Duke Power Co. v. Somerset County Bd. of Taxation, 48.

• Decision Date: 10 October 1940
• Docket Number: No. 48.,48.
• Parties: DUKE POWER CO. v. SOMERSET COUNTY BOARD OF TAXATION et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

15 A.2d 460

DUKE POWER CO.

v. SOMERSET COUNTY BOARD OF TAXATION et al.

No. 48.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Oct. 10, 1940.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Proceeding by the Duke Power Company against Somerset County Board of Taxation and Hillsborough Township for a writ of certiorari to review proceedings had before the Board on a complaint praying that an assessment be added to the tax duplicate for the taxing district of the township as of October 1, 1938, on the tangible personal property of the company. From a judgment dismissing the writ, 124 N.J.L. 481, 12 A.2d 234, the Duke Power Company appeals.

Affirmed.

Pitney, Hardin & Skinner, of Newark (Shelton Pitney and William J. Brennan, Jr., both of Newark, of counsel), for appellant.

W. Eddy Heath, of Somerville (Charles F. Lynch and Frederick C. Vonhof, both of Newark, of counsel), for respondent Hillsborough Tp.

PERSKIE, Justice.

The judgment under review is affirmed for the reasons expressed in the opinion of Chief Justice Brogan for the Supreme Court.

Prosecutor assails the propriety of the inclusion of R.S. 54:3-20 in the "Revised Statutes" of 1937, N.J.S.A. 54:3-20. That assault has far-reaching significance. It strikes at the very vitals of the entire revision and consolidation. The effect of the laws embraced in the revision and consolidation should be free from debate, in pursuance of that conviction, we have considered and determined the merits of the three-fold argument made in support of the stated assault although some phases of the argument were neither raised nor argued below.

1. It is argued here, as it was below, that since R. S. 54:3-20 has for its source P. L.1903, ch. 208, sec. 28, p. 412, which act it is claimed "never empowered County Boards to entertain omitted property complaints," and that since the act of 1903, supra, "in any event, has been repealed" by P.L.1918, ch. 236, sections 507 and 801, N.J.S.A. 54:4-46 to 54:4-48, therefore, R. S. 54:3-20 was improperly included in the Revised Statutes. The basis for this argument is that the act providing for the revision and consolidation of the public statutes of this state merely empowered the commissioners "to revise, simplify, arrange and consolidate all the public acts of this State, which are general and permanent in their nature and which shall be in force at the time such commissioners shall make their final report." P.L.1925, ch. 73, sec 1, p. 244.

The opinion of the Chief Justice very carefully analyzes the pertinent provisions of the acts of 1903 and 1918, supra. See Duke Power Co. v. Somerset County Board of Taxation, 124 N.J.L. 481, pages 485, 486, 12 A.2d 234. That analysis clearly points out that there is no inconsistency between the pertinent provisions of the two acts. The Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that the act of 1918, supra, did not, as it was contended, repeal the act of 1903, supra, now R.S. 54:3-20, N.J.S.A. 54:3-20.

Be that as it may, we are firmly of the opinion that R.S. 54:3-20, N.J.S.A. 54:3-20, did properly come into force and effect as part of the revised statute law of this state.

The legislature recognized the need to eliminate the existence of "contradictions, omissions, and imperfections" in the existing statute law of our state. Thus it empowered the revision commissioners "to suggest" to it "such contradictions, omissions, and imperfections," and also to suggest to it "the mode in which they shall have reconciled, supplied and amended the same," and also to recommend the passage of "new acts, or parts of acts" necessary or expedient to accomplish the desired result. Sec. 3, P.L.1925, supra. The commissioners embraced their suggestions and recommendations in their final report to the legislature. That report was in the "mode" or form of a printed copy of the acts so revised and consolidated, as required by the statute. P.L.1925, supra. It was then clearly the function of the legislature to determine whether or not to adopt the commissioners' suggested and recommended revision and consolidation. The legislature exercised that function on December 20, 1937; it adopted, without change, the commissioners' final report. The revision, in "mode" or form submitted and adopted, became the "public statute law of a general nature of the State of New Jersey." P.L.1937, ch. 188, p. 832.

We are, therefore, fully in accord with the view heretofore expressed by the Supreme Court that "the revision is a wholly independent enactment, superseding all existing general law." Cf. State v. Czarnicki, 124 N.J.L. 43, 45, 10 A.2d 461, 462; Devlin v. Cooper, 124 N.J.L. 155, 158, 11 A.2d 29. Thus, just as it has been properly held that a theretofore existing public statute law of this state, of a general nature, not included in the Revised Statutes is no longer a part of the public statute law of this state (Brower v. Township of Franklin, 119 N.J.L. 417, 197 A. 367), so we also hold that the inclusion of a public statute law, of a general nature, not theretofore in existence, within the Revised...