Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.

• Decision Date: 26 November 1969
• Docket Number: No. 42061,42061
• Citation: 253 N.E.2d 373,44 Ill.2d 15
• Parties: Clarence H. DULEY, Admr., Appellant, v. CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 373

253 N.E.2d 373

44 Ill.2d 15

Clarence H. DULEY, Admr., Appellant, v. CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., Appellee.

No. 42061.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 26, 1969.

Elmo E. Koos, Peoria, for appellant.

David A. Nicoll and Ross E. Canterbury, Peoria (Westervelt, Johnson, Nicoll & Keller, Peoria, of counsel), for appellee.

KLUCZYNSKI, Justice.

Stella Duley was fatally injured in the course of her employment when she was struck by a fork-lift truck at defendant's plant in August, 1963. Clarence Duley, husband and sole surviving beneficiary of deceased, filed a claim for her death before the Industrial Commission wherein it was stipulated that both she and defendant were operating under the Workmen's Compensation Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, ch. 48, pars. 138.1 Et seq.) A $500 burial expense was paid to plaintiff by defendant pursuant to section 7(f) of the Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, ch. 48, par. 138.7(f).) No further compensation was paid because the arbitrator found that deceased left no persons entitled to compensation as provided in section 7.

Thereafter plaintiff, as administrator of his wife's estate, brought a wrongful death action to recover damages for the death of his wife. Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that decedent and defendant were operating under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the rights and remedies of plaintiff were exclusively provided therein was allowed and the suit was dismissed.

Plaintiff has two contentions: (1) that section 5(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a)) does not bar plaintiff's action for wrongful death, and (2) if section 5(a) does bar his action then sections 5(a) and 7 are unconstitutional. U.S.Const., 14th amend.; Ill.Const., art. II, sec. 2, S.H.A.

Under the circumstances of this case section 5(a) of the Act constitutes a bar to plaintiff's wrongful death action. This section provides: 'No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer or his employees for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, shall be available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury.' In addition, section 11 sets out the extent of liability of the employer. 'The compensation herein provided * * * shall be the measure of the responsibility of any employer engaged in any of the enterprises or businesses enumerated in * * * this Act, * * *.' Ill.Rev.Stat. 1963, ch. 48, par. 138.11.

Plaintiff argues that the foregoing is inapplicable because the Act does not provide compensation for the husband of a deceased employed where the husband is not totally dependent on deceased. This argument ignores both the fact that plaintiff's wife is still an employee who is covered by the provisions of the Act and the fact that some compensation was paid to the plaintiff under the Act as a result of the death.

The section 5(a) prohibition of additional actions is consistent with the legislative purpose of the statute. 'The act was designed as a substitute for previous rights of action of employees against employers and to cover the whole ground of the liabilities of the master, and it has been so regarded by all courts. * * * The act, in taking away existing rights of action of the employee and extending the liabilities of the employer, fixes limits to the amount to be recovered, and is sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power for the promotion of the general welfare by covering the entire subject with fixed rules.' (Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Bd., 254 Ill. 378, 382--383, 120 N.E. 249, 251.) Also, this determination is consistent with Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill.2d 407, 137 N.E.2d 842, wherein the court held that section 5(a) barred a common-law action for damages arising out of employment, even though no compensation for permanent injury was provided for in the Act.

Plaintiff cites Miller v. Hotel Savoy Co., 228 Mo.App. 463, 68 S.W.2d 929 which interprets the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act. The court found that because no remedy was provided in the Act, the plaintiffs therein were not precluded from bringing an action outside of the Act. However, the 'exclusive liability' clause of the Missouri Act includes an exception reading as follows: 'The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his wife, her husband, parents, personal representatives, dependents, heirs or next kin, at common law of otherwise, on account of such accidental injury or death, Except such rights and remedies as are not provided for by this chapter.' (Emphasis added.) (Mo.W.C.L. par. 3301.) The Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act contains no such exception in its 'exclusive liability' clause. (Section 5(a).) Other cases cited by plaintiff involve different facts and statutes and are not analogous to the instant case.

Having determined that section 5 (a) bars...