Dunbar v. State
Decision Date | 12 November 1942 |
Docket Number | A-10076. |
Citation | 131 P.2d 116,75 Okla.Crim. 275 |
Parties | DUNBAR v. STATE. |
Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The true test of the sufficiency of an information is not whether it might possibly have been made more certain, but whether it alleges every element of the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprizes the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.
2. For information held sufficient to charge the offense of assault with intent to kill by attempting to shoot at another, see opinion.
3. "An assault is any wilful and unlawful attempt or offer with force or violence to do a corporeal hurt to another" or by any threatening gesture, showing in itself or by words accompanying it, sufficient to cause a well founded apprehension of immediate peril.
4. An attempt to commit a crime consists of the following elements First, the intent to commit the crime. Second, performance of some act toward commission thereof, Third, the failure to consummate its commission.
5. Overt act is sufficient to complete offense of attempt to commit crime, if it goes far enough toward accomplishment of offense to amount to commencement of its consummation.
6. "Attempt to commit crime," as distinguished from mere preparation, consists of a direct movement toward consummation of intended crime after preparations have been made.
7. If upon the trial additional instructions are desired, it is the duty of counsel to reduce them to writing and request that they be given, and if he fails to do so a conviction will not be reversed, unless the court is of the opinion, in the light of the entire record and instructions of the court, that there was a failure to instruct the jury upon some material question of law, and that the defendant has been deprived of a substantial right.
8. If upon the trial special instructions are desired by the defendant, he is required by the provisions of our Code of Criminal Procedure to present in writing to the court the instructions desired, and it is not error for the trial court to omit to instruct upon every possible question under the defendant's theory of the case, where he has not requested such instructions.
9. Where a verdict is irregular in form, but is not objected to at the time it is returned, and the court given an opportunity to have the jury correct it, every intendment and inference will be indulged to uphold it, and where from an examination of the verdict, and the entire record, the intent and purpose of the jury as expressed in the verdict may be clearly ascertained, it will be upheld.
10. Upon information charging assault with intent to kill by attempting to shoot at another, as defined by first part Penal Code. Sec. 652, 21 O.S.1941, where the instructions of the court submit the included offense of assault with intent to do bodily harm, with any sharp or dangerous weapon, or who attempts to shoot at another with any kind of firearm with intent to injure, but without intent to kill as defined by Penal Code, Sec. 645, 21 O.S.1941, the verdict was: "We the jury *** 'find the defendant guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon' as charged in the information and assess his punishment at imprisonment in the State penitentiary for one year." Held, that the verdict is sufficiently definite and certain as to the included offense, and is in effect a verdict of guilty of an attempt to shoot at another with intent to injure, although without intent to kill.
11. For evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction of appellant of crime of assault with a dangerous weapon, by attempting to shoot at another, with intent to injure, but without intent to kill, see body of opinion.
Appeal from District Court, Mayes County; N. B. Johnson, Judge.
Charles Dunbar was convicted of felonious assault, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
A. Lee Battenfield, of Pryor, for plaintiff in error.
Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., and Jess L. Pullen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was tried on an information which, omitting formal parts, charged that Charles Dunbar did in Mayes county, on or about the 15th day of May, 1940, commit the crime of assault with intent to kill in manner as follows:
That on the day aforesaid, he did unlawfully, wilfully, intentionally and feloniously, make an assault upon one Floyd M. Henry, with a certain weapon, to-wit, a Winchester, which he then and there had and held in his hands, that he did then and there go to his automobile and take therefrom said Winchester, and did then and there load said Winchester by putting in the chamber of said Winchester shells or leaden bullets, and did then and there brandish said Winchester, bringing it up in position to shoot, did point said Winchester at and towards the said Floyd M. Henry, who at said time did run and escape into and through a certain garage nearby to the M. K. & T. Depot, nearby; that said Charles Dunbar followed and pursued said Floyd M. Henry with said Winchester with the unlawful and felonious intent, then and there on the part of him the said Charles Dunbar to kill him the said Floyd M. Henry, contrary to, etc.
December 10, 1940, the jury rendered the following verdict: "We the jury duly drawn, impaneled and sworn in the above entitled cause do upon our oaths find the defendant guilty of 'assault with a dangerous weapon' as charged in the Information and assess his punishment at imprisonment in the State penitentiary for a period of 1 year."
December 16th, defendant filed motion for new trial.
On January 29, 1941, said motion coming on regularly for hearing, at the close of the arguments the court overruled the motion and pronounced judgment as follows:
Briefly stated, the record discloses the following facts: That on the date alleged, complaining witness Henry was living with his wife and six children of tender years on a rented farm, about four miles northwest of Mazie. The defendant, Charles Dunbar, a married man, with his wife and son were living on what is called the old Kennedy Ranch, and he was foreman of what is known as the Dunbar Ranch, owned by defendant's brother, Ralph Dunbar, Sr., and his son Ralph, Jr. Henry left his home that forenoon, went to Mazie, and from there drove on to Pryor, and returned to Mazie about three o'clock that afternoon, parked his car, went in to the Neal Brother's Garage. Partitioned from the garage is their country store, and behind the service station is their repair shop.
The complaining witness, Henry, testified: ...
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