Dunaway v. State

• Citation: 440 N.E.2d 682
• Decision Date: 22 October 1982
• Docket Number: No. 1281S381,1281S381
• Parties: William Leroy DUNAWAY, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Page 682

440 N.E.2d 682

William Leroy DUNAWAY, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 1281S381.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 22, 1982.

Jack Quirk, Muncie, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Dan S. LaRue, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

HUNTER, Justice.

The defendant, William LeRoy Dunaway, was convicted by a jury of murder, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.) and was sentenced to the Indiana Department of Correction for a term of sixty years. He raises the following six issues in this direct appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in overruling defendant's motions to suppress and subsequently admitting his written confession;

2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony of a statement made by the decedent over defendant's objection;

3. Whether the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs of the decedent;

4. Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony about a substance which appeared to be blood but was not specifically identified;

5. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing defendant to present testimony of other rapes which occurred in the vicinity of the instant crime and for which another individual had been arrested; and

6. Whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence on all the elements of the crime as charged.

A summary of the facts from the record most favorable to the state shows that the victim, Debra Stough, went with two friends, Brenda and Shirley James, to see a fireworks show in Richmond, Indiana, on July 4, 1980. The three girls returned to Debra's home and defendant stopped by to see them about 11:00 p. m. that evening. They sat on the porch drinking beer and then defendant and Shirley James left to get more beer. Shirley testified that they drove out to a reservoir where defendant made advances toward her. She refused defendant and they returned to Debra's house. Debra's mother, Beatrice Allen, who was also at the house at this time, testified that Debra told her she did not want to be left alone with defendant.

Eventually, Debra's mother and the James sisters left and Debra went inside her house to fix a bottle for her baby. Defendant followed her into the kitchen and they engaged in sex. Debra then began to argue with defendant and attempted to hit him. Defendant struck her with his hand and then pulled out his knife, stabbed her and slashed her throat in two places. His clothes and shoes were bloodstained, so he went to his mother's house where he changed into some clean clothes. He took the bloodstained clothes and shoes with him and drove to his uncle's property in Oxford, Ohio.

Defendant's uncle was camping on this property and testified that defendant knocked on his camper door about 4:00 a. m. on the morning of July 5, 1980. Defendant talked with his uncle for a few minutes and said he had been in a fight and wanted to burn some clothes in the campfire. He was also going to burn his knife but his uncle said he would take the knife. His uncle then went back in his camper and did not actually see defendant burn his clothes. Defendant returned to his own house in Richmond around noon on July 5, 1980. Two police officers came to his house later that afternoon and said that they wanted to question him. Defendant accompanied them to the police station and later that afternoon signed a written statement admitting to the murder of Debra Stough.

I.

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by overruling his motions to suppress his inculpatory statement given to the police at the police station on the afternoon of July 5, 1980. He argues that this statement was given after he was illegally arrested without probable cause. Furthermore, he argues that he was so intoxicated at the time that he could not have made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights.

It is clear that if a confession is the product of an unlawful detention or an illegal arrest it is inadmissible. Dunaway v. New York, (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824; Brown v. Illinois, (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416; Triplett v. State, (1982) Ind., 437 N.E.2d 468; Morris v. State, (1980) Ind., 399 N.E.2d 740. However, it is also clear that not every police-citizen encounter amounts to a "seizure" of the person so that an arrest or unlawful detention has occurred. The test for determining whether a person has been "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes is whether, considering all the circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, the defendant entertained a reasonable belief that he was not free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall, (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (plurality opinion); Barber v. State, (1981) Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 563.

As a court of review, we review the question of the admissibility of a confession as we do other sufficiency matters. We do not weigh the evidence, but rather determine whether there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's finding. This is true even though conflicting evidence is presented on the issue of voluntariness. Long v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 284; Battle v. State, (1981) Ind., 415 N.E.2d 39, Arch v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 450, 381 N.E.2d 465.

In the instant case, the facts are sufficient to show that defendant voluntarily accompanied the officers to the police station. The record shows that two officers went to defendant's home on the afternoon of July 5, 1980. They knocked on the door and were invited to come inside. They asked defendant to accompany them to the police station for questioning. No weapons were drawn and defendant was not handcuffed. Defendant rode to the police station in the front seat of the police car. At the station he talked with one policeman, Officer Bratton, who had been his friend for several years as well as with other officers. He was given a soft drink during the period of questioning. He was read a statement of his Miranda rights and signed the rights form before any questioning started. Defendant had been involved with police on prior occasions and stated that he did understand his rights. He stated that he wanted to talk about the incident because he "wanted to get it off his conscience." His statement was completed in a little over an hour. One of the police officers testified that after defendant finished giving his statement he asked to see his girlfriend "before he was arrested and taken to the county jail." While it is true that defendant was not specifically informed at his home that he was not under arrest, no physical restraints were used. His previous experience with the law, his friendship with Officer Bratton, and his request to see his girlfriend "before he was arrested" all support the conclusion that he did not believe he was under arrest when he was transported to police headquarters. We find there was sufficient evidence here to support the trial court's finding that defendant's confession was not the product of an illegal arrest.

Defendant next alleges that his confession was not voluntarily given because he was too intoxicated at the time he gave his statement to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights. On this issue, also, we are limited to a determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion. There is uncontested evidence that defendant was drinking throughout the day on July 4, 1980. However, three experienced police officers testified about defendant's appearance and actions at the police station on the next day, July 5, 1980, and all stated that defendant was sober at that time. They testified that defendant appeared clean and composed, walked in a normal manner without a stagger, and that his speech was coherent. There was no odor of alcoholic beverages on defendant. It is uncontested that defendant was properly advised of his Miranda rights and stated that he understood them prior to all questioning. We find that this was substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding of a voluntary confession.

II.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in allowing Debra's mother to testify about some remarks Debra made on the evening of the crime. Beatrice Allen was allowed to testify, over defendant's hearsay objection, about what her daughter said to her while they were inside the house and defendant was out on the porch. Mrs. Allen testified about what Debra had said:

" 'Mom,' she says, 'Don't leave us.' I said, 'Why.' She says, 'I just don't want Billy around me.' She said, 'Make him leave.' I said, 'What's wrong?' She said, 'I just don't want him around me.' She said, 'There's something...