Dugger v. Anderson, 90-3386
Citation | 593 So.2d 1134 |
Decision Date | 07 February 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 90-3386,90-3386 |
Parties | Richard L. DUGGER, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Appellant, v. Stanley Steven ANDERSON, Appellee. 593 So.2d 1134, 17 Fla. L. Week. D424 |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Elaine D. Hall, Asst. Gen. Counsel of the Dept. of Corrections, Tallahassee, for appellant.
No appearance by appellee.
The appellant, as Secretary of the Department of Corrections (the department), appeals an order establishing that the appellee is eligible for provisional credits under section 944.277, Florida Statutes, on a sentence which precedes a habitual offender sentence. 1 We conclude that the lower court properly construed the statute in determining that the appellee is eligible for provisional credits.
The appellee received a 30-month sentence in case no. 81-4875. He subsequently received a five-year sentence as a habitual offender in case no. 88-11520. The habitual offender sentence is consecutive to the appellee's earlier sentence. The department established the appellee's maximum release date, and a tentative release date with basic and additional gain time. However, the department declined to allow any provisional credits to be used in the release date computations, relying on the exception in section 944.277(1)(g) for an inmate who "is sentenced" as a habitual offender.
Section 944.277 creates a system of provisional credits but excepts, at subsection (1)(g), an inmate who:
Is sentenced, or has previously been sentenced, under s. 775.084, or has been sentenced at any time in another jurisdiction as a habitual offender.
The statute imposes a temporal requirement with regard to the habitual offender exception. Section 944.277(1)(g) applies if an inmate "is ... or has previously been sentenced" as a habitual offender in Florida (under section 775.084, Florida Statutes). This language contrasts with the reference to an inmate who has been sentenced "at any time" as a habitual offender in another jurisdiction. Because the appellee's sentence in case no. 81-4875 was imposed prior to the habitual offender sentence in case no. 88-11520, it is not within the temporal sequence suggested by the statutory language.
The order is affirmed.
1 This court has considered, on its own motion, the question of its jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Although the appellee sought a writ of mandamus as the petitioner below, the appealed order...
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Leftwich v. Fla. Dep't of Corr.
...further provisional credits on any sentence once that inmate received a habitual offender sentence. See generally Dugger v. Anderson, 593 So.2d 1134, 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). In 1992, the First District held that the language “is ... or has previously been sentenced” with respect to a sent......
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Downs v. Crosby, 2D03-4364.
...claims that he is entitled to those credits under section 944.277(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1991), as interpreted in Dugger v. Anderson, 593 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), and McBride v. State, 601 So.2d 1335 (Fla. 2d DCA Section 944.277(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1991), excludes from eligibi......
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McBride v. Moore, 1D00-875.
...the habitual offender sentence was not imposed until after he had begun serving the original sentence. He relies on Dugger v. Anderson, 593 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), in which this court held that, under section 944.277(1)(g), the defendant's habitual offender status did not adversely ......
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Senko v. Singletary, 91-1886
...Florida Statutes, on a sentence which precedes a habitual offender sentence. We reverse. As we recently held in Dugger v. Anderson, 593 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), appellant is entitled to provisional credits on a sentence which precedes his sentence as a habitual offender. See also Wou......