Duncan v. Barnett

• Decision Date: 05 March 1879
• Docket Number: CASE 694.
• Citation: 11 S.C. 333
• Parties: D. P. DUNCAN v. SAMUEL BARNETT.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

11 S.C. 333

D. P. DUNCAN v. SAMUEL BARNETT.

CASE No. 694.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 5, 1879

1. The legislature can exempt from levy and sale only such articles of personal property as are embraced within the enumeration contained in Article II., Section 32, of the constitution. A more extended exemption is unconstitutional and void.

2. A question suggested in Homestead B. & L Association v. Enslow , 7 S. C. 1 explained.

Before NORTHROP, J., at Union, June Term, 1876.

The sheriff of Union county, in November, 1875, levied the execution in this case upon two bales of cotton and some seed cotton and corn, of value more than sufficient to satisfy the execution, as the property of the defendant in the execution such defendant, being an agricultural laborer, owning no lands, and having less than $500 worth of personal property including the property levied upon. The sheriff returned the property to the defendant as exempted property. The cause of action arose January 1st, 1873.

The sheriff was ruled by the assignee of the plaintiff to show cause why he had failed to make the money; and this appeal is taken from order discharging the rule.

Mr. R. W. Shand , for appellant, cited the following authorities: Cates v. Knight , 3 T. R. 442; Smelt. Lead Co. v. Richardson , 3 Burr . 1344; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. People , 67 Ill. 11; Test Oath Cases , 2 Hill 1, and Mr. Grimke's argument at p. 17; Smith on Const. Law , § 508; Cooley on Const. Lim. 64, 94, note 1, 195, note 3, and 599.

OPINION

WILLARD C. J.

The Circuit Court discharged a rule against the sheriff for failure to enforce an execution against personal property, consisting of cotton in bales, seed cotton and corn, the defendant claiming that they are exempt from levy under the provisions of the act of March 13th, 1872, (15 Stat. 229, § 9,) he being an " agricultural laborer." It is stated in appellant's argument, that the contract upon which the judgment was obtained bore date prior to the passage of the act in question, contending that such exemption could not be claimed as against an antecedent contract; but that fact does not appear in the brief, and, therefore, is not available to the appellant. The question to be considered is, whether the legislature could create new subjects of exemption in addition to those enumerated in the constitution. The provisions of the constitution relating to the exemption of personal property from execution, are contained in Article II., Section 32. After providing for a homestead exemption on the land of a debtor, the constitution goes on to say: " To secure the full enjoyment of said homestead exemption to the person entitled thereto, or the head of any family, the personal property of such person of the following character, to wit, household furniture, beds and bedding, family library, arms, carts, wagons, farming implements, tools, neat cattle, work animals, swine, goats and sheep, not to exceed in value, in the aggregate, the sum of five hundred dollars, shall be subject to like exemption as said homestead; and there shall be exempt in addition thereto all necessary wearing apparel." The question is, whether the subsequent attempt to add to the list of articles exempted " one third of the annual products of agricultural laborers" by the act of 1873 was consistent with the provisions of the constitutional enactment, or tended to deny the proper force due to the same; and if the latter conclusion is reached, such conflicting provisions must be held unconstitutional and void.

This involves a question of intention to be made out constructively on the provisions of the constitution. It is contended that the enumeration of kinds of property intended for exemption is exclusive, and general rules of interpretation are urged as leading to that conclusion. It will not be necessary to resort to such general rules, or to place the decision on any technical rule or reasoning, as the nature of the subject with which the constitution deals, points very distinctly to the solution of the question at issue.

The question of allowing the legislative exemption to debtors is in its nature, fundamental, as involving an inquiry into the principles of government. Until within a few years it has not been regarded as a legitimate exercise of legislative power to place the...