Duarte Nursery, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
| Decision Date | 23 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:13-cv-02095-KJM-DB,2:13-cv-02095-KJM-DB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | DUARTE NURSERY, INC., a California Corporation; and JOHN DUARTE, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, Defendant. AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM. |
The matter is before the court on a motion for reconsideration, or, in the alternative, for certification of interlocutory appeal and for a stay by plaintiffs and counter-defendants Duarte Nursery, Inc. and John Duarte in their case against defendant United States Army Corps of Engineer and counterclaim-plaintiff United States of America (collectively, "the United States").
As explained below, the court denies plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and denies plaintiffs' motion for certification of interlocutory appeal.
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On June 10, 2016, the court issued an order granting, among other things, the United States' motion for summary judgment on the United States' Clean Water Act counterclaim. Order, ECF No. 195. On June 13, 2016, plaintiffs filed the pending motion for reconsideration. Mem. P. & A., ECF No. 196. The United States has opposed, Opp'n, ECF No. 201, and plaintiffs have replied, Reply, ECF No. 204. Plaintiffs filed two notices of additional authority after filing their motion. See Davis Supp. Auth., ECF No. 198; Cardenas Supp. Auth., ECF No. 200. The United States objects but also argues the two decisions do not change this court's conclusion in the Order. Resp., ECF No. 203.
The court first discusses plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
A motion for reconsideration can be properly brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) if it is filed within twenty-eight days of the entry of judgment. Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1989); see Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). "A court should be loath to revisit its own decisions unless extraordinary circumstances show that its prior decision was clearly erroneous or would work a manifest injustice." Walsh v. Am. Med. Response, No. 13-2077, 2015 WL 1898062, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2015) (citing Christianson v. Coit Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)). Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, a court has discretion to reconsider its prior decisions, as an "extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources." Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). A district court should not grant a motion for reconsideration "absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law." 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). A party's mere dissatisfaction with a court's order, or belief that thecourt is wrong in its decision, is not grounds for relief under Rule 59(e). Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981).
Furthermore, "courts avoid considering Rule 59(e) motions where the grounds for amendment are restricted to either repetitive contentions of matters which were before the court on its prior consideration or contentions which might have been raised prior to the challenged judgment." Costello v. United States, 765 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1991); see also Taylor, 871 F.2d at 805. This approach stems from the district courts' "concerns for preserving dwindling resources and promoting judicial efficiency." Costello, 765 F. Supp. at 1009 (internal citations omitted). "Rule 59(e) motions for reconsideration are therefore not intended to give an unhappy litigant one additional chance to sway the judge." Walsh, 2015 WL 1898062, at *2 (citations and quotation omitted).
Plaintiffs request that the court reconsider its June 10, 2016 decision on the cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue, broadly, the court granted the United States' motions and denied plaintiffs' without addressing or at least giving only "short shrift" to plaintiffs' arguments; they say the court did not acknowledge plaintiffs' evidence creating material disputes of fact. Notice of Mot., ECF No. 196 at 1. Specifically, plaintiffs first argue "[t]he [c]ourt's order quotes the plowing regulation . . . [b]ut the order contains no analysis of whether that regulation applies." Mem. P. & A., ECF No. 196-1 at 4. Second, plaintiffs argue the court misinterpreted L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. NRDC, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 710 (2012) and S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004). Id. at 6. Plaintiffs argue these two cases effectively overruled or at least limited the Ninth Circuit's decision in Borden Ranch P'ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001). Id. Third, plaintiffs argue the order does not cite Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003), in its discussion of corporate officers' personal liability. Id. at 7. Fourth, plaintiffs argue there remain material disputes of fact. Id. at 8-9. Lastly, with their notice of supplemental authority, plaintiffs argue that the "significant nexus" standard articulated in the concurrence in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 782 (2006) is inapplicable. Davis Supp. Auth. at 1.
As discussed below, the court considered each of plaintiffs' arguments in its prior order, and none of the arguments raised by plaintiffs presents newly discovered evidence or identifies an intervening change in law. See 389 Orange St. Partners, 179 F.3d at 665. The issue, therefore, is whether the court committed clear error. Id. Clear error occurs when "the reviewing court on the entire [record] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). In order to show clear error, a party moving for reconsideration based on Rule 59(e) must "set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision." Walsh, 2015 WL 1898062, at *2 (citations omitted). Clear error is "'more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must be dead wrong.'" Campion v. Old Repub. Home Prot. Co., Inc., No. 09-748, 2011 WL 1935967, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2011) (quoting Hopwood v. State of Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 273 (5th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiffs have not met this standard; in essence, as explained below, they request the court reassess its original decision, hoping for a different outcome on a second pass based on the same evidence on which they relied in summary judgment briefing. Id. They have not demonstrated anything approaching a "'wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.'" Id. (quoting Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000)). Their motion is the type of "second bite at the apple" prohibited by Rule 59(e). Id. The court explains this conclusion in some detail below.
33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(iii)(D). The regulatory provision further provides that "[t]o fall under this exemption, the activities specified in [33 C.F.R. § 323.4](a)(1)(i)]," including plowing, "must be part of an established (i.e., on-going) farming . . . operation . . . ." 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(ii). In other words, the "plowing regulation" referenced by plaintiffs provides an exemption from the Clean Water Act. However, as the court previously noted, the exemption comes with regulatory constraints set forth in 33 C.F.R. § 323.4. See Order at 32.
Plaintiffs argue that "if an activity causes no discharge, then it is irrelevant whether the activity is 'established.'" Mem. P. & A. at 4. Plaintiffs' argument correctly summarizes the last sentence of § 323.4(a)(1)(iii)(D): "Plowing as described above will never involve a discharge of dredged or fill material." 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(iii)(D). However, the same section also provides that "[t]he term [plowing] does not include redistribution of soil, rock, sand or other surficial materials in a manner which changes any area of the waters of the United States to dry land." Id. The summary judgment record reflected the parties' agreement that the tillage performed on the property at issue in this case did not avoid all wetlands as delineated by one of the environmental consulting companies. Order at 11. The court, therefore, did not simply cease its analysis with a determination of whether plaintiffs had "plowed," and the court did not err in moving on to consider whether the tillage was part of an established farming operation. See Order at 32-34.
In sum, plaintiffs' argument merely reiterates their position presented in their cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' disappointment with the court's decision and desire for an "additional chance to sway the [court]"...
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