Hopwood v. State of Texas
| Decision Date | 21 December 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-50506,98-50506 |
| Citation | 236 F.3d 256 |
| Parties | (5th Cir. 2000) CHERYL J. HOPWOOD; ET AL, Plaintiffs, CHERYL J. HOPWOOD, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. STATE OF TEXAS; BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM; LARRY R. FAULKNER, President of the University of Texas at Austin in his official capacity; UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW; M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, Dean of the University of Texas School of Law in his official capacity; STANLEY M. JOHANSON, Assistant Dean in his official capacity; THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, DOUGLAS CARVELL; ET AL, Plaintiffs, DOUGLAS CARVELL Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee and KENNETH ELLIOTT; DAVID ROGERS, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants v. STATE OF TEXAS; REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SYSTEM; RITA CROCKER CLEMENTS; DONALD L. EVANS; PATRICK C. OXFORD; A. W. RITER, JR.; A. R. SANCHEZ; WOODY L. HUNT; CHARLES MILLER; RAUL R. ROMERO; TOM LOEFFLER, as members of the Board, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants-Cross-Appellees |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE, District Judge*
This higher education, reverse racial discrimination case is before us on appeal for the third time. The first appeal ("Hopwood I") was interlocutory and affirmed the district court's denial of intervention sought by several minority rights advocacy organizations.1 The second appeal ("Hopwood II") followed the district court's judgment on the merits ("Hopwood A")2 of the individual claims of Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, Cheryl J. Hopwood and Douglas Carvell, and Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, Kenneth Elliott and David Rogers (collectively, the "Plaintiffs"), against Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, The University of Texas at Austin (the "University"), the University of Texas School of Law (the "Law School"), and the State of Texas, the Board of Regents of the University and its President, and the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the Law School (collectively, "Texas"), grounded in the denial of the Plaintiffs' admission to the Law School.3 Now, in "Hopwood III, 2000 WL 1868233, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir.2000)" each of the parties either appeals or cross-appeals one or more of the district court rulings made at the conclusion of an extensive bench trial4 conducted pursuant to our remand from Hopwood II. As a broad generalization, three areas dealt with by the district court in Hopwood B are implicated in this appeal: That court's (1) ultimate finding of fact that none of the Plaintiffs had a realistic chance of being offered admission to the Law School in 1992, even under a constitutionally valid, race-blind admissions program; (2) rulings on attorneys' fees; and (3) grant of an injunction prohibiting any consideration of race whatsoever in the Law School's admissions process. In addition, Texas would have us disregard the law of the case doctrine and reverse the prior panel's decision in Hopwood II. We set forth below our reasons for affirming (1) the district court's factual findings that the Plaintiffs would not have been offered admission in 1992 under a race-blind system, and (2) that court's awards of attorneys' fees. We also express our reasons for declining to reconsider the substance of Hopwood II, and for reversing the court's injunction against any consideration of race in the Law School's admission process and remanding that issue for further consistent proceedings.
In Hopwood A, the case underlying the Hopwood II appeal, the district court held that the Plaintiffs had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have been offered admission to the Law School under a constitutional admissions system.5 On appeal, a panel of this court held that, under the burden-shifting scheme of Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,6 the Law School must bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that, even under a race-blind admissions system, the Plaintiffs would not have been offered admission.7 The Hopwood II panel8 stated that, "[i]n the event that the law school is unable to show (by a preponderance of the evidence) that a respective plaintiff would not have been admitted to the law school under a constitutional admissions system, the court is to award to that plaintiff any equitable and/or monetary relief it deems appropriate."9
In the spring of 1997, following remand from Hopwood II, the district court conducted a four-day bench trial. The Law School called one expert witness on the question of causation, i.e., what caused the Plaintiffs to be denied admission in 1992 and whether they would have been offered admission under a race-blind system. That witness was Professor Olin Guy Wellborn, a faculty member of the Law School. He presented both a primary report and a supplemental report analyzing whether the Plaintiffs would have been admitted under a constitutional, race-blind admissions system, concluding that none of the four plaintiffs would have been. After considering Professor Wellborn's reports and testimony, as well as the testimony of several members of the Law School's admissions committee and the Plaintiffs themselves, the district court found that the Law School had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that none of the Plaintiffs would have been admitted to the law school under a constitutional admissions system.10
The district court nevertheless proceeded to make alternative factual findings and legal conclusions on the issue of damages. These would only be used in the event that the Plaintiffs should be successful in an appeal ---- this appeal ---- of the trial court's causation findings.11 Finally, the district court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting any consideration of race, for any purpose, in the Law School's admissions process.
Following the initial trial of this action in Hopwood A, the Plaintiffs had requested an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.12 The district court denied the request, finding that the Plaintiffs, "although prevailing parties under the statute, only attained de minimis relief."13 When the adverse rulings in Hopwood A were appealed to us, we reversed and remanded the attorneys' fees issue with instructions for the district court to award reasonable attorneys' fees.14 Before the commencement of the Hopwood B bench trial on remand, the district court entertained supplemental applications for attorneys' fees and made its final decision on the issue in the memorandum opinion resolving the matters raised at that trial.15
The Plaintiffs sought $853,847.69 for their counsel in payment for 4,840.56 hours of work related to the May, 1994 trial of Hopwood A. They also asked for $614,138.56 for their counsel in payment for 2400.85 hours of work related to the appellate phase of this litigation. The district court denied the portions of the fee request for time spent on (1) public and media relations, (2) opposing the attempted interventions by the Thurgood Marshall Legal Society, the Black Pre-Law Association, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and (3) any legal work done after our remand in Hopwood II because the Plaintiffs were not prevailing parties as to any issues resolved after that remand. The court reduced the number of hours spent for travel by one-half to reflect its judgment that travel should be billed at a lower rate than active legal work, and reduced all hours submitted by the Plaintiffs' counsel by twenty-five percent to account for duplicative work product and lack of billing judgment.16 The court then reviewed current billing rates for each of the Plaintiffs' counsel17 and reduced all submitted rates for the stated purpose of bringing those rates more into line with the prevailing legal market rate in the Austin, Texas trial venue. After multiplying the adjusted number of hours by the adjusted hourly rates, the district court arrived at tentative fee awards for each of the Plaintiffs' counsel. It then reduced the tentative awards for the trial attorneys by fifteen percent to reflect the lack of success in obtaining any injunctive or monetary relief for the Plaintiffs individually. The court concluded its task with numerous tables displaying the relevant calculations.18 This appeal followed.
The district court's determination that the Plaintiffs would not have been admitted to the Law School under a constitutional admissions system is a question of fact, which we review for clear error.19 We review de novo whether the district court faithfully and accurately applied our instructions on the burden of proof on remand from Hopwood II.20 We review for clear error the district court's weighing of the evidence in light of the burden of proof.21
The Hopwood II panel noted that, even though as a general rule plaintiffs seeking money damages must bear the burden of proving that they have been injured, there can be a shift of burden on proof of discrimination.22 That panel concluded that the Mt. Healthy methodology is appropriate in this case, and that under that methodology's burden-shifting minuet, the Law School should have a chance to prevail by showing, through a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have reached the same admission decisions even in the absence of unconstitutional conduct.23 The Hopwood II panel stated that " [i]n the event that the law school is unable to show (by a preponderance of the evidence) that a respective plaintiff would not have been admitted under a...
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