Drown v. Boone (In re Estate of Langeland)

• Decision Date: 28 October 2013
• Docket Number: Nos. 67255–0–I, 67659–8–I.,s. 67255–0–I, 67659–8–I.
• Citation: 177 Wash.App. 315,312 P.3d 657
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Randall J. LANGELAND. Sharon Drown, Appellant, v. Janell Boone, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

177 Wash.App. 315

312 P.3d 657

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Randall J. LANGELAND.Sharon Drown, Appellant,

v.Janell Boone, Respondent.

Nos. 67255–0–I, 67659–8–I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

Oct. 28, 2013.

Douglas Ross Shepherd, Bethany C. Allen, Shepherd and Abbott, Bellingham, WA, for Appellant.

Michael L. Olver, Kameron Lee Kirkevold, Christopher C. Lee, Helsell Fetterman LLP, Seattle, WA, Douglas Kevin Robertson, Belcher Swanson Law Firm PLLC, Bellingham, WA, for Respondent.

LEACH, C.J.

¶ 1 This case involves competing claims to the estate of Randall J. Langeland asserted by his daughter, Janell Boone, and the woman with whom he lived from 1991 until his death in 2009, Sharon Drown. Drown appeals several pretrial orders, a posttrial order memorializing an evidentiary ruling made during trial, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered after trial on her petition for accounting, determination of ownership, fair and equitable division of assets, and other relief. She alleges that the court erroneously classified assets acquired during her committed intimate relationship with Langeland as his separate property and inequitably divided those assets. She also challenges the court's determination that the dead man's statute ¹ prevented her from testifying to conversations with Langeland about the character of certain property and its decision that the statute governing intestate succession did not apply by analogy. Finally, Drown asserts that the trial court should not have awarded attorney fees to Boone because this case involves novel issues of law.

¶ 2 In a cross appeal, Boone contests the trial court's rejection of her challenge to Langeland's designation of Drown as the beneficiary of his Fidelity IRA (individual retirement account) and its denial of her request for attorney fees on this claim.

¶ 3 We affirm the trial court's decisions about the laws for intestate succession and the IRA beneficiary designations but do not reach the dead man's statute challenge. From our examination of the history and nature of the conflicting presumptions invoked by the parties before the trial court, viewed in the context of this case, we conclude that the presumption that property acquired during a committed intimate relationship is jointly owned should prevail over a presumption of correctness for an estate inventory. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's division of probate assets and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. To allow the trial court full discretion to make an equitable award following a correct characterization, we also vacate the fee award to Boone.

FACTS

¶ 4 Randall Langeland and Sharon Drown met and began dating in 1983. In 1991, they began living together. Boone has stipulated that they lived in a committed intimate relationship. Beginning in 1999 and throughout the rest of his life, Langeland suffered from numerous undiagnosable and untreatable ailments. In 2009, he died from complications relating to an autoimmune disorder of unknown etiology. Langeland did not have a will.

¶ 5 Throughout Langeland's many illnesses, Drown served as his primary caregiver. She traveled with him and assisted him with his business affairs; she cared for his personal hygiene needs and administered his medications; she attended all his medical appointments and was very involved with his treatment.

¶ 6 The probate assets itemized in the personal representative's inventory as Langeland's property, and now disputed on appeal, include the proceeds from a software company Langeland founded in 1994, a house that he purchased with Drown in 1999, and a 36–foot sailboat purchased in 1998. The court, relying on the presumption of correctness for this inventory, required Drown to prove her ownership interest. It rejected Drown's claim that the court should presume joint ownership of assets acquired while she and Langeland cohabited and applied the dead man's statute to limit Drown's testimony.

¶ 7 When Drown failed to meet the burden of proving that she owned any interest in the contested assets, the court awarded nearly all of the assets to Langeland's only heir, Boone. It found that Drown proved her rights to the Fidelity IRA, on which she was named as beneficiary, and 24.7 percent ownership of the couple's Belling ham home, based upon a promissory note executed by Drown and Langeland. Characterizing Drown's claims as baseless, the court awarded attorney fees to the estate for defending against Drown's claims. It denied Boone's request for fees relating to the IRA award. Drown appeals the award of property and fees to Boone; Boone cross appeals the award of the IRA to Drown and the court's denial of fees related to that claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 Resolution of conflicting presumptions presents a question of law, which we review de novo. When reviewing challenged findings of fact and conclusions of law, we determine if substantial evidence supports the findings and if the findings of fact, in turn, support the conclusions of law.² Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational person that the finding is true.³ Unchallenged findings of fact become verities on appeal.⁴

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 We first address resolution of the conflicting presumptions invoked by the parties before the trial court. Drown contends that all property acquired while she and Langeland lived together is presumed to be owned by both of them because Boone stipulated that Drown and Langeland lived in a committed intimate relationship. She further contends that Boone has the burden of proving otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. Boone contends that the personal representative's inventory is presumed to be correct and that Drown has the burden of proving the contrary. Pretrial, the trial court adopted Boone's position. We disagree.

¶ 10 When parties invoke conflicting presumptions, two viewpoints exist about how to resolve the conflict.⁵ Under the first approach conflicting presumptions cancel each other, while the second requires that the court determine which presumption should prevail, based upon a variety of factors, which may include public policy, logic, and an assessment of probabilities.⁶ Logically, jurisdictions that adhere to the Thayer “bursting bubble” theory of presumptions ⁷ should follow the first approach, while jurisdictions giving different weight to different presumptions ⁸ should follow the second one.⁹

¶ 11 Washington cases provide little guidance about how to resolve conflicting presumptions. This lack of clarity exists, at least in part, because Washington cases apply the Thayer theory to some, but not all, presumptions and provide no general rule about when it applies.¹⁰ Other cases identify presumptions that shift the burden of proof.¹¹ To further complicate the problem, the quantum of evidence required to overcome a burden-shifting presumption varies, and Washington cases do not provide any general guidelines or standards.¹² As a result, “the subject of presumptions is one of impossible difficulty for lawyers, and trial judges as well.” ¹³

¶ 12 A leading commentator on Washington evidence law suggests that Parker v. Parker,¹⁴ provides “some indication that if a choice is necessary[,] the ‘stronger’ presumption should be applied” ¹⁵ and that conflicting presumptions of equal weight cancel each other.¹⁶ We do not find this indication in the Parker opinion.

¶ 13 In Parker, the assignee of two promissory notes sued the deceased maker's estate for payment.¹⁷ The executrix presented evidence of the decedent's delivery of cash and bonds in the same amount as the notes to the original note holder. She relied upon the presumption that money transferred from one person to another is presumed to be in payment of the obligation between them.¹⁸ The noteholder and assignee presented evidence that these payments were gifts and sought to offset this presumption with another-that since the notes remained in their possession, they were presumed to be unpaid.¹⁹ The court did not resolve the conflict between these two presumptions.

¶ 14 Instead, it decided the case using a third presumption not asserted by any party. The court noted that the decedent had been married a number of years and had acquired the cash and bonds after his marriage, raising the presumption that they were community property.²⁰ After observing that “[t]his presumption is not overcome in any way by any proof on behalf of the appellant,” the court noted that the decedent lacked the required consent of his wife to make a gift of community property and held that any alleged gift of the cash and bonds was void.²¹ The court's opinion does not purport to provide any rule for resolving conflicting presumptions or identify any of the three described presumptions as being stronger than the others.

¶ 15 A number of states require that the trial court assess the comparative weight of conflicting presumptions and apply the stronger one. ²² Some states have adopted this approach through judicial decision, ²³ and many others have done so through evidence rule.²⁴ A number of the evidence rules adopt the approach of Rule 301(b) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence:

(b) Inconsistent Presumptions. If presumptions are inconsistent, the presumption applies that is founded upon weightier considerations of policy. If considerations of policy are of equal weight neither presumption applies.

The Federal Rule of Evidence 301 addresses presumptions but does not include any provision for resolving inconsistent presumptions:

In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these rules provide otherwise, the party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it originally.

Washington has not adopted an evidence rule addressing presumptions.

¶ 16 Washington c...