Duane v. Lane

• Decision Date: 01 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 88-1350,88-1350
• Citation: 959 F.2d 673
• Parties: Daniel F. DUANE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael P. LANE, James Thieret, Warden, James Buch and Daniel Cowen, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 673

959 F.2d 673

Daniel F. DUANE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael P. LANE, James Thieret, Warden, James Buch and Daniel Cowen, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 88-1350.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 24, 1991.

Decided April 1, 1992.

Howard B. Eisenberg (argued), Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiff-appellant.

William H. London, Asst. Atty. Gen., John A. Morrissey (argued), Office of the Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before POSNER and KANNE, Circuit Judges, and ENGEL, Senior Circuit Judge. ^*

ENGEL, Senior Circuit Judge.

Daniel Duane, a prisoner at Menard Correctional Center in Illinois, sued four officials of the Illinois Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that their "deliberate indifference" to his safety amounted to "cruel and unusual punishment." Finding no genuine issues of material fact, the district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On March 25, 1986, Daniel Duane watched an unidentified arm reach into his cell in the segregated maximum security unit at Menard Correctional Center in Illinois. In its hand it held a cup full of a steaming liquid. The arm then flung the liquid at Duane, who suffered third degree burns of his arm and first degree burns of his stomach. Despite reporting his injuries immediately, Duane waited an hour before seeing a medical technician and three hours before visiting the prison hospital.

Although prison officials forbade its use in the segregation unit, Duane hypothesized that the unknown assailant heated the liquid with a "stinger," which is an electrical device used to heat liquids and which is sold at the prison canteen. He also believed that the assailant was among the inmates from the general prison population who were assigned to work details in the segregation unit. While Duane's hypotheses appear quite plausible, our holding by no means assumes their correctness.

Duane sued the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, Michael Lane, as well as three department officials who worked at Menard Correctional Center, James Thieret, James Buch, and Daniel Cowen, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ¹ Duane alleges that these officials violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, which is applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The district court, finding that Duane failed to demonstrate that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk of Duane's injury, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. There was evidence, the court explained, that Menard officials forbade the use or possession of stingers in the segregated maximum security unit, and that they took measures to prevent the introduction of all varieties of contraband into the unit. Moreover, the court added, Duane presented no evidence that might prove personal involvement on the part of the defendants.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is appropriate only where two conditions are satisfied: There must be no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We review a district court's determination that there are no issues of material fact drawing all inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Jamison-Bey v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 1046, 1047 (7th Cir.1989). Where that party bears the burden of proof on an issue, however, it must make specific factual allegations establishing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. We review de novo a district court's determination that a party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Entertainment Group, Inc., 945 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir.1991).

Whether prison officials are "deliberately indifferent" to a prisoner's safety is a material fact for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes liability on state actors who deprive a person of a right secured by the Constitution. Here, Duane seeks recovery from the defendant prison officials on the grounds that their "deliberate indifference" to his safety constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Duane does not allege that any defendant is the unknown person who threw scalding water on him. Rather, he argues that these prison officials failed to protect him from harm inflicted by his fellow inmates. Specifically, Duane maintains that each defendant was aware of the high incidence of violence, including scaldings, against Menard's segregated prisoners at the hands of inmate workers from the general population. Defendant Cowan, he explained, as the prison official directly responsible for supervising inmates who worked in the segregation unit, was well aware that his charges frequently attacked inmates housed in the segregation unit. Similarly, as Warden and Assistant Warden in charge of security in the segregation unit, respectively, defendants Thieret and Buch, Duane argues, routinely reviewed log books and other documents chronicling the frequent attacks on segregated prisoners. Likewise, as Director of Illinois's Department of Corrections, Duane adds, Lane was aware of the violence that occurred in the segregation unit at Menard. Despite their awareness of these risks to prisoner safety, Duane argues, these officials displayed their "deliberate indifference" as they failed to take even trivial prophylactic measures. Specifically, he charges that the defendants failed to ensure that prison guards adequately supervised inmate workers or adequately searched those workers for stingers and other contraband as they entered the segregated unit. Moreover, Duane adds, the defendants took no action even to protect segregated inmates from inmates known to have a history of attacking fellow inmates with scalding liquid.

Although Duane does not allege that any defendant attacked him, his claim nonetheless rests on a recognized constitutional duty: "[T]he eighth amendment requires the state to protect prisoners from each other." McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 347 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1265, 117 L.Ed.2d 493 (1992). That duty, however, "does not lead to absolute liability." Id. Rather, because the Eighth Amendment speaks only to "punishment," prison officials who fail to prevent an injury inflicted by fellow prisoners are liable only where those officials possess the requisite mental state. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) and Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)). The requisite mental state, moreover, is intent, or some "functional equivalent," such as "deliberate indifference." Id. That is, the officials must "want[ ] harm to come to the prisoner," or, at least, must possess "total unconcern for a prisoner's welfare" in the face of "serious risks." Id. Thus, a prisoner must show, at the least, "recklessness," which, for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, entails "actual knowledge of impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant's failure to prevent it." Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 653 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 71, 93 L.Ed.2d 28 (1986). A prisoner who merely establishes negligence but does not show either actual knowledge of the danger, or danger objectively so great that actual knowledge of the danger can be inferred, cannot prevail. Id.

Duane argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because he had established a genuine issue of material fact, namely, whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk of...