Dukes v. Shell Oil Co.

Citation40 Del.Ch. 174,177 A.2d 785
PartiesJohn W. DUKES, Louise H. Dukes, Edna H. W. Dukes, Howard Charleston, Beulah Charleston, James L. Dickinson, Betty Dickinson, John H. McQuail, Helen McQuail and James A. Staats, Plaintiffs, v. SHELL OIL COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Joseph S. Dayton, Harry H. Lambert, and Harry B. Roberts, Jr., constituting the Levy Court of New Castle County; and Bayard A. Vandergrift, William R. Manning, John F. Porter, Charles C. Gammons, and Harvey G. Cole, constituting the New Castle County Zoning Commission and Grey M. Budd, Frances K. Budd, Edward R. Cordery, Lucy C. Cordery, Mary C. Derrickson, Lone Manor Farms, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Harry W. Lynch, Jr., Mary T. Lynch, Ruth F. Vogel, Susanna C. Wallace, Augustus E. Sheats, Elizabeth S. Sheats, Daniel C. Casapulla, Dorothy L. Casapulla, Nolan B. Williams, Meta Williams, Freeman Segars, Ruby B. Segars, Joseph A. Krejci, William H. Brady, Jr., Edith F. Brady, Michael Kitschik and Elena Kitschik, Defendants.
Decision Date19 January 1962
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware

William Prickett, Jr., of Prickett, Prickett & Tybout, Wilmington, for plaintiffs.

Edmund N. Carpenter, II, and Richard J. Abrams, of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, for Shell Oil Co.

Clarence W. Taylor and Robert C. O'Hora, Wilmington, for Levy Court of New Castle County and New Castle County Zoning Commission.

William F. Lynch, II, of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, for certain individual defendants.

Clair J. Killoran, of Killoran & Van Brunt, Wilmington, for certain individual defendants.

David F. Anderson, of Berl, Potter & Anderson, Wilmington, for defendant Ruth F. Vogel.

Joseph Donald Craven, Wilmington, Delaware, for defendant Joseph A. Krejci.

SHORT, Vice Chancellor.

Plaintiffs seek a decree of this court avoiding the action of the New Castle County Zoning Commission and the Levy Court of New Castle County in rezoning certain parcels of land in Blackbird Hundred, New Castle County, Delaware, from the R-2 (Agricultural and General Purposes) classification to the M-3 (Heavy Industry) classification, and an injunction restraining the defendants from using said parcels of land for any purpose in violation of the R-2 classification. Pursuant to an act of the Legislature, 48 Del.Laws, Ch. 321, now Ch. 26 of Title 9, Del.C., the Levy Court of New Castle County, in about the year 1954, adopted a zoning plan and regulations for those portions of the county lying outside of incorporated municipalities. With certain minor exceptions, not here important, the whole of Blackbird Hundred was zoned in the R-2 classification. The Zoning Code adopted by the Levy Court of New Castle County defined the R-2 classification as follows:

'While R-2 districts are designated as one of the R districts, they include large undeveloped areas for which the ultimate purpose cannot now be determined. It is expected that, as the development of New Castle County takes place, portions of these R-2 districts will be required for other uses. Requests for rezoning such portions as residential, commercial, or industrial districts will be studied and acted upon on their own merits, following procedures outlines in Article XX of this Code.'

In the latter part of 1960 and early 1961, Shell Oil Company (hereinafter Shell) obtained options from the owners of fourteen parcels of land situate in the Deakyneville area of Blackbird Hundred to purchase such lands with a view to constructing and operating a petroleum refinery and for related petro-chemical uses. The options thus acquired covered lands totalling 3,345 acres, more or less. This acreage comprised two large non-contiguous, irregular shaped parcels. Plaintiffs, or one or more of them, own lands between the two parcels, or in the 'corridor', as plaintiffs describe the intervening lands.

On May 5, 1961 Shell and the owners filed a petition with the New Castle County Zoning Commission to rezone all of the optioned lands from the R-2 classification to the M-3 classification. On May 24, 1961 a hearing was held by the Zoning Commission pursuant to the statutory mandate. Following the hearing the commission reserved its decision for a period of thirty days in order to provide members of the public an opportunity to express their views. The majority of the members of the commission who participated in the hearing concluded that all of the lands mentioned in the petition should be rezoned as requested. The recommendations of the Zoning Commission were then delivered to the Levy Court of New Castle County which proceeded to a hearing on August 8, 1961 as required by law. On August 29, 1961 the Levy Court passed a resolution by a two to one vote rezoning 2,625 acres of the lands covered by the petition filed with the Zoning Commission from the R-2 classification to the M-3 classification. The present complaint was filed on September 11, 1961. By stipulation the case made out by Count One of the complaint has been submitted to the court on the record made before the Zoning Commission and the Levy Court of New Castle County, together with depositions and other documents agreed upon by the parties.

Count Two of the complaint alleges causes of action anticipatory in nature. As to this count defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The present opinion is not intended to dispose of such motion.

Paragraph 5 of the complaint sets forth the grounds upon which plaintiffs claim that the action of the Levy Court was invalid. This paragraph is as follows:

'5. The actions of the Levy Court and purported rezoning by the majority opinion and resolution were without authority in law or fact in that:

'(a) The proceedings of the majority of the Levy Court were arbitrary and capricious and in violation of 9 Del.C. 2603.

'(b) The purported rezoning of 2,625 acres in a checkerboard pattern was flagrant spot rezoning of a larger area than necessary for the needs of Shell and was for the benefit of Shell and the owners to the detriment of the plaintiffs and the other residents of the area, the county and the State.

'(c) The two members of the Levy Court who voted for the rezoning resolutions failed to consult, confer and advise with one another and with the member who voted against the resolutions.

'(d) The two members of the Levy Court who voted for the rezoning resolutions imposed on the opponents of the rezoning including the plaintiffs, the burden of proof.

'(e) Members of the Levy Court or their representatives consulted privately with representatives of Shell and the owners in violation of 9 Del.C. 2611 and deprived the opponents of the rezoning including the plaintiffs, of due process of law.

'(f) There is no evidence to support the purported rezoning of 2,625 acres in a checkerboard pattern in the Deakyneville area.

'(g) The Levy Court has failed to make a zoning plan for Blackbird Hundred in violation of 9 Del.C. 2607.'

It now appears that plaintiffs have abandoned the matters complained of in subparagraphs [c] and [g] of paragraph 5 of the complaint.

Before proceeding to a determination of the issues presented by the record and briefs of counsel, it should be observed that the hearings held before the Zoning Commission and the Levy Court of New Castle County were lengthy and exhaustive. This is evidenced by a transcript of the hearing before the Zoning Commission comprising 209 pages, and by the transcript of the hearing before the Levy Court of 259 pages. The record contains also, numerous briefs and exhibits which were before those bodies. In addition to this mass of material, several thousand letters were received by the Commission and the Levy Court relating to this subject. It also appears that the members of the Levy Court conferred with numerous persons both before and after the hearing with regard to the problem confronting them. Two of the Levy Court commissioners inspected the area involved before the hearing. Between the time of the hearing and the date of the rezoning resolution each of the members of the Levy Court reviewed the transcripts, recommendations of the Zoning Commission and the many documents involved. On August 24, 1961 the members of the Levy Court met for a period of approximately four hours, during which time they conferred with one another and with their attorneys with respect to their problem. It is evident from the record that the Levy Court commissioners devoted many hours of their time to a consideration of the numerous questions involved. Not only did they have the benefit of the views of members of the general public of New Castle County, but also the testimony of a number of experts in the zoning field and other areas related to the problems which were before them. In fact, it appears that at the conclusion of the hearing before the Levy Court it was agreed by all involved, including the attorney for the plaintiffs, that the entire subject had been exhausted. Under these circumstances it can hardly be contended that the members of the Levy Court of New Castle County did not give thorough consideration to the issues presented to them. It is also to be observed that nowhere, either in the complaint, in plaintiffs' brief or in the oral argument, is there any suggestion whatever of any improper motives which might have induced the members of the Levy Court to act as they did.

The pertinent provisions of the New Castle County Zoning law, Ch. 26 of Title 9 Del.C., are in substance, as follows:

§ 2601 empowers the Levy Court to regulate, inter alia, 'the uses of land for trade, industry, residence, recreation, public activities, water supply conservation, soil conservation, or other similar purposes,' in New Castle County outside of incorporated municipalities.

§ 2602 empowers the Levy Court, for the purposes specified in § 2601, to divide New Castle County into districts or zones as it might determine and to regulate the uses...

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