Not having alleged any 'special circumstances' in his second petition to excuse his failure to have raised the issue either on direct appeal or in his first petition under the Act he will not be afforded an opportunity to do so for the first time at a hearing on his second petition.'
In People v. Burks, 82 Ill.App.2d 85, 227 N.E.2d 84 (1967), the Illinois appellate court summarily affirmed the dismissal of a second...
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