Dugan v. Jerry Sweetster, Inc.

• Citation: 54 Ark.App. 401,928 S.W.2d 341
• Decision Date: 11 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. CA,CA
• Parties: Waymond DUGAN, Appellant, v. JERRY SWEETSTER, INC., and Bituminous Insurance Companies, Appellees. 95-1066.
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

Page 341

928 S.W.2d 341

54 Ark.App. 401

Waymond DUGAN, Appellant, v. JERRY SWEETSTER, INC., and Bituminous Insurance Companies, Appellees.

No. CA 95-1066.

Court of Appeals of Arkansas Division II.

Sept. 11, 1996.

Jay N. Tolley, Fayetteville, for appellant.

Randy Murphy, Little Rock, for appellee.

GRIFFEN, Judge.

Waymond Dugan ("Dugan" or "appellant") suffered an electrical shock on September 7, 1993, while working for his employer, Jerry Sweetster, Inc. ("Sweetster" or "the employer"). Dugan was draining water from a hole with an electric pump when the pump stopped working. When Dugan reached down and touched the pump, he received a shock that lasted about ten seconds. He recalled a small explosion, recalled being knocked backwards, and recalled that he lay on a nearby pipe semiconscious for an estimated 15-20 minutes until help arrived. Dugan was admitted to Washington Regional Medical Center in Fayetteville where he presented with an "entry port" or burn site on his hand, but no exit port. ¹ He complained of anxiety and chest pains but a battery of tests revealed nothing abnormal except for the 3-4 mm burn site on his hand. He remained at the hospital two days for observation and was discharged. Within hours of his discharge, he was readmitted after he began to stutter, had trouble walking, and lost consciousness again.

Dugan was then hospitalized for five days, and more diagnostic tests were performed. A CAT scan, EKG, MRI, and chest x-ray showed no abnormal findings. However, his stuttering and difficulty with walking became more pronounced over time. He was referred to a neurologist, Dr. Brown, and a clinical psychologist, Dr. Back. They agreed that Dugan suffered post-traumatic stress syndrome, a conversion reaction, and possibly depression--all psychological disorders. Both doctors were uncertain whether Dugan's mental problems were caused by an organic source (i.e. a physical injury) or a psychological source. A speech pathologist opined that appellant's stuttering resulted from an organic source. Over time, Dr. Brown and Dr. Back concluded that Dugan's mental illness was the direct result of the electrical shock.

The employer initially deemed Dugan's problems compensable, but later controverted all benefits related to his psychological problems. The administrative law judge found that Dugan's psychological problems were compensable. The Workers' Compensation Commission (the "Commission") reversed, finding that Dugan failed to prove the requisite physical injury to make a mental injury compensable under Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-113 (Repl.1996). We disagree and reverse, holding that the Commission erred when it held that Dugan failed to prove that he received a physical injury so that his mental problems were compensable.

Workers' compensation appeals are governed by the substantial evidence standard of review. Bradley v. Alumax, 50 Ark.App. 13, 899 S.W.2d 850 (1995). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Couch v. First State Bank of Newport, 49 Ark.App. 102, 898 S.W.2d 57 (1995). Where the Workers' Compensation Commission has denied a claim, "substantial evidence" requires the appellate court to affirm if the Commission's opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Bussell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 48 Ark.App. 131, 891 S.W.2d 75 (1995) (emphasis added).

One of the significant changes to the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law made by Act 796 of 1993 was a new section that defined the compensability of mental injury or illness. Prior to Act 796, workers' compensation benefits were upheld for mental illness in a variety of situations ranging from psychological disorders resulting from traumatic physical injury to nontraumatic experiences involving job stress. See, e.g., Wilson & Co. Inc. v. Christman, 244 Ark. 132, 424 S.W.2d 863 (1968); George W. Jackson Mental Health Ctr. v. Lambie, 49 Ark.App. 139, 898 S.W.2d 479 (1995); City of Fort Smith v. Brooks, 40 Ark.App. 120, 842 S.W.2d 463 (1992); Boyd v. General Indus., 22 Ark.App. 103, 733 S.W.2d 750 (1987). Act 796 narrowed the definition of compensable mental illness or injury as follows:

(a)(1) A mental injury or illness is not a compensable injury unless it is caused by physical injury to the employee's body, and shall not be considered an injury arising out of and in the course of employment or compensable unless it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence; provided, however, that this physical injury limitation shall not apply to any victim of a crime of violence.

Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-113(a)(1) (Repl.1996) (emphasis added). We now must interpret this section and, particularly, the term "physical injury" as it relates to compensable psychological injury. Although we are construing an act of the General Assembly, our jurisdiction is proper under Rule 1-2(a)(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

The Commission denied compensation to Dugan because it held that the preponderance of the evidence failed to show "actual demonstrable damage, impairment, wound, or other bodily harm or disorder to the internal or external structure of the body." For this definition of "physical...