Duff v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1936
• Docket Number: No. 11875.,11875.
• Citation: 91 S.W.2d 871
• Parties: DUFF v. FORD MOTOR CO.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

91 S.W.2d 871

DUFF v. FORD MOTOR CO.

No. 11875.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.

February 8, 1936.

Rehearing Denied March 7, 1936.

Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; Towne Young, Judge.

Action by J. H. Duff against the Ford Motor Company. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

John W. Craig, T. I. Rosser, P. H. Kveton, and T. H. Marberry, all of Dallas, for appellant.

R. T. Bailey, of Dallas, for appellee.

JONES, Chief Justice.

J. H. Duff, appellant, instituted this suit in a district court of Dallas county on May 3, 1933, to recover damages from the Ford Motor Company, a corporation, appellee, for the breach of an employment contract. The trial court sustained a general demurrer and a special exception that had the force of a general demurrer to appellant's second amended original petition, and upon appellant's refusal to amend a final judgment of dismissal was entered, from which this appeal is duly prosecuted. The following are the essential facts alleged in appellant's petition:

On May 15, 1918, appellant was an employee of appellee and on such date he received a personal injury consisting of a hernia and other injuries incident thereto. At the time of appellant's injury, appellee carried compensation insurance under the Workmen's Compensation Act of this State (Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 8306 et seq.), and the petition alleges facts showing that appellant was entitled to be compensated by such carrier for the injuries received.

The petition shows that appellant filed no claim for compensation against the carrier, with the State Industrial Accident Board, for the reason that an agent and employee of appellee entered into an agreement with appellant that, "if he would waive and forego his claim for said injuries, against the insurance company, the defendant (appellee) would retain him in its employment from that date until his death, or until such time as he should be physically incapacitated to work"; that he accepted such employment and at once entered upon work for appellee under such contract, and remained in such employment, under the same wages and in the same character of work, until January 4, 1932. The petition also alleges that, because of this agreement, appellant did not make any claim to the Industrial Accident Board for his injuries, because he relied upon such agreement; that under the Workmen's Compensation Law he was entitled to a large sum in damages for the injuries received, and did not claim such sum, solely because of his reliance upon this agreement, and his belief that appellee would consider his employment agreement in force so long as he was physically able to work; the petition alleged further that he was discharged without cause, and that he was physically able to continue to do the work that he had been doing under his contract.

By proper allegations the petition shows that one Anderson was the agent and employee of appellant who entered into the alleged agreement with appellee. The petition is very full in its allegations, as to the authority of Anderson to enter into such a contract for appellee; and it further alleges that the agreement was approved and ratified by one Cunningham, appellee's superintendent of its Dallas agency; and it further alleges that Cunningham submitted the said employment contract to appellee's main office in Detroit, Mich., and that, by the proper officers of appellee at such main office, the said employment contract was approved and ratified.

The general demurrer sustained was in the usual form of such a demurrer; the special exception sustained by the trial court is: "Defendant specially excepts to said Second Amended Original Petition in its entirety because the same shows on its face, as a matter of law, that such purported agreement, if in fact the same was made, was wholly without consideration, unilateral, lacking in mutuality, and unenforceable as against either of the parties, and therefore of no force and/or effect."

It should also be stated that appellant alleged his weekly wage and alleged his life expectancy, as a basis for the measurement of damages, and alleged that he suffered damages by reason of such wrongful discharge in the total sum of $18,011.60.

Two primary questions are raised by the briefs of the parties: (1) Is the contract supported by a valuable consideration? and if this question is decided in the affirmative, then (2) is the contract alleged too vague and indefinite as to the element of time it is to continue as to render it merely a contract at the will of either party? These questions will be discussed in their numerical order.

Is the contract supported by a valuable consideration? Under the facts alleged and under the Workmen's Compensation Law, appellee gave up no right that could have accrued to it when appellant waived his right to prosecute his claim for compensation against the compensation carrier; hence,...