Dumas v. Mena

• Decision Date: 16 March 2004
• Docket Number: (AC 24691)
• Citation: 82 Conn. App. 61,842 A.2d 618
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: RALPH DUMAS v. RAFAEL MENA ET AL.

82 Conn. App. 61

842 A.2d 618

RALPH DUMAS v. RAFAEL MENA ET AL.

(AC 24691)

Court of Appeals of Connecticut.

Argued January 7, 2004.

Officially released March 16, 2004.

Foti, Schaller and Dranginis, JS. William J. Melley III, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

Gerald M. Beaudoin, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

FOTI, J.

The defendants Rafael Mena and the city of Hartford appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Ralph Dumas. The jury awarded $23,453¹ to the plaintiff as compensation for personal injuries that he sustained in a motor vehicle accident that took place in Hartford on October 21, 1999. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found that the plaintiff stopped his vehicle at a stop sign, located at the intersection of Granby Street and Burlington Street, and then proceeded onto Granby Street, turning left into the southbound lane. At the same time, Mena, an officer in the Hartford police department, was traveling northbound on Granby Street in a police cruiser, responding to a disturbance call. Mena, during the course of his employment for the city, negligently operated his vehicle so that it crossed into Dumas' lane and the two vehicles collided. As a result of Mena's negligence, both Dumas and Mena sustained injuries. The defendant Albert DiStefano, a Hartford police officer, investigated the accident and issued a ticket to Dumas for violating General Statutes § 14-301 (c).²

Dumas subsequently commenced a three count action against Mena, the city of Hartford and DiStefano. In the first count, which was directed at Mena and the city, Dumas alleged that Mena's negligence caused the accident. In the second count, Dumas alleged that DiStefano's issuance of a ticket to Dumas constituted an abuse of process. In the third count, Dumas alleged that Mena falsely informed DiStefano that Dumas had failed to stop at the stop sign and that such conduct constituted an abuse of process.

Prior to trial, the defendants filed a motion to bifurcate the trial of the negligence claim from the trial of the abuse of process claims. They essentially argued that the evidence relating to the abuse of process claims would prejudice the jury as to the negligence claim. The court denied the motion to bifurcate. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the negligence count and in favor of the defendants on the abuse of process counts. The defendants thereafter filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, claiming that the court abused its discretion in denying their motion to bifurcate the negligence claim from the abuse of process claims and that such denial caused them prejudice. The court denied the motion. On appeal, Mena and the city again argue that the judgment should be set aside on that ground.

The record reflects that the defendants filed their motion to bifurcate on the day prior to the start of the trial. The defendants stated in their motion that "[a]lthough the actions arise out of the same set of facts, the legal theories behind the recovery reached are quite varied as one is of simple negligence and the other is a tort." The defendants also argued that bifurcation was necessary "for the reason that the opening statements that posture the questions and the evidence will serve as a distraction to the jury with regard to its immediate and primary focus: whether or not the plaintiff has sustained his burden that Officer Mena was the cause of the motor vehicle accident. If the plaintiff fails in that burden of proof, the jury will never need to address the issue of the allege[d] abusive process."

The court heard argument concerning the motion and, in denying the defendants' motion, stated: "I see little to be gained by bifurcating and certain disadvantages. I think we would end up trying some of the same issues twice. It may be that there are some things that are appropriate on the verdict form or even in the charge, but I'm going to deny the motion to bifurcate."

"Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-205³ and Practice Book § 15-1,⁴ the trial court may order that one or more issues that are joined be tried before the others. The interests served by bifurcated trials are convenience, negation of prejudice and judicial efficiency.... Bifurcation may be appropriate in cases in which litigation of one issue may obviate the need to litigate another issue.... The bifurcation of trial proceedings lies solely within the discretion of the trial court." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 448-49, 820 A.2d 258 (2003).

Nothing in the record...