Duke v. Boyd County

• Decision Date: 15 June 1928
• Citation: 225 Ky. 112,7 S.W.2d 839
• Parties: DUKE et al. v. BOYD COUNTY.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

7 S.W.2d 839

225 Ky. 112

DUKE et al. v. BOYD COUNTY.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

June 15, 1928

Appeal from Circuit Court, Boyd County.

Suit by William Duke and others against Boyd County. Petition was dismissed, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded.

James B. Adamson and John S. Fullerton, both of Ashland, for appellants.

Jos. M Spears and Martin & Smith, all of Catlettsburg, for appellee.

CLAY C.J.

Section 16 of the Rash-Gullion Act of 1922 (Acts 1922, c. 33), now section 2554a16, Kentucky Statutes, Baldwin's 1926 Supplement, provides as follows:

"Any peace officer making an arrest of any person for any violation of this act shall, upon final conviction of defendant, receive a fee of $5.00 to be taxed as costs, and if not paid as costs then same shall be allowed by the fiscal court of the county and paid out of county funds."

This suit was brought against Boyd County by William Duke, W. B Gainey, and M. L. Hutchinson, in their own behalf, and for the use and benefit of about 25 policemen and ex-policemen of the city of Ashland to recover the sum of $6,514.25, being the aggregate amount of their claims against the county for arrests made under the foregoing statute between January 1, 1923, and October 1, 1926. The county interposed a demurrer to the petition, as amended, and the petition was dismissed. Plaintiffs have appealed.

It is first insisted that there was a misjoinder; but the case cannot be distinguished from Gorley v. City of Louisville, 65 S.W. 844, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1782, where it was held that, under section 25, Civil Code of Practice, providing, "If the question involved a common or general interest of many persons, or if the parties be numerous and it is impracticable to bring all of them before the court within a reasonable time, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all," several of a large number of policemen, having claims against the city for compensation for the time they were illegally suspended under a void order, might sue for the benefit of all.

The only defense to the claims of the policemen is that the statute is unconstitutional. It must not be overlooked that, when the power of the Legislature to enact a law is called in question, the sole duty of the courts is to look to the provisions of the federal and state Constitutions, and if they do not in express terms, or by necessary and proper implication, forbid the exercise of such power, they must uphold the validity of the act. Beyond the constitutional restrictions thus to be interpreted the only limits upon the state Legislature in enacting laws are its own wisdom, sound judgment, and patriotism. In case of doubt its action will not be interfered with by the courts. Respect for the wisdom of a co-ordinate department of the government, as well as sound policy, forbids such interposition except upon clear and satisfactory grounds. Commonwealth v. Goldburg, 167 Ky. 96, 180 S.W. 68; Craig v. O'Rear, 199 Ky. 553, 251 S.W. 828; Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 201 Ky. 441, 257 S.W. 33. With these principles in mind, let us examine the grounds on which the statute is assailed.

We find no merit in the contention that the quoted provision is invalid in that it violates section 51 of the Constitution, which provides:

"No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." * * *

It is not essential that every provision of an act be specifically referred to in the title. All that is necessary is that each provision shall be germane, and not foreign, to the title. The title of the act of which the quoted provision is a part need not be quoted at length. The title, in part, is:

"An act to prohibit the manufacture, sale, transportation, possession, or other disposition, of spirituous, vinous, malt, or intoxicating liquors, except for sacramental, medicinal, scientific or mechanical purposes."

The statute was enacted for the purpose of enforcing a prohibition. Therefore, any reasonable method or means by which that object may be accomplished is naturally related to, and connected with, the subject, and may be included in the act as appropriate legislation. Collins v. Henderson, 11 Bush, 74; Commonwealth v. Starr, 160 Ky. 260, 169 S.W. 743.

The principal ground on which the validity of the act is challenged may be summarized as follows: The prevention and punishment of crime is an attribute of state sovereignty, and no such power lies in a county as a political subdivision of the state. Being purely a state function, the Legislature is without power to impose upon a county the burden of administration of that function without making provision for revenue to defray the expense of such administration. Nor can it give to one political subdivision the control of the courts administering that function, and the revenue arising from its administration, and impose upon another separate political subdivision a part of the cost of such...