State v. Czarnicki

• Decision Date: 10 January 1940
• Docket Number: No. 231.,231.
• Citation: 10 A.2d 461,127 N.J.Eq. 43
• Parties: STATE v. CZARNICKI.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

10 A.2d 461

127 N.J.Eq. 43

STATE

v. CZARNICKI.

No. 231.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Jan. 10, 1940.

John Czarnicki was convicted of being a disorderly person on a complaint charging the possession of lottery slips pertaining to a lottery, in contravention of statute, and he brings certiorari.

Affirmed.

Argued October term, 1939, before TRENCHARD, CASE, and HEHER, JJ.

Edward M. Salley, of Jersey City (Edward A. Markley and Charles W. Broadhurst, both of Jersey City, of counsel), for prosecutor.

Daniel O'Regan, Pros, of the Pleas, of Jersey City, and Frank G. Schlosser, Asst. Pros., of Hoboken, for respondent.

HEHER, Justice.

This cause should be captioned as above. Rule 15 of this court, N.J.S.A. Tit. 2, directs that the parties be named in the order in which they appeared in the title below, even though the defendant be the moving party here.

Prosecutor was convicted, and adjudged to be a disorderly person, in the Hudson County Traffic Court on a complaint charging the possession on June 26, 1939, of "lottery slips pertaining to a lottery", in contravention of section 2:202-16 of the Revised Statutes of 1937, N.J.S.A. 2:202-16. Upon the imposition of sentence, he petitioned the Hudson Common Pleas for a summary review of the conviction. Such review was had, and the judgment was affirmed. Thereupon he sued out this writ of certiorari; and the judgment, "together with all matters touching the same, including the testimony taken in the Hudson County Traffic Court," have been returned in obedience to its mandate.

First: The primary insistence is that section 2:229-3 of the Revision, N.J. S.A. 2:229-3, supra, clothing the several county traffic courts with jurisdiction of the offenses denounced by sections 2:201-1 et seq., contravenes Article IV, section VII, placitum 4, of the State Constitution, in that "said statute embraces more than one object and such object is not expressed in its title".

The point is not well made. It proceeds on the premise that Chapter 71 of the Laws of 1930, Pamph. L., p. 300, N.J.S.A. 2:229-l et seq., entitled "An Act relating to county traffic courts, defining their jurisdiction, powers and duties", as amended by Chapter 26 of the Laws of 1934, Pamph. L., p. 78, the source of section 2:229-3 of the Revision, N.J.S.A. 2:229-3, supra, violated the cited constitutional precept, to the conclusion that this asserted invalidity extends to the like provisions incorporated in the revision. But such is not the case.

Granting the postulate for present purposes, the conclusion is faulty. Non sequitur. The revision is a wholly independent enactment, superseding all preexisting general laws; and the constitutionality of its several provisions in this behalf depends upon its own title and not upon the titles of prior enactments embodied therein. It is entitled "An Act to establish all the public statute law of a general nature of the State of New Jersey in the form of a revision, consolidation and compilation, to be known as the Revised Statutes". N.J. S.A. Tit. 1, p. XII. Thus, the object of the enactment is single and is expressed in its title. The stated object is the "revision, consolidation and compilation" of "all the public statute law of a general nature". The contrary view would nullify the revision; it would render a general revision impossible. The title is in no sense uncertain, misleading or deceptive. This is the general test of constitutional sufficiency in this regard. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. v. Camden, 118 N.J.L. 245, 192 A. 222; State v. Guida, 119 N.J.L. 464, 196 A. 711.

Nor is there a plurality of objects in the constitutional sense. A revision, consolidation and compilation of all the general laws is not within the mischiefs outlawed by this constitutional edict. That constitutes a unified object, i. e., the achievement of the major advantages to be had through the revision, consolidation and compilation of the general public laws into a systematic whole. The act providing for the revision (Chapter 73 of the Laws of 1925, p. 244, N.J.S.A. 1:10-1) affirms the legislative concept of the benefits thus to be had; and we deem it unnecessary further to elaborate the theme. The object is single, even though statutory provisions otherwise unrelated in subject matter are combined in one general enactment. The constitutional command thus invoked was designed "to prevent the concealment of the real object of the act and what is commonly called logrolling." Hulme v. Board of Commissioners of Trenton, 95 N.J.L. 30, 111 A. 541, affirmed Hulme v. Donnelly, 95 N.J.L. 545, 112 A. 498. See, also, Sawter v. Shoenthal, 81 N.J.L. 197, 80 A. 101; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. State, 104 Ga. 831, 31 S.E. 531, 42 L.R.A. 518; Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N.W. 923, 28 Am.St.Rep. 382; Marston v. Humes, 3 Wash. 267, 28 P. 520.

Second: It is next urged that "there was no competent legal proof that a lottery in fact existed and that the alleged lottery slips found in prosecutor's possession were a part of or pertained to said existing lottery," and therefore the conviction is utterly lacking in evidential support.

The transcript of the evidence and proceedings reveals that the question thus presented was not raised below. The case was tried on the assumption that the lottery slips were in fact contraband within the definition of the statute. The defense interposed was that the slips had not been in the possession of the accused; and he moved, at the close of the case, for "a direction of verdict of not guilty" on the grounds (a) that the "complaint * * * is defective"; (b) that "the court is without jurisdiction"; and (c) the "only testimony in this case is the testimony of Officer Lisa and this defendant", and therefore guilt had not been "established beyond a reasonable doubt", and the court was under "a duty * * * to find this defendant not guilty."

In a proceeding such as this, the writ of certiorari serves the function of a writ of error. The review is confined to errors of law. This court does not review the evidence and resolve factual disputes; it accepts the fact-findings of the inferior court, if there be any legal evidence to sustain them. Ayers v. Bartlett, 14 N.J.L. 330; Coles & Sons' Co. v. Blythe, 69 N.J.L. 666, 55 A. 816; Ryer v. Turkel, 75 N.J.L. 677, 70 A.'68; Shangnuole v. Ohl, 58 N.J.L. 557, 34 A. 755; McAdam v. Block, 63 N.J.L. 508, 44 A. 208; Traphagen v. Township of West Hoboken, 39 N.J.L. 232, affirmed 40 N.J.L. 193; State, Elder, Pros. v. District Medical Society of Hudson County, 35 N.J.L. 200. And the rule is firmly embedded in our system of procedure, apposite also to such reviews by certiorari, that the appellate court will not take cognizance of a question not raised in the inferior tribunal, unless it be an error of law exhibited on the face of the record or one involving jurisdiction or public policy. Kluczek v. State, 115 N.J.L. 105, 178 A. 632; State v. Shupe, 88 N.J.L. 610, 97 A. 271; Schmid v. Law, 83 N.J.L. 635, 87 A. 452; Mechler v. Fialk, 82 N.J.L. 273, 82 A. 330, affirmed 84 N.J.L. 406, 86 A. 401; Ryer v. Turkel, supra; State v. O'Leary, 110 N.J.L. 36, 163 A. 904; Corn v. Kaplan, 103 NJ.L. 628, 139 A. 12; Reeves v. Jones, 74 N.J.L. 330, 66 A. 113; Shangnuole v. Ohl, supra; Smith v. Board of Excise of Elizabeth, 46 N.J.L. 312; State v. Verona, 93 N.J.L. 389, 108 A. 250; State v. Schlosser, 85 N.J.L. 165, 89 A. 522, affirmed 86 N.J.L. 374, 91 A. 1071. Ordinarily, the writ of certiorari evokes the return of the entire record of the inferior tribunal, but this does not render inapplicable the general rule that only the questions raised therein are cognizable by the court of review.

More specifically, the question of failure...