Duffen v. State

• Decision Date: 04 December 1997
• Citation: 245 A.D.2d 653,665 N.Y.S.2d 978
• Parties: , 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 10,400 Stephen P. DUFFEN, Respondent, v. STATE of New York, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 978

665 N.Y.S.2d 978

245 A.D.2d 653, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 10,400

Stephen P. DUFFEN, Respondent, v. STATE of New York, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Dec. 4, 1997.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General (Michael S. Buskus, of counsel), Albany, for appellant.

Silberman & Platte P.C. (Jeffrey Klarsfeld, of counsel), New York City, for respondent.

Before MIKOLL, J.P., and MERCURE, CREW, WHITE and YESAWICH, JJ.

MERCURE, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims (Bell, J.), entered January 29, 1997, upon a decision of the court in favor of claimant.

Claimant, an inmate at a State correctional facility, commenced this action to recover for an ankle injury he allegedly sustained when he fell on the ground in the facility recreation yard. As relevant to this appeal, claimant's theory of liability against the State is founded upon the prison personnel's demonstrated delay in providing claimant with his prescribed medication, which claimant alleges caused him to become dizzy and fall. At trial, claimant called Kang Lee, the facility medical director, who testified that claimant's lack of medication "may or may not" have caused his dizziness. Following the liability phase of the bifurcated trial, the Court of Claims determined that the State was negligent in delaying claimant's medical treatment. Notably, the Court of Claims concluded that, as a pro se litigant, claimant could not be expected to obtain expert testimony with the same skill as counsel and also that, as an employee of the State directly involved in the incident, Lee "may naturally have wanted to minimize the effect of the lack of medication". Accordingly, the Court of Claims held that Lee's testimony was sufficient to demonstrate that claimant's injuries were proximately caused by the State's negligence in delaying medication. Following a trial on damages and an award in favor of claimant, the State brought the present appeal.

In our view, there is considerable merit to the State's contention that, in the absence of any competent expert opinion on the issue of proximate causation, the Court of Claims' decision in favor of claimant was not supported by legally sufficient evidence. We shall accordingly reverse the judgment in favor of claimant and dismiss the claim.

Whether the claim is considered to assert a cause of action sounding in negligence or one for malpractice, there cannot be serious doubt that the issue of "[w]hether and to what extent * * * medications contributed to claimant's condition is not a matter of common knowledge which a fact finder could decide in the absence of expert testimony" (Armstrong v. State of New York, 214 A.D.2d 812, 813, 625 N.Y.S.2d 317, lv. denied 86 N.Y.2d 702, 631 N.Y.S.2d 606, 655 N.E.2d 703; see, Sabatino v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 187 A.D.2d 777, 589 N.Y.S.2d 654). Furthermore, claimant's choice to proceed pro se had no effect on his burden to present legally competent evidence. Although courts will routinely afford pro se litigants some latitude (see, Sloninski v. Weston, 232 A.D.2d 913, 648 N.Y.S.2d 823, lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 809, 655 N.Y.S.2d 889, 678 N.E.2d 502; Sabatino v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., supra; Moore v. County of Rensselaer, 156 A.D.2d 784, 549 N.Y.S.2d 828), a pro se litigant "acquires no greater right than any other litigant" and will be held to the same standards of proof as those who are represented by counsel (Roundtree v. Singh, 143 A.D.2d 995, 996, 533...