Dunbar v. United States, 4881.
| Decision Date | 30 June 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 4881.,4881. |
| Citation | 65 F.2d 497 |
| Parties | DUNBAR et al. v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Casper William Ooms, of Chicago, Ill., for appellants.
Frank K. Lemon, U. S. Atty., and Marks Alexander, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Springfield, Ill.
Before EVANS and SPARKS, Circuit Judges, and BALTZELL, District Judge.
SPARKS, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).
We are first confronted with appellee's motion to strike appellants' purported bill of exceptions on the ground that it does not appear that it was settled, allowed, signed and sealed by the court at the term within which the judgment was rendered, nor within the period of time extended by the court for that purpose. The record discloses that the judgment was rendered on December 17, 1930, which was during the October term of that year, and that said term expired April 19, 1931. The time for filing the bill of exceptions was duly and properly extended from time to time until October 12, 1931. On October 13, 1931 there was entered an order purporting to further extend the period for settlement of the bill of exceptions for thirty days from October 12, 1931, and thereafter there were ordered further extensions of time to May 11, 1932, and no longer. The bill of exceptions was signed and sealed by the court on August 6, 1932.
No explanation is offered for the first delay in not securing the extension of time until October 13 when the period had terminated October 12. The delay from May 11 to August 6 was alleged to have been caused by appellants' inability to pay the expenses incident to the preparation of the bill of exceptions, and in addition, to the fact that during that period they were not represented by counsel. They had been represented by counsel of their own selection at the trial of the cause which resulted in their conviction and the assessment of heavy penalties against them. All of them started serving their sentences at once, Mrs. Dunbar in the Federal Industrial Institution for Women at Alderson, West Virginia, and the others in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. At this time their financial resources were practically depleted, and their attorney declined to represent them further. During the period until August 6 when the bill was finally signed, Floyd Dunbar was doing everything he could do through the medium of letters from Leavenworth to urge the preparation and presentation of the bill of exceptions and in otherwise perfecting the appeal. On petition filed September 12, 1932, the trial court authorized the Dunbars to prosecute their appeal as poor persons, and this court granted the same privilege and appointed counsel for them on November 15, 1932. Carpenter and Norton were allowed to join January 23, 1933. Under these circumstances we are asked by appellants to accept the bill of exceptions as incorporated in the record, and they base this request upon the principles laid down in Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S. 1, 52 S. Ct. 466, 467, 76 L. Ed. 951; Michigan Insurance Bank v. Eldred, 143 U. S. 293, 12 S. Ct. 450, 36 L. Ed. 162, and Jennings v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 218 U. S. 255, 31 S. Ct. 1, 2, 54 L. Ed. 1031.
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United States v. Dunbar
...to review the evidence upon which the judgment was entered because the bill of exceptions had not been timely filed. See Dunbar v. United States, 7 Cir., 65 F.2d 497, certiorari denied, 290 U.S. 626, 54 S.Ct. 81, 78 L.Ed. Since the power of the court to convict and impose consecutive senten......