Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-1382.,02-1382.
• Parties: David DUDLEY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. HANNAFORD BROS. CO., Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

333 F.3d 299

David DUDLEY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. HANNAFORD BROS. CO., Defendant, Appellant.

No. 02-1382.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard November 4, 2002.

Decided June 24, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lawrence C. Winger, for appellant.

John M.R. Paterson and Bernstein Shur Sawyer & Nelson on brief for Maine Restaurant Ass'n, Maine Grocers Ass'n, Maine Oil Dealers Ass'n, and Maine Merchants Ass'n, amici curiae.

Peter M. Rice, with whom Tracie L. Adamson, Lipman, Katz & McKee, P.A., and Disability Rights Center of Maine were on brief, for appellee.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000) (the ADA), with a view toward eliminating discrimination against persons with disabilities. That is a laudable policy-but so is the policy of the State of Maine, variously expressed in statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions, that constrains retailers against the profligate sale of alcoholic beverages to inebriates. This difficult case places those policies in tension with each other.

The underlying action arises out of a retailer's refusal to sell alcoholic beverages to a disabled person whose symptoms mimic the traits of intoxication. The district court first concluded that Title III of the ADA permitted the maintenance of a private cause of action. Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 146 F.Supp.2d 82, 85-86 (D.Me.2001) (Dudley I). The court then found, following a non-jury trial, that the retailer, defendant-appellant Hannaford Bros. Co. (Hannaford), had sanctioned a policy that forbade the manager of the store in question from reconsidering a clerk's initial refusal to sell, even after the customer revealed his disability. Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 190 F.Supp.2d 69, 73 (D.Me.2002) (Dudley II). In the court's view, this hard-and-fast rule violated the ADA. Id. at 76.

We agree with the district court that the ADA requires a retail establishment to exhibit more flexibility in serving disabled patrons. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below.

I. BACKGROUND

We rehearse the facts as found by the district court, consistent with record support. See Sierra Fria Corp. v. Donald J. Evans, P.C., 127 F.3d 175, 180 (1st Cir.1997).

In 1993, plaintiff-appellee David Dudley suffered massive trauma to his head, legs, and internal organs in an automobile accident. He never fully recovered from the effects of those injuries. Although he lost the manual dexterity needed to operate his appliance repair business, a regimen of therapy, stretching over several years, enabled him to resume a modicum of activities. His remaining symptomatology, however, included severely impaired speech, a pronounced loss of muscular control, an inability to take even breaths, and a tendency toward impulsive mood swings. The district court observed Dudley during the trial and described his speech as "awkward and often very difficult to comprehend." Dudley II, 190 F.Supp.2d at 72. The court concluded that his gait and balance had been severely affected by his injuries and found his movements "exceedingly labored." Id. The court added that the use of an appliance, such as a cane or a walker, "would not significantly ameliorate his condition." Id.

On Saturday, February 27, 1999, Dudley moved from Augusta to a new abode in Gardiner, Maine. Although friends assisted him in making the move, Dudley found the day tiring.¹ That evening, he drove to a Shop `n Save supermarket operated by Hannaford, intending to purchase alcoholic beverages. He parked his van in a spot reserved for handicapped patrons, entered the store, and proceeded to the appropriate aisle. He then began slowly to inspect the available merchandise.

The store's shift leader, Armand Cookson, noticed that Dudley was spending what seemed to be an inordinate amount of time staring at the shelves. When Dudley finally selected a four-pack of wine coolers and proceeded toward the checkout counter, Cookson observed his rambling gait, drooping eyelids, and flushed face. Cookson jumped to the conclusion that Dudley was intoxicated. Accordingly, Cookson advised the cashier, Erin Donnell, not to sell Dudley any alcoholic beverages.

Dudley placed the wine coolers on the counter. Donnell greeted him and received a slurred response. Donnell, like Cookson, already had concluded that Dudley was drunk, and his slurred speech reinforced her mindset. She told Dudley that she believed him to be intoxicated and, therefore, would not sell him any alcoholic beverages. Dudley immediately became agitated, throwing his arms into the air and exclaiming, "Here we go again!"

Speaking loudly, Dudley tried to explain that he was not besotted but disabled. Donnell was taken aback by Dudley's aggressive manner and stepped away from the cash register. Cookson then intervened, reiterating that the store would not sell any alcoholic beverages to Dudley and removing the wine coolers from the counter. Dudley became increasingly frustrated; in his labored speech, he tried to impart that injuries from a car wreck, not the overindulgent consumption of alcohol, explained his behavior. Cookson — who admitted at trial that he thought this explanation plausible when given — informed Dudley that the store had a strict rule prohibiting managers from reversing a cashier's decision not to sell alcoholic beverages to a customer. Dudley nonetheless persisted and asked to speak with the person in charge.

Henry Fossett, the night manager, responded. He had observed much of what had transpired. Dudley calmly described the nature of his disability. He pointed out that his car (clearly visible through the plate glass storefront) was parked in a handicapped parking place and bore license plates denoting that its owner was a person with a disability. He also encouraged Fossett to call the police so that he could take a breathalyzer test and prove conclusively that he was not intoxicated. After hearing Dudley's explanation, Fossett considered it possible that Dudley suffered from a disability. Nevertheless, Fossett fell back on the store's policy, reiterating that management would not revisit a cashier's refusal to purvey alcoholic beverages to a customer.

Dudley left the store empty-handed. Since that evening, he has not attempted to purchase alcoholic beverages at the Gardiner Shop `n Save or at any of Hannaford's other locations (despite Hannaford's relatively attractive prices). For its part, Hannaford has not changed any of its policies or practices regarding the sale of alcoholic beverages.

II. TRAVEL OF THE CASE

On or about September 1, 1999, Dudley filed a charge of discrimination with the Maine Human Rights Commission (MHRC) under the ADA and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). After the MHRC issued a right-to-sue letter, Dudley brought suit in the federal district court under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189, and the counterpart provisions of Subchapter V of the MHRA, Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §§ 4591 to 4594-F (West 2002). On July 10, 2001, the district court denied Hannaford's motion to dismiss, ruling that Dudley could pursue a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1). See Dudley I, 146 F.Supp.2d at 85-86. Following a two-day bench trial, the district court took the merits under advisement.

The court proceeded to write a thoughtful rescript delineating Dudley's incapacities, describing the events of February 27, 1999, and determining that Dudley was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Dudley II, 190 F.Supp.2d at 71-74. The court found as a fact that "[a]t the Gardiner store it is an unwritten rule that once a cashier refuses to sell alcohol to a customer, the cashier's supervisors will rarely, if ever, reverse that decision." Id. at 73. Based in part on this finding, the court concluded that Hannaford's actions and policies violated Dudley's rights under the ADA. Id. at 76. Deeming the ADA and the MHRA coextensive, id. at 73, the district court further found that Hannaford's actions violated the MHRA, id. at 76.

The court then turned to the question of relief. Acting pursuant to both statutes, the court enjoined Hannaford from continuing to enforce its discriminatory "refusal to reconsider" policy at its Gardiner store. Id. Then, acting under the MHRA, the court imposed a $5,000 civil penalty and awarded Dudley reasonable attorneys' fees. Id. at 77. Hannaford now appeals.

III. ANALYSIS

We divide our analysis into several segments. We begin with an overview of the pertinent provisions of the ADA. We then discuss Hannaford's two principal defenses to the ADA claim. Finally, we turn to the MHRA claim.

A. The ADA: An Overview.

The ADA did not emerge in a vacuum. Congress found that "society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities," thus creating "a serious and pervasive social problem." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). Such individuals "continually encounter[ed] various forms of discrimination," id. § 12101(a)(5), and, as a group, "occup[ied] an inferior status in our society," id. § 12101(a)(6). Mindful of these inequities, Congress enacted the ADA "to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities," id. § 12101(b)(4), hoping "to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals," id. § 12101(a)(8).

Title III of the ADA targets discrimination by privately operated places of public accommodation (including supermarkets and other types of retail shops). It sends a bluntly worded message to those establishments that fall within its purview: you may not discriminate against an individual in the full and equal access to goods and services on the basis of a disability.

The case before us involves Title III. The law's general prohibition stipulates that:

No individual shall be...