Dube v. Astrue, Case No. 3:11cv474/LC/CJK
| Decision Date | 14 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:11cv474/LC/CJK |
| Parties | NANCY S. DUBE Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA LOCAL RULES 72.1(A), 72.2(D), and 72.3, relating to review of administrative determinations under the Social Security Act ("Act") and related statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-1400v. The case is now before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for review of a final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying claimant's application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34, and for supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83.
Upon review of the record before this court, I conclude that the findings of fact and determinations of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence. The decision of the Commissioner, therefore, should be affirmed, and the application for benefits denied.
Nancy S. Dube1 (who will be referred to by name, as plaintiff, or as claimant) filed an application for supplemental security income on November 30, 2007.2 T. 175-83.3 Ms. Dube also filed an application for disability insurance benefits on December 19, 2007. T. 170-74. In both instances, claimant alleged disability beginning August 24, 2007.4 T. 172, 175. Both applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. T. 117, 121, 127, 130. Claimant filed a written request for a hearing, T. 133-34, which was held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") on April 30, 2010. T. 52-79. Plaintiff appeared and testified at the hearing; Robert Strader, an impartial vocational expert, also testified at the hearing. T. 52-79. The ALJ denied claimant's applications, finding she had not been under a disability within the meaning of the Act from August 24, 2007, through the date of the decision, July 22, 2010. T. 22-46. The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration denied plaintiff's request for review, rendering the ALJ's decision theCommissioner's final decision. T. 1. Claimant now seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's decision, contending "the ALJ minimized [her] subjective pain complaints and rejected [her treating physician's] opinions on conclusory grounds." (Doc. 7, p. 6).5
In the written decision the ALJ made a number of findings relative to the issues raised in this appeal:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2009.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 24, 2007, the alleged disability onset date.
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative disc disease, bilateral hallux valgus deformities, hypertension, fibromyalgia, gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), mild cervical spondylosis, cervical degenerative disc disease, cervical facet joint dysfunction, bilateral median nerve compression across wrist segments (without axonal loss), and bilateral hand osteoarthritis.
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). She is unable to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, cannot tolerate exposure to dangerous heights or machinery, can only occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, and can only occasionally perform fingering.
6. The claimant is capable of performing her past relevant work as a retail manager. This work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity.
7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from August 24, 2007, through July 22, 2010.
A federal court reviews a Social Security disability case to determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied by the ALJ. See Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991) (). Substantial evidence is "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938)). With reference to other standards of review, the Eleventh Circuit has said, "'Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla . . . .'" Somogy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 366 F. App'x 56, 62 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439).Although the ALJ's decision need not be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, "it cannot stand with a 'mere scintilla' of support." Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Flynn v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 1273 (11th Cir. 1985)). The reviewing court "'may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner] . . . .'" Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)). Nevertheless, a reviewing court may not look "only to those parts of the record which support the ALJ[,]" but instead "must view the entire record and take account of evidence in the record which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ." Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983). In sum, review is deferential to a point, but the reviewing court conducts what has been referred to as "an independent review of the record."6 Flynn, 768 F.2d. at 1273; see also Getty ex rel. Shea v. Astrue, No. 2:10-cv-725-FtM-29SPC, 2011 WL 4836220 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2011); Salisbury v. Astrue, No. 8:09-cv-2334-T-17TGW, 2011 WL 861785 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2011). The recitation of medical and historical facts of this case, as set out below, is based upon my independent review.
The Social Security Act defines a disability as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). To qualify as a disability, the physical or mental impairment must be so severe that the plaintiff is not only unable to do her previous work, "but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(g), the Commissioner analyzes a disability claim in five steps:
1. If the claimant is performing substantial gainful activity, she is not disabled.
2. If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, her impairments must be severe before she can be found disabled.
3. If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity and she has severe impairments that have lasted or are expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months, and if her impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, the claimant is presumed disabled without further inquiry.
4. If the claimant's impairments do not prevent her from doing her past relevant work, she is not disabled.
5. Even if the claimant's impairments prevent her from performing her past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that accommodates her RFC and vocational factors, she is not disabled.
Claimant bears the burden of establishing a severe impairment that keeps her from performing her past work. See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F. 2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Circuit has explained the operation of step five:
In practice, the burden temporarily shifts at step five to the Commissioner. The Commissioner must produce evidence that there isother work available in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant has the capacity to perform. In order to be considered disabled, the claimant must then prove that [she] is unable to perform the jobs that the Commissioner lists. The temporary shifting of the burden to the Commissioner was initiated by the courts, and is not specifically provided for in the statutes or regulations. See Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 1999) ().
Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 n.2 (11th Cir. 2001).
Step five (or step four in cases where the ALJ decides a claimant can perform her past work) is generally where the rubber meets the road. At that point, the ALJ formulates the all-important RFC. Even where one or more severe impairments are established, the claimant must show that she cannot perform work within that RFC. The ALJ establishes the RFC, utilizing the impairments identified at step two, by interpretation of (1) the medical evidence, and (2) the claimant's subjective complaints (generally complaints of pain). The RFC is then used by the ALJ to make the ultimate vocational determination required by step five.7 "[R]esidual functional capacity is the most [claimant] can still do despite [claimant's] limi...
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