Dry v. CFR Court of Indian Offenses for Choctaw Nation, 98-7027
Decision Date | 22 February 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-7027,98-7027 |
Citation | 168 F.3d 1207 |
Parties | 1999 CJ C.A.R. 1852 Douglas DRY; Rosie Burlison; Juanita McConnell, Petitioners-Appellants, v. CFR COURT OF INDIAN OFFENSES FOR THE CHOCTAW NATION; James Wolfe, Magistrate, Respondents-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Scott Kayla Morrison, Dry & Morrison Law Firm, Wilburton, Oklahoma, for Petitioners-Appellants.
Robert L. Rabon, Rabon, Wolf & Rabon, Hugo, Oklahoma, for Respondents-Appellees.
Before BRORBY, McWILLIAMS and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Appellants, Douglas Dry, Rosie Burlison and Juanita McConnell, are Choctaw Indians charged with various violations of the Choctaw Criminal Code. After arraignment, the Court of Indian Offenses for the Choctaw Nation released Appellants on their own recognizance pending trial. Appellants then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, challenging the jurisdiction of the Court of Indian Offenses. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding Appellants were not "in custody" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and Appellants appealed. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253 and reverse. We review the district court's dismissal of Appellants' habeas petition de novo. Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir.1996).
Federal courts have jurisdiction to grant writs of habeas corpus to persons "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 1 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added). A petitioner must satisfy the "in custody" requirement as a prerequisite to habeas corpus jurisdiction. Carter v. United States, 733 F.2d 735, 736 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1161, 105 S.Ct. 915, 83 L.Ed.2d 928 (1985). A petitioner need not show actual, physical custody to obtain relief. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989). A petitioner is in custody for purposes of the statute if he or she is subject to "severe restraints on [his or her] individual liberty." Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351, 93 S.Ct. 1571, 36 L.Ed.2d 294 (1973). A restraint is severe when it is "not shared by the public generally." Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963).
In this case, tribal authorities charged, arraigned, and released Appellants on their own recognizance pending trial. 2 Although Appellants are ostensibly free to come and go as they please, they remain obligated to appear for trial at the court's discretion. This is sufficient to meet the "in custody" requirement of the habeas statute. See Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 300-01, 104 S.Ct. 1805, 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) ( ); Kolski v. Watkins, 544 F.2d 762, 763-64 and n. 2 (5th Cir.1977) ( ); United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292, 293-94 (2d Cir.1976) ( ); Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir.1976) (, )rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978).
Accordingly, we REVERSE the trial court's dismissal and REMAND for further proceedings. On remand, the district court should consider, in the first instance, whether Petitioners have sufficiently exhausted their tribal remedies. See Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 353-54 (10th Cir.1993) ( ); Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 826 (9th Cir.1995) ( ).
1 Petitioners also rely on the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301, et seq., as a basis for habeas corpus jurisdiction. The Indian Civil Rights Act makes habeas corpus "available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (emphasis added). We read the "detention" language as being analogous to the "in custody" requirement contained in 28...
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