Dues v. State
Decision Date | 09 June 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 62589,No. 3,62589,3 |
Citation | 634 S.W.2d 304 |
Parties | Diana Burton DUES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Danny D. Burns, Dallas, for appellant.
Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., Ronald D. Hinds & Randy Biddle, Asst. Dist. Attys., Dallas, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before ODOM, DALLY and McCORMICK, JJ.
This is an appeal from the offense of terroristic threat. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Section 22.07. The punishment is a fine of two hundred dollars.
The appellant in his first ground of error argues that the prosecutor misstated the law during the voir dire examination of the jury panel so that he was denied a fair trial. During the examination the prosecutor made the following remarks:
Section 22.07(a)(2), V.T.C.A., provides:
Therefore, in order to commit this offense the accused must have the specific intent to place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. A person acts with intent with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 6.03(a). Intent can be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Romo v. State, 593 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). However, the accused's intent cannot be determined merely from what the victim thought at the time of the offense. Indeed, for this offense to be completed it is not necessary that the victim or anyone else was actually placed in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Additionally, it is immaterial to the offense whether the accused had the capability or the intention to carry out his threat. Burrell v. State, 541 S.W.2d 615 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Jarrell v. State, 537 S.W.2d...
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Molitor v. State
...aff'd, 780 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). Intent may be inferred from the acts, words and conduct of the accused. Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). Knowledge can also be inferred from the conduct of and remarks by the accused and from the circumstances surrounding the......
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...conduct of the accused. See Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 50; Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim.App.1995); Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). Mental culpability is of such a nature that it generally must be inferred from the circumstances under which the prohibi......
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Zuliani v. State
...(Tex.Crim.App.1985); Lazcano, 836 S.W.2d at 659. Intent can be inferred from acts, words, and conduct of the accused. Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Martinez v. State, 844 S.W.2d 279, 283 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1992, pet. ref'd). Since mental culpability is of such ......
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...22.07 does not require the victim or anyone else actually to be placed in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. See Dues v. State , 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982). The Court of Criminal Appeals has defined “imminent,” as used in the robbery statute, as meaning “near ......