Dunaway v. State (Ex parte Dunaway)
Decision Date | 18 April 2014 |
Docket Number | 1090697. |
Parties | Ex parte Larry Dunaway. (In re Larry DUNAWAY v. STATE of Alabama). |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Randall S. Susskind and Charlotte R. Morrison, Equal Justice Initiative, Montgomery, for petitioner.
Luther Strange, atty. gen., John C. Neiman, deputy atty. gen., and Thomas R. Govan, Jr., asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
MURDOCK
, Justice.
Larry Dunaway1 filed a Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition in the Barbour Circuit Court (“the Rule 32 court”) challenging his 1997 convictions for the capital murder of his girlfriend Tressa M. Patterson and Patterson's 22–month–old son James Patterson.2 See Dunaway v. State, 746 So.2d 1021 (Ala.Crim.App.1998)
(affirming Dunaway's convictions) (“Dunaway I ”), aff'd, 746 So.2d 1042 (Ala.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1089, 120 S.Ct. 1724, 146 L.Ed.2d 645 (2000). The Rule 32 court entered an order denying Dunaway's petition, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. See Dunaway v. State, 198 So.3d 530 (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (“Dunaway II ”). Dunaway petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Dunaway II. We granted the writ to consider (1) Dunaway's claims of misconduct by four jurors who allegedly failed to disclose pertinent information during voir dire; (2) Dunaway's claim that the Rule 32 court erred by denying his Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), claims that he was denied due process as a result of District Attorney Boyd Whigham's failure to disclose alleged relationships between him and certain jurors; and (3) Dunaway's claim that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial. Because we conclude that Dunaway is entitled to a new trial based on his juror-misconduct claim, we pretermit any discussion of his nondisclosure claim as to Whigham and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
The following is from the rendition of facts by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Dunaway I:
, and that he had heard voices telling him what to do since he was a child. His trial testimony about the murders was similar to his statement to Paulk, except that he testified that voices started talking to him while he was in the mobile home. He stated that he did not remember everything he did between the time he shot Tressa and the time he realized he was in the woods, and he added that he was not in control of himself at the time. He contended that he did what the voices told him to do. He testified that he made up the story about going to Clayton because he was scared and nervous. He also admitted that, in spite of his statements [to neighbors to the contrary] immediately following the fire, he knew Tressa and James were in the mobile home when it was burning.
“During his testimony, [Dunaway] admitted that he had previously been convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of car-jacking in Louisiana. He also admitted that a weapon had been used to commit the crime.
“Dr. James Lauridson, the medical examiner, testified that Tressa died from a gunshot wound to the chest. He determined that she was badly injured before [Dunaway] started the fire, but she probably did not die instantly. There was no carbon monoxide in her blood and no sign of inhaled smoke or soot in her airways. Therefore, Lauridson concluded that she may not have been breathing when the fire began.
“Lauridson testified that James's body showed no signs that he had suffered any injuries before the fire. There was a great deal of soot in his windpipe, indicating that he was probably alive when the fire became fully developed. Toxicological tests revealed that James had a fatal level of carbon monoxide in his blood. Lauridson stated that James died because he choked to death while inhaling smoke and other by-products of the fire.
“....
“[Dunaway] initially entered a plea of not guilty. Subsequently, he amended his plea to assert that he was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The trial court ordered an evaluation to determine whether [Dunaway] was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense; whether the symptoms of any disease or defect contributed to the commission of the offense, and, if so, in what manner; whether [Dunaway] was capable of assisting in his own defense; and whether he was competent to stand trial. Dr. Michael D'Errico, a forensic psychologist and certified forensic examiner for the State of Alabama, examined [Dunaway] pursuant to the trial court's order and found [Dunaway] to be competent to stand trial.
. This is an illness of young adults, mostly males, between 15 and 25 years of age. And half the women but later, 25 to 35 years of age. And it is...
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