Dunbar v. Dunbar

• Decision Date: 31 December 1901
• Citation: 62 N.E. 248,180 Mass. 170
• Parties: DUNBAR v. DUNBAR.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

180 Mass. 170

62 N.E. 248

DUNBAR v. DUNBAR.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

December 31, 1901

COUNSEL

John Oscar Teele and Frank H. Stewart, for plaintiff.

George Fred Williams and James A. Halloran, for defendant.

OPINION

BARKER J.

The action is in contract to recover 10 installments, of $74.99 each, alleged to be due to the plaintiff in part for her own support, and in part for that of her minor son, under a sealed instrument executed by herself and the defendant in the year 1896. After a ruling that so much of the demand as related to the support of the son was barred by the defendant's discharge in bankruptcy, and a finding for the plaintiff for so much as related to her own support, and an order of judgment for the plaintff upon the finding, the case comes here upon a report which states some facts that seem to have been admitted or not disputed at the trial, and upon the evidence there introduced. The court below refused to rule that upon all the evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover and also refused to rule that the discharge in bankruptcy was not a bar to any part of the claim, and ruled that the discharge was a bar to so much of the demand as was aleged to be due for the support of the son. By the terms of the report, if the rulings were right the judgment is to be affirmed; otherwise, such judgment is to be entered as law and justice may require.

The defendant's contentions are that his discharge in bankruptcy is a bar to the suit; and also that the agreement sued upon was without consideration; and, further, that the agreement is void, because in substitution for an earlier one, founded upon a collusive arrangement to enable him to procure a divorce from the plaintiff. It is immaterial whether there was collusion in the divorce suit and whether the agreement of September, 1889, was invalid by reason of such collusion or for want of consideration. That agreement was made and performed by the defendant for several years. When he broke it the plaintiff asserted that it was valid and binding, and the agreement of 1896, now sued on was made in settlement of the controversy so arising. The compromise of this controversy was a sufficient consideration for the agreement of 1896. Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of Milford, 21 Pick. 349, 353; Barlow v. Insurance Co., 4 Metc. 270, 275; Cobb v. Arnold, 8 Metc. 403, 405; Tuttle v. Tuttle, 12 Metc. 551, 554, 46 Am. Dec. 701; Allis v. Billings, 2 Cush, 19, 26; Whitney v. Insurance Co., 9 Allen, 35; Easton v Easton, 112 Mass. 438, 443; Cutter v. Cochrane, 116 Mass. 408; Rollins v. Marsh, 128...