Duarte v. Healy

• Decision Date: 10 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. 4893,4893
• Citation: 537 N.E.2d 1230,405 Mass. 43
• Parties: , 4 IER Cases 639 Frederick DUARTE v. Robert W. HEALY et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1230

537 N.E.2d 1230

405 Mass. 43, 4 IER Cases 639

Frederick DUARTE v. Robert W. HEALY et al. ¹ No. 4893.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Argued Jan. 4, 1989.

Decided May 10, 1989.

Edward D. Kalman (Andra R. Hotchkiss, Boston, with him), for defendants.

Willie J. Davis, Boston, for plaintiff.

Before WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LIACOS, Justice.

The issue in this case is whether the defendants, public officials of the city of Cambridge, are entitled to qualified immunity from suit on claims against them under G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H & 11I, and G.L. c. 214, § 1B. The case arises out of a policy, adopted by the city, of subjecting fire fighter probationary recruits to urinalysis at random times during their training. On cross-motions for summary judgment a judge in the Superior Court ruled that the defendant Robert W. Healy, city manager of Cambridge, is immune from a suit for damages, but that the defendant Thomas V. Scott, chief of the Cambridge fire department, has no such immunity. Both Duarte and Scott have appealed. ² We decide that both defendants are immune.

We summarize the judge's findings. On April 26, 1985, the plaintiff, Frederick Duarte, graduated from the basic fire fighter training program of Cambridge. On April 29, 1985, Duarte and the other members of his class reported for duty to engine company no. 3 on Cambridge Street in East Cambridge. When they arrived, they were informed that they would be required to provide urine samples immediately. The class of thirty fire fighters was split in groups of six. Each group was taken to a lavatory which had two toilet stalls with doors, two shower stalls with curtains, and two urinals without doors. Each fire fighter was given a sealed plastic container and was instructed to provide a urine sample. None of the fire fighters was permitted to leave the view of the officials who monitored the test.

The fire fighters were directed to sign statements listing any medication they were taking. Duarte listed only "Vitamins and Medication." Laboratory testing indicated, however, that Duarte's urine sample contained traces or by-products of cocaine. The testing also revealed other traces or by-products of cocaine in samples of two other fire fighters, and traces or by-products of marihuana in samples from six fire fighters. The three fire fighters with cocaine traces were terminated, and the other six fire fighters were suspended, with probationary conditions.

Duarte was informed on May 9, 1985, that his employment would be terminated because his urine sample had been tested and found to be positive for cocaine. A second test was conducted on the same sample, which confirmed the first test. The judge found that the procedures used to collect and to test the sample were procedures upon which a reasonable person could rely for accurate results.

The judge also found that the defendant Healy approved the policy of urine testing, and that Healy had decided that termination of employment was the appropriate disciplinary action to be taken against those firemen found to have traces or by-products of cocaine in their system. Finally, the judge found that the defendant Scott implemented these policies.

Duarte's original complaint was based on various Federal and State grounds, for declaratory and injunctive relief and money damages against the defendants. A judge of the Superior Court in Middlesex County denied all of the claims except those under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The judge granted declaratory relief under those provisions, decided that injunctive relief was not appropriate, and permitted Duarte to amend his complaint to elaborate on his grounds for seeking damages.

Duarte then filed an amended complaint seeking damages on two counts. He renewed his constitutional claims under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H & 11I (1986 ed.), and he asserted a claim under the Massachusetts Privacy Act, G.L. c. 214, § 1B (1986 ed.). Duarte made no claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). All parties moved again for summary judgment. Another judge granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant Healy on ground of immunity, but held that the defendant Scott had no such immunity and granted summary judgment against him on both claims, setting the case against Scott for hearing on damages.

1. Immunity. We assume, for purposes of this discussion, that the judge was correct in concluding that the urinalysis tests conducted in this case violated Duarte's rights under both the Privacy Act and the Civil Rights Act. We proceed directly to the question whether the defendants are nevertheless immune from suit, not just from liability. See Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26, 31, 513 N.E.2d 1277 (1987), cert. denied sub nom. Forastiere v. Breault, 485 U.S. 906, 108 S.Ct. 1078, 99 L.Ed.2d 237 (1988).

In Breault, supra, we discussed the two forms of immunity that might apply to public employees under the Civil Rights Act. The first was common law immunity, as variously expressed in our cases, and the second was a qualified immunity patterned after Federal qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. 401 Mass. at 35, 38, 513 N.E.2d 1277. We noted that "the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act by its terms admits of no immunities." Id. at 35, 513 N.E.2d 1277, quoting Chicopee Lions Club v. District Attorney for the Hampden Dist., 396 Mass. 244, 252, 485 N.E.2d 673 (1985). We also noted that there was no " 'tradition' of immunity for nonjuridical officers so firmly 'rooted in history' that we should not presume the Legislature to have abandoned it without comment." Breault, supra 401 Mass. at 37, 513 N.E.2d 1277, quoting Chicopee Lions Club, supra. However, we had no occasion to decide whether the Legislature intended to adopt the Federal system of immunity for discretionary functions under § 1983 because we decided that the actions of the defendants in Breault were ministerial. The case before us presents an occasion to address the issue of qualified immunity under our State Civil Rights Act. We conclude it to be consistent with the intent of the Legislature in enacting the Civil Rights Act to adopt thereunder the standard of immunity for public officials developed under § 1983.

In Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 822-823, 473 N.E.2d 1128 (1985), we concluded that "the Legislature intended to provide a remedy under G.L. c. 12, § 11I, coextensive with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... except that the Federal statute requires action whereas its State counterpart does not." By the time the Legislature enacted the Civil Rights Act, St.1979, c. 801, the Supreme Court already had interpreted § 1983 to provide qualified immunity for discretionary functions. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). We presume that the Legislature was aware of this case law when it chose to pattern the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act after § 1983. Packaging Indus. Group v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 611, 405 N.E.2d 106 (1980). Furthermore, the Supreme Court already had established the basic two-part test for determining to what discretionary functions the doctrine of qualified immunity applies. That test involved an objective element, a presumptive knowledge of, and respect for, basic, unquestioned constitutional rights, and a subjective element, whether the official actually knew that the law forbade the conduct. Wood v. Strickland, supra 420 U.S. at 321-322, 95 S.Ct. at 1001-02. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have elaborated on this standard, but none has changed its basic test. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). We have had no occasion to consider whether it is appropriate under the Civil Rights Act to adopt all of the current Supreme Court precedent under § 1983. However, for purposes of this case we can say that public officials are not liable under the Civil Rights Act for their discretionary acts, unless they have violated a right under Federal or State constitutional or statutory law that was "clearly established" at the time. See Anderson, supra 107 S.Ct. at 3038-3039. Thus, with regard to the plaintiff's claim under the State Civil Rights Act, we must consider whether the relevant law was clearly established when Duarte was subjected to urinalysis in April, 1985.

2. Immunity under G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H & 11I. "Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the doctrine of qualified immunity applies only to 'discretionary functions.' " Dobos v. Driscoll, 404 Mass. 634, 646, 537 N.Ed.2d 558 (1989). In light of our prior decisions (see preceding discussion), we apply the same principle to alleged violations of the State Civil Rights Act. Thus, we must decide whether the acts of these defendants were discretionary and, if so, whether they retain the protection offered them by the doctrine of qualified immunity. "Even defendants who violate constitutional rights enjoy a qualified immunity that protects them ... unless it is further demonstrated that their conduct was unreasonable under the applicable standard." Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3017, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984).

We conclude that the acts of the defendants herein were discretionary under our State Civil Rights Act. The United States Supreme Court has stated that, under § 1983, "[a] law that fails to specify the precise action that the official must take in each instance creates only discretionary authority." Id. at 196-197 n. 14, 104 S.Ct. at 3020 n. 14. We hold that the same is true under our Civil Rights Act. ³ At the time the defendants formulated their drug testing policy, no Federal or State...