Drouet v. Superior Court
| Decision Date | 07 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. A092016.,A092016. |
| Citation | 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 159,86 Cal.App.4th 1237 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Joel DROUET, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the City and County of San Francisco, Respondent; Jim Broustis et al., Real Parties in Interest. |
Andrew M. Zacks, San Francisco, James B. Kraus, San Diego, Law Offices of Andrew M. Zacks, San Francisco (Attorneys for Petitioner—Joel Drouet).
William M. Simpich, Oakland, Marc S. Janowitz, San Francisco (Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest—Jim Broustis & Ivy McClelland).
The Ellis Act (Gov.Code, § 7060 et seq.) provides a statutory procedure allowing a landlord to remove rental units from the market and leave the landlord business— and, if necessary, evict tenants. Civil Code section 1942.5 provides for an affirmative defense to eviction, as well as an independent action for damages, when the eviction is in retaliation for the exercise of a tenant's rights. This case raises the issue whether a tenant facing eviction under the Ellis Act may raise an affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction under Civil Code section 1942.5, when the landlord has complied with the procedural requirements of the Ellis Act to remove rental units from the market. We conclude that the Legislature did not intend that the Ellis Act allow a tenant to prevent a landlord from removing property from the rental market by resisting eviction through an affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction. But the tenant retains the right to an independent action for damages provided by the retaliatory eviction statute.
Petitioner Joel Drouet owns rental property in San Francisco. He withdrew his rental property from the rental market under the Ellis Act, and filed an unlawful detainer action to evict his tenants, real parties in interest Jim Broustis and Ivy McClelland, when they would not move out. Real parties raised the affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction. Petitioner moved for summary adjudication of that affirmative defense in his favor, on the ground that the defense was not legally available in Ellis Act proceedings. The trial court denied petitioner's motion. Petitioner sought writ review in the Appellate Division of the San Francisco Superior Court. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court and issued the writ to compel the trial court to grant the motion on the ground that the defense was unavailable.
We transferred this case from the Appellate Division pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 62, in order to settle an important question of law. We agree with the Appellate Division and grant the petition for writ of mandate.
The material facts are essentially undisputed. Petitioner owns a two-unit apartment building at 378-380 San Carlos Street in San Francisco. Real parties rented the unit at 378 San Carlos, a two-bedroom apartment, on a month-to-month basis. Real party Broustis lived in the unit for 12 years. By the time of the proceedings below, real party McClelland had lived with Broustis for approximately one year.
Apparently, the landlord-tenant relationship was strained. The Appellate Division noted that petitioner and real party Broustis "have had conflicts for many years," and that the conditions of the apartment purportedly required real party Broustis to make several repairs and deduct them from his rent. In their opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and in answers to interrogatories, real parties claimed that in April 1999 they informed petitioner that they believed they had been overcharged $411 for garbage bills since 1991, and were going to deduct this amount from their August 1999 rent. Real parties also orally complained about needed repairs to the shower, stairs, and sewage line. Petitioner did not dispute these factual allegations in his reply to the opposition.1
On August 5, 1999, petitioner commenced Ellis Act proceedings on the San Carlos rental units by filing a "Notice of Intent to Withdraw Residential Rental Units from the Rental Market" and a "Memorandum of Notice Regarding Withdrawal of Rental Unit from Rent or Lease" with the San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board (Board).2
On that same day, and pursuant to Civil Code section 1946, petitioner served on real parties a written Termination Notice to quit the premises and deliver up possession by October 4, 1999. The Notice of Intent and Memorandum of Notice were attached to the Termination Notice. Petitioner then filed a second Notice of Intent and Memorandum of Notice with the Board, indicating that he had taken the appropriate steps to terminate all tenancies in the property by giving proper notice to his tenants of the termination of their tenancies. On September 7, 1999, petitioner recorded a copy of the Memorandum of Notice with the Board, and recorded another copy with the Recorder's Office of the City and County of San Francisco.
It is undisputed that petitioner complied with all procedural requirements of the Ellis Act. Nevertheless, real parties did not quit the premises by October 4, 1999.
On October 6, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the San Francisco Superior Court, sitting as a court of limited civil jurisdiction. The complaint alleged that petitioner had complied with the Ellis Act to remove the units from the rental market but that real parties remained in possession despite being served with notice to quit. Real parties answered the complaint and alleged four affirmative defenses, including retaliatory eviction. Petitioner moved for summary adjudication on each of the four affirmative defenses. The superior court granted the motion in part but denied it with regard to retaliatory eviction.
Petitioner then sought a writ of mandate in the Appellate Division of the San Francisco Superior Court, to compel the trial court to set aside the denial of summary adjudication on the ground that the defense of retaliatory eviction is legally unavailable in Ellis Act unlawful detainer proceedings. After briefing and oral argument, the Appellate Division held that the defense of retaliatory eviction was not available and issued the writ of mandate to compel the trial court to reverse its denial of petitioner's motion for summary adjudication. We granted transfer.
In a writ proceeding challenging a denial of summary adjudication, we review the trial court's ruling de novo. (Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 60, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 366, 939 P.2d 766; Dyer v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 61, 65, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 85.) In the present case there are no disputed issues of fact material to the legal issue of whether the affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction is available in an unlawful detainer proceeding filed under the Ellis Act. Thus, our task is to decide that legal issue on the undisputed facts and determine whether petitioner is entitled to summary adjudication as a matter of law. (56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 65-66, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 85.)
We begin at the headwaters of any Ellis Act discussion: Nash v. City of Santa Monica (1984) 37 Cal.3d 97, 207 Cal.Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (Nash). Nash addressed the validity of a provision of the Santa Monica City Charter which severely restricted the removal of rental units from the housing market. (Id. at p. 99, 207 Cal.Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894.) The charter provision was enacted in response to a severe shortage of rental housing caused by the so-called "Demolition Derby," a 15-month period in which Santa Monica landlords demolished over 1300 rental units and converted hundreds of others to condominiums. (Id. at p. 100, 207 Cal.Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894.)
To alleviate the rental housing shortage, the charter provision required a permit from the Santa Monica Rent Control Board before any landlord could demolish or convert rental units. Such a permit was granted only if the Rent Control Board found that (1) the units were not occupied by, or could not be afforded by, persons of low or moderate income; (2) removal of the rental units from the market would not adversely affect the housing supply; and (3) the landlord could not make a reasonable return on his investment. (Nash, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 101, 207 Cal.Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894.)
Nash, a Santa Monica landlord, decided to leave the business of rental housing and tear down his buildings. Nash was not eligible for a demolition permit because his tenants were of low or moderate income, and the demolition of the building would, as Nash conceded, adversely affect the housing supply. (Nash, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 101-102, 207 Cal.Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894.) Nash sought a writ of mandate in the Los Angeles Superior Court, which ruled in his favor. (Id. at p. 102, 207 Cal.Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894.)
On the City's appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The court rejected Nash's argument that he had a right to go out of the apartment rental business, but the City of Santa Monica was forcing him to remain in that business against his will. (Nash, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 102-103, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894.) The Supreme Court reasoned that Nash was free to relinquish personal involvement with the rental property by hiring a property manager; withholding units from the rental market as they became vacant; or selling the property to someone willing to continue in the rental housing business. (Id. at p. 103, 207 Cal.Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894.) The court further held that the restrictions imposed on Nash by the charter provision were "indirect and minimal," and constituted a permissible form of regulation of property ownership to satisfy Santa Monica's "legitimate goal of maintaining adequate rental housing." (Id. at pp. 104-105, 109, 207 Cal.Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894.)
In response to the Nash decision, the Legislature enacted the Ellis Act in 1985 (the Act). (Stats.1985, ch. 1509, § 1.) "The Legislature, under the apparent...
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