Dunbar v. Cronin
Citation | 164 P. 447,18 Ariz. 583 |
Decision Date | 18 April 1917 |
Docket Number | Civil 1525 |
Parties | MARK DUNBAR, Appellant, v. CON P. CRONIN, Appellee |
Court | Supreme Court of Arizona |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. R. C. Stanford, Judge. Affirmed.
Messrs Kibbey, Bennett & Curtis, for Appellant.
Mr. G P. Bullard, for Appellee.
This is an action in the nature of a writ of quo warranto brought to try the title to the office of state law and legislative reference librarian. The plaintiff-appellant claims title through appointment by the board of curators of the state library, and the defendant-appellee claims title by legislative appointment. A demurrer to the plaintiff-appellant's complaint was sustained by the trial court, and, he refusing and declining to amend his complaint, judgment was entered in favor of defendant-appellee, from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
Both the appellant and appellee claim title to the office by virtue of the provisions of chapter 62, entitled "An act establishing a state library, with a law and legislative reference bureau, providing for the appointment of a board of curators and librarian, defining their duties and making an appropriation therefor," passed at the second regular session of the legislature, effective June 10 1915. That act, or so much thereof as we deem important and material to the decision of this case, we here set forth:
If the legislature had the power to do so, it is very plain that it has appointed the appellee the law and legislative reference librarian "until otherwise provided by law," and it has, by express language, deprived the board of curators of the power "to appoint said legislative reference librarian during the incumbency in office" of the appellee.
As to the intent of the legislature in this matter there is no room for controversy. To say that the legislature meant something else is to indict it of saying one thing and meaning another. The appellee's tenure of office, under the terms of this act, is determinable only by death, resignation, failure to perform the duties of the office, or willful misconduct therein, or by the legislature. In any event the board of curators cannot remove the legislative appointee.
Section 366, Sutherland on Statutory Construction.
Indeed the appellant and appellee are in agreement as to the meaning intended by the legislature, for the appellant in his brief says:
". . . The legislature provides that the board shall not exercise its power of appointment during the incumbency of an appointee of the legislature thereafter named."
If other proof than the very plain language used in making the appointment of appellee were needed, it might be mentioned that the legislature, convened in January, 1917, passed an act appropriating the sum of $500 to pay the expenses incurred by appellee in defending his title to the office of librarian in this very suit. This not only evidences the intention of the members of the legislature that he should not be removed by the board of curators, but it also may be considered as an expression of appreciation of the legislature of benefits secured to it through the legislative bureau. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, does not question the intention of the legislature to appoint the appellee to the office of state law and legislative reference librarian, and that his tenure should continue "until otherwise provided by law"; his principal contention being that the appointment "is invalid and ineffective for the reason that the appointment to an administrative office is not within the legislative power under the Constitution of the state." He makes other objections to the appointment, which we shall notice later on, but this is the principal one and the one toward which most of his very learned brief and argument are directed.
The appellant bases his contention that the legislature is without power to appoint a librarian upon article iii of the Constitution, which divides the powers of government into three departments, and declares that these departments shall be separate and distinct, and that no one of them shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others. It is argued that an appointment to office is an executive function, and therefore properly belongs to the executive department. This position is a direct challenge of the constitutionality of the appointment by the legislature. The matter of declaring this act unconstitutional is a very serious one,...
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