Duncan v. Duncan
| Decision Date | 08 March 1983 |
| Citation | 652 S.W.2d 913 |
| Parties | Earlene S. DUNCAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul DUNCAN, Defendant-Appellant. 652 S.W.2d 913 |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
W. Clark Meredith, Thomas N. Depersio, Oak Ridge, for plaintiff-appellant.
W. Buford Lewallen, David L. Buuck, Knoxville, for defendant-appellant.
In this divorce case, both parties appeal the judgment of the Trial Court which granted the Plaintiff, Earlene Duncan, a divorce along with alimony in solido in the amount of $25,000 and $750 in attorney fees. In making his award, the Chancellor upheld the provisions of the parties' antenuptial agreement relating to the division of property, but held invalid that portion of the agreement dealing with alimony and attorney fees. The Defendant, Paul Duncan, asserts that the questions of alimony and attorney fees should be decided in accordance with the parties' antenuptial agreement which provided that neither party would be entitled to either in the event of a separation. The Plaintiff argues that the $25,000 award was actually a division of jointly-held property acquired after the marriage and that the Trial Court abused its discretion in failing to award the Plaintiff adequate alimony.
The parties were married in August 1979. Prior to their marriage and in July 1979, they executed an antenuptial agreement that purported to control the division of property, support, alimony, and attorney fees in the event of a separation. At the time of this agreement, the Defendant owned certificates of deposit in the amount of $108,412, as well as various properties including a restaurant, filling station, skating rink, and beauty parlor. The Plaintiff owned some six or seven pieces of real estate, including one eight-acre tract. At some time following the agreement, the Plaintiff sold one of her lots for $10,000. At the time of this trial, two additional lots owned by the Plaintiff were on the market at an asking price of $140,000. The parties were separated in September 1981, and after brief attempts at reconciliation, this action was commenced.
As noted by the Chancellor, both of the parties are in excellent financial condition at the present time. The Defendant owns $326,525 in certificates of deposit alone and enjoys a gross income of approximately $70,000 per year. The Plaintiff continues to own several pieces of real estate and receives $500 per month in rental income.
The Defendant cites the case of Hoyt v. Hoyt, 213 Tenn. 117, 372 S.W.2d 300 (1963), in support of his contention that the Chancellor erred in holding that the provision in the antenuptial agreement limiting alimony and attorney fees is void as against public policy. Hoyt dealt with a reconciliation agreement entered into in an attempt to save a failing marriage. Certainly any attempt at reconciliation would not be promotive or conducive to the breaking up of the marriage even though the reconciliation agreement might include provisions limiting alimony or child support. On the other hand, an antenuptial agreement limiting support, alimony, or attorney fees in the event of divorce would not be in furtherance of the marriage but would tend to make a divorce a more attractive alternative to the wealthier spouse when faced with the everyday problems with which all married couples must cope. Indeed, the Court stated in Hoyt, 213 Tenn. at 123, 372 S.W.2d at 302:
The stability of the home founded on the union of man and woman through marriage has from the beginning been of such great importance to the public good, that the courts have long held void, as against the public interest, any contract of any nature, which would be promotive or conducive to the breaking up of this relation. This reasoning is as valid in this modern...
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§ 4.14 Miscellaneous Marriage Contract Issues
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