Drury v. State

• Decision Date: 08 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 23,23
• Citation: 793 A.2d 567,368 Md. 331
• Parties: Dwayne Anthony DRURY, v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

793 A.2d 567

368 Md. 331

Dwayne Anthony DRURY, v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 23, Sept. Term, 2001.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 8, 2002.

Stacy W. McCormack, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, and Mark Colvin, Asst. Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Gary E. Bair, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.

RAKER, Judge.

After Dwayne Anthony Drury, petitioner, was taken into police custody, but before he was advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), a police officer showed him physical evidence and told him that the evidence would be processed for fingerprints. The question we must decide in this case is whether, under the circumstances presented herein, the statements that petitioner made prior to being advised of his Miranda rights must be suppressed because the officer conducted the functional equivalent of interrogation. We shall answer that question in the affirmative and hold that the statements should have been suppressed.

I.

Petitioner was indicted by the Grand Jury for Queen Anne's County for the offenses of second degree burglary, fourth degree burglary, and theft over the value of $300.00. Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress the statements that he made to the police on the grounds that Corporal Mark Whaley of the Centreville Police Department in Queen Anne's County had interrogated him without informing him of his Miranda rights. Petitioner argued that the police officer's conduct was tantamount to interrogation under Miranda in that the officer should have known that placing evidence in front of petitioner, and telling him that it would be fingerprinted, was likely to elicit an incriminating response.

The Circuit Court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. The only witness to testify was Corporal Whaley. We recite the facts from the record of the suppression hearing.

On July, 14, 1996, Corporal Whaley went to the Hillside Market in response to a report of a break-in and theft at the market. The owner of the market told Corporal Whaley that he had found a tire iron behind the counter near the cash register. The officer looked around and saw that the rear door of the building had been pried open; it appeared to him that the tire iron had possibly been used to gain entry. Further investigation revealed that some property was missing, including several adult magazines, several cartons of cigarettes, bottles of liquor, and numerous Maryland Instant Scratch-Off Lottery tickets.

Later that evening, a deputy sheriff told Corporal Whaley that he had seen two men acting suspiciously near an alleyway close to the market. Corporal Whaley went to that location, looked through the trash, and found several adult magazines and a liquor bottle. The officer interviewed Karl Kirby, a suspect in the case, who led him to petitioner. Corporal Whaley went to petitioner's home, brought him to the police station, and sat him down "within the department" for questioning. Before advising petitioner of his rights pursuant to Miranda, Corporal Whaley placed the tire iron and the trash bag containing the magazines on a desk in front of petitioner. Petitioner made some statements about the tire iron and the magazines. Corporal Whaley then advised petitioner of his Miranda rights, and petitioner made no further statements.

On direct examination, Corporal Whaley testified as follows:

Q: After you talked with Mr. Kirby, did you go visit Mr. Drury?

A: Yes. I picked Mr. Drury up for questioning, at which time I proceeded to show Mr. Drury the evidence which was retrieved. In showing Mr. Drury the tire iron that was retrieved from the actual incident area, Mr. Drury said, well, my fingerprints could be on that and are on hundreds of tire irons around Centreville, okay, and picking up the trash bag in which the magazines were located in, Mr. Drury proceeded to tell me the contents of the bag prior to me even stating what was in the bag myself.

Q: What did he tell you?

A: He said that he had touched the magazines that were in that bag.

On cross-examination, the officer testified as follows:

Q: So you took the evidence out and put it in front of Mr. Drury?

A: I put it up on the desk in front of myself.

* * * *

Q: And did you tell Mr. Drury that you were going to send this evidence off for fingerprints?

A: As I recall, yes sir.

Q: You told him all that before you Mirandized him?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And that's when you claim that he made some statement about his fingerprints possibly being on these physical items?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And then once he was Mirandized, he didn't want to talk to you?

A: No sir

Petitioner argued that his statements were inadmissible because they were made in custody, in response to interrogation, and prior to his being advised of his Miranda rights. Concluding that the officer's conduct and statements would not prompt an answer from petitioner, the Circuit Court denied petitioner's motion to suppress. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of all counts.¹ He noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and, in an unreported opinion, that court affirmed the judgment. We granted petitioner's writ of certiorari. Drury v. State, 364 Md. 139, 771 A.2d 1069 (2001).

II.

Petitioner argues before this Court that confronting a suspect in custody with physical evidence of a crime and telling him that the evidence will be processed for fingerprints is the functional equivalent of interrogation and that, in the absence of a valid Miranda waiver, any subsequent statements must be suppressed. The State concedes that petitioner was in custody.² The State argues that under the circumstances presented in this case, the officer's conduct was not the functional equivalent of interrogation and that Miranda warnings were therefore unnecessary.

III.

It is a basic principle that a statement taken during custodial interrogation conducted before a defendant is informed of his or her Miranda rights may not be used by the State in its case in chief against the defendant. The test to be applied in determining whether the police officer's statements and exhibition of the physical evidence was tantamount to interrogation is whether the words and actions of the officer were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses from petitioner. See Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 760, 679 A.2d 1106, 1124-25 (1996).

In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), the Supreme Court considered whether Innis, the defendant, was subject to "interrogation," as the term was used in Miranda. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 298, 100 S.Ct. at 1688, 64 L.Ed.2d 297. The Court concluded that the meaning of "interrogation" is not limited to express questioning; it also includes its "functional equivalent." See id. at 300, 100 S.Ct. at 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297. The Court stated:

"[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term `interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of the police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."

Id. at 300, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297. While the Innis inquiry focuses primarily upon the perception of the suspect rather than the intent of the police, the Court noted that the intent of the police is not irrelevant "for it may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response." Id. at 302 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. at 1690 n. 7, 64 L.Ed.2d 297.

IV.

We turn now to the question of whether it can be fairly concluded that petitioner was subjected to the functional equivalent of interrogation. We find that the officer's conduct and words were the functional equivalent of interrogation within the meaning of Innis.

It is undisputed that, although petitioner was in custody, he was not subjected to express interrogation. The officer did not ask petitioner questions, but rather made a statement to him and displayed the tire iron and magazines.

Petitioner had been brought to the police station for the express purpose of questioning and, in fact, had been told so by Corporal Whaley. The police were not engaged in routine booking procedures; they were not required by any Maryland rule or procedure to read any document (other than the Miranda rights) to petitioner. Nonetheless, the officer placed the tire iron and the trash bag containing the stolen magazines on the table before petitioner before advising him of his Miranda rights. The officer told petitioner that he was going to send the evidence to be examined for fingerprints. Moreover, the officer testified that he "was presenting the evidence that was going to be used for...