Dubie v. Branz

• Decision Date: 04 May 1950
• Citation: 73 A.2d 217,146 Me. 455
• Parties: , 146 Me. 455 DUBIE v. BRANZ.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 217

73 A.2d 217

145 Me. 170, 146 Me. 455

DUBIE v. BRANZ.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

May 4, 1950.

Saul H. Sheriff, Portland, for plaintiff.

Wilfred A. Hay, Portland, Charles A. Pomeroy, Portland, for defendant.

Before MURCHIE, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, MERRILL, NULTY and WILLIAMSON, JJ.

NULTY, Justice.

This case is before this Court on exceptions to acceptance of report of Referees. The action is trover, plea, general issue with brief statement alleging title and right of possession of the property in question and claiming that said property, which was a diamond ring, was pledged as collateral security for a loan made by the defendant in good faith and that the indebtedness for which said ring was collateral security had not been paid and that said defendant would relinquish possession of said ring upon payment of said indebtedness. The action was referred to Referees under Rule of the Superior Court with right of exceptions as to matters of law reserved. The Referees reported in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant filed seven objections in writing to the acceptance of the report. The Referees' report was accepted and defendant filed exceptions which were allowed by the presiding justice. The written objections filed by the defendant are made a part of the bill of exceptions by reference and defendant is, therefore, properly before this Court to be heard on such matters as are put in issue by the written objections filed by him in so far as said objections comply with Rule 21. 129 Me. 511; Camp Maqua Young Women's Christian Ass'n v. Inhabitants of Town of Poland, 130 Me. 485, 157 A. 859; Staples v. Littlefield, 132 Me. 91, 93, 167 A. 171. The report of the Referee is specific in its terms and contains the statements of fact upon which the report is based and also contains statements of the legal principles which the Referees applied in determining liability and assessing damages.

After the case was docketed in this Court an error was discovered in the pleadings and the case was remanded to the Superior Court for correction, 72 A.2d 450, said case to be re-entered in this Court in accordance with the opinion.

Rule 21 of the Supreme Judicial and Superior Courts provides: 'Objections to any report offered to the Court for acceptance, shall be made in writing and filed with the clerk and shall set forth specifically the grounds of the objections, and these only shall be considered by the court.'

The written objections to the report were as follows:

1. There is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion which the Referees reached that immediately after pledging the ring with the defendant Albert F. Allen left for parts unknown and continued search has not disclosed his whereabouts.

2. There is no evidence to support the conclusion that Albert F. Allen neither advanced or intended to advance any money to the plaintiff to buy oil leases for her or for any other purpose, and that his procurement of her ring from her and its sub-pledge was clearly a fraud.

3. There is no evidence to support the conclusion that Albert F. Allen was guilty of conversion of the plaintiff's ring.

4. That the Referees' conclusion that the defendant became liable to the plaintiff for his possession of her ring is contrary to the law.

5. That the Referees' findings of fact above described are manifestly against the evidence.

6. That the Referees' findings of fact above described are manifestly against the weight of evidence.

7. That the Referees' conclusions of law above described are against the law.

Objections 5, 6 and 7 are manifestly insufficient and were properly overruled by the presiding justice. They are not specific, but general, and they cannot be considered. Throumoulos v. First National Bank of Biddeford, 132 Me. 232, 169 A. 307 and cases cited.

Objection 4 is also too general and the exception based thereon cannot be considered. This objection does not in any way specify how or why the Referees' conclusion with respect to the possession of the defendant of the plaintiff's ring is contrary to law. Throumoulos v. First National Bank of Biddeford, supra; Moores v. Inhabitants of Town of Springfield, Me., 64 A.2d 569, 573.

Objections 1, 2 and 3 filed by the defendant assert that there was no evidence before the Referees to support the particular findings and conclusions of the Referees set forth in the above objections. These three objections raise questions of law which under the rule of reference were properly reserved. It is, however, unnecessary to make more than passing mention that this Court has many times held that findings of fact by the Referees will not be disturbed provided there is any evidence to support the findings. Staples v. Littlefield, supra; Morneault v. Boston & Maine R. R., Me., 68 A.2d 260. The record discloses that the plaintiff, Emma Dubie, early in May 1948 delivered her platinum ring set with a 1.25 carat diamond and 22 chip diamonds to one Albert F. Allen as security for $1,000.00 which he promised to advance and use to purchase for her certain oil leases, agreeing not only that the advance should be paid from income from the leases which he assured her would begin the following June, but also that the ring would be kept in his safe deposit box at Brunswick until her payments were completed. It should be noted that Allen and his wife had for some months occupied a room in a tourist house on State Street in Portland, Maine, operated by the plaintiff. This pledge agreement was not reduced to writing and no receipt for the ring was given. On May 17, 1948, said Allen called upon the defendant, Maurice A. Branz, who conducted a small loan business...