Duhon v. Nelson, 03CA2342.
| Decision Date | 11 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 03CA2342.,03CA2342. |
| Citation | 126 P.3d 262 |
| Parties | Ronald U. DUHON, Gloria I. Duhon, and Casey Jimenez, Manager, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Yvonne I. NELSON, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Law Office of Anthony Martinez, P.C., Anthony L. Martinez, Salida, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Dale R. Enck, Buena Vista, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.
Opinion by: Judge MARQUEZ.
In this dispute involving a leased space in a mobile home park, plaintiffs, Ronald U. Duhon and Gloria I. Duhon (owners) and Casey Jimenez (manager), appeal the judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of defendant, Yvonne I. Nelson (tenant). Plaintiffs also appeal the trial court's orders denying bifurcation, granting a directed verdict in favor of tenant, and denying plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We affirm and remand for further proceedings regarding attorney fees and costs.
The Duhons own Fessler's Mobile Home Park. Tenant leased space no. C-24 in the Park under a month-to-month rental agreement beginning in November 1998. During her tenancy, plaintiffs notified tenant of various alleged violations of the Park's rules and regulations.
In January 2001, tenant entered into a listing contract with certain brokers for the sale of property described as "Lot C-24 Fessler's Park," even though she did not own that space. She twice extended the listing contract with the brokers. According to tenant, plaintiffs interfered with her efforts to sell her mobile home.
In August 2002, plaintiffs served tenant with a notice to quit, alleging noncompliance with park rules and notifying her that the lease would expire that month on its own terms and would not be renewed. A month later, plaintiffs filed a complaint against tenant in forcible entry and detainer in county court. Tenant answered the complaint and brought counterclaims for intentional interference with contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and outrageous conduct, and the case was transferred to the district court. Although plaintiffs moved for bifurcated trials, the motion was denied, and all claims were tried to a jury.
The trial court entered a directed verdict dismissing plaintiffs' claim regarding expiration of the lease. It also dismissed tenant's counterclaim for severe emotional distress. The jury found against plaintiffs on their complaint in forcible entry and detainer and in favor of tenant on her counterclaim for intentional interference with contract. Plaintiffs then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but the trial court denied the motion.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to bifurcate their complaint in unlawful detainer from tenant's counterclaims for tortious interference with contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We disagree.
Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 42(b), a court may order the separate trial of any separate issue or of any number of claims or counterclaims in the furtherance of convenience, to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition or economy in the adjudicatory process. See Gaede v. Dist. Court, 676 P.2d 1186, 1188 (Colo.1984). C.R.C.P. 42 grants the trial court discretion as to whether there should be separate trials. Thus, a court order as to a joint or separate trial will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing that there has been an abuse of discretion. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dist. Court, 617 P.2d 556, 558 (Colo.1980); Kielsmier v. Foster, 669 P.2d 630, 633 (Colo.App.1983). An abuse of discretion occurs where the court's failure to order separate proceedings virtually assures prejudice to a party. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dist. Court, supra. However, in the absence of convenience, avoidance of prejudice, or promotion of expedition or economy in the adjudicatory process, C.R.C.P. 42 is not applicable. Gaede v. Dist. Court, supra.
Plaintiffs contend that the failure to sever resulted in significant prejudice to their case. They argue that the "jury was confronted with the specter of tossing a silver-haired mother onto the street for reasons portrayed as contrived to inflict intentional emotional harm" and that these issues arose from the expiration of the lease. They argue, in the alternative, that they sought to evict defendant for violation of park rules. According to plaintiffs, the issues are highly emotional and are never submitted to a jury, and the combination of issues with infliction of emotional harm is a "formula for prejudice." We disagree.
Here, plaintiffs' motion for bifurcation alleged that
(1) the lease, by its terms, has expired, with the landlord not wishing to renew the lease with the current tenant[]; (2) the delay in a complaint in FED delays the entrance of a new lease for the mobile home space; (3) forcing existing parties to enter into an extension of the existing lease would be an inappropriate interference with contract; and (4) the tenant, having repeatedly violated mobile home park rules and having been served with notices, would weaken the management and safety of the mobile home park through an acquiescence that rules are made to be violated.
In our view, none of plaintiffs' arguments support a finding of prejudice.
Generally, under § 13-40-104(1)(c), C.R.S.2004, a person is guilty of unlawful detention of real property
[w]hen any lessee or tenant at will, or by sufferance, or for any part of a year, or for one or more years, of any real property, including a specific or undivided portion of a building or dwelling, holds over and continues in possession of the demised premises, or any portion thereof, after the expiration of the term for which the same were leased, or after such tenancy, at will or sufferance, has been terminated by either party.
However, the normal forcible entry and detainer law does not apply to owners of mobile homes who are tenants in a mobile home park. Rather, the General Assembly developed specific procedures to address such rentals. Leader Fed. Bank for Sav. v. Saunders, 929 P.2d 1343, 1351-52 (Colo.1997).
Under § 38-12-200.1, et seq., C.R.S.2004, the Mobile Home Park Act, a tenancy shall be terminated only for one or more of the reasons set forth, including (1) failure to comply with ordinances, laws, and regulations; (2) annoyance to other home owners or interference with park management; (3) failure to comply with written rules and regulations of the mobile home park; (4) condemnation or change of use of the mobile home park; (5) false or misleading statements made on the application for tenancy; or (6) certain conduct not at issue here. Section 38-12-203, C.R.S.2004; see also § 13-40-110(2), C.R.S.2004 (); Newport Pac. Capital Co. v. Waste, 878 P.2d 136, 138 (Colo.App.1994). A tenancy may also be terminated for failure to pay rent when due. Section 38-12-204, C.R.S.2004.
A tenancy or other estate at will or lease in a mobile home park may not be terminated solely for the purpose of making the home owner's space in the park available for another mobile home or trailer coach. Section 38-12-205, C.R.S.2004.
In addition to any other defenses a home owner may have, it shall be a defense that the landlord's allegations are false or that the reasons for termination are invalid. Section 38-12-203(2), C.R.S.2004. Thus, tenant could present, as a defense, evidence that plaintiffs' allegations were false or that the reasons for termination were invalid. She could also contest within the FED action the alleged reasons for termination and present evidence of the dispute relating to the sale of her mobile home and plaintiffs' intent to inflict emotional harm.
That forcing the parties to enter into an extension of the existing lease may be an inappropriate interference with contract is not a ground under § 38-12-203(1)(c) for termination. The conditions plaintiffs allege, if true, would have existed regardless of whether the cases were severed, and if severed, tenant would have had to present her case twice, because all the claims involve the same parties.
The record reflects that all the parties' claims arose out of related events. The notice to quit was served one month after plaintiffs' alleged interference with tenant's contract. Further, tenant asserted that plaintiffs' eviction efforts were wrongful and entitled her to an award of damages. She testified that the manager suggested that she would have trouble selling her mobile home and offered to list it for her for a fee of $500. Accordingly, evidence of defendant's claims would have to be addressed in plaintiffs' forcible entry and detainer claim.
Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant plaintiffs' motion for bifurcation because of alleged prejudice.
Plaintiffs also contend that severance was required because the dates of the occurrences were separate, the claims were unrelated, and defendant's claims arose from the sale of her mobile home, not the lease. Thus, in plaintiffs' view, separate trials would not "require the duplication of evidence" because plaintiffs were required to introduce the lease and the notice of violations of mobile home park rules, while the counterclaim required evidence of a contract of sale of a mobile home and a hearsay letter from the brokers. We disagree.
We find no support in the record for plaintiffs' allegations that their ability to enter into a new lease for the mobile home park property would be delayed until the completion of both cases. The record reflects that defendant continued to pay the rent due on the lot. See § 38-12-204(2), C.R.S.2004.
Because convenience, expedition, or economy would not be disserved by a single trial,...
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