Duncan v. State
| Decision Date | 21 November 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. A89A1623,A89A1623 |
| Citation | 193 Ga.App. 793,389 S.E.2d 365 |
| Parties | DUNCAN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Virgil L. Brown & Associates, Virgil L. Brown, Zebulon, for appellant.
Gerald N. Blaney, Jr., Sol., David M. Fuller, Asst. Sol., for appellee.
On May 30, 1986, defendant Duncan was arrested and charged by uniform traffic citations with the offenses of driving under the influence of alcohol and improper lane usage. Subsequently, defendant was convicted of both offenses in the Gwinnett County Recorder's Court. Defendant's appeal to the Gwinnett County Superior Court was dismissed and she appealed to this Court. In Duncan v. State, 185 Ga.App. 854, 366 S.E.2d 154, this Court reversed defendant's convictions after concluding that the convictions were for violations of state law and that the Recorder's Court of Gwinnett County was without jurisdiction to try defendant for a violation of state law (as opposed to a violation of a county ordinance). This Court also held that the proceeding by the recorder's court was null and void and therefore did not bar defendant's retrial on grounds of double jeopardy or prior prosecution. This Court's decision in Duncan v. State, 185 Ga.App. 854, 366 S.E.2d 154 supra, remains the law of that case although this Court in Kolker v. State, 193 Ga.App. 306, 387 S.E.2d 597 held that this Court exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction in deciding Duncan v. State, 185 Ga.App. 854, 366 S.E.2d 154, supra, rather than transferring that case to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
On September 26, 1988, and subsequent to this Court's earlier decision in the case sub judice, defendant was charged by accusation in the State Court of Gwinnett County with having committed the offenses of driving under the influence of alcohol, improper lane usage, and simple battery. The alleged date of each of the offenses is May 30, 1986. Defendant filed a plea in bar in the State Court of Gwinnett County contending that the state court accusation "shows on its face that it was filed outside of the two-year statute of limitations, which violates OCGA § 17-3-1(d) and prevents the State of Georgia from pursuing this prosecution." The present appeal arises from the state court's denial of defendant's plea in bar. Held:
Generally, prosecution for misdemeanors must be commenced within two years after the commission of the crime. OCGA § 17-3-1(d). The period within which a prosecution must be commenced under OCGA § 17-3-1(d) does not include any period in which the person committing the crime is unknown or the crime is unknown. OCGA § 17-3-2(2). The knowledge placed at issue by OCGA § 17-3-2(2) is the knowledge of the State, which knowledge includes that imputed to the State through the knowledge not only of the prosecution, but also includes the knowledge of someone interested in the prosecution, or injured by the offense. State v. Brannon, 154 Ga.App. 285, 287(2), 267 S.E.2d 888. Thus, the knowledge of a victim of a crime (Taylor v. State, 44 Ga.App. 64, 67(2) 69, 70, 160 S.E. 667) or of a law enforcement officer (Holloman v. State, 133 Ga.App. 275, 277(4), 278, 211 S.E.2d 312), is imputed to the State. It follows that the assistant solicitor's argument in the case sub judice, that "appellee was not aware of the charges against appellant until August 7, 1987, when the charges were bound over to the State Court from the Recorder's Court," is not correct since the knowledge of the officer who arrested defendant on May 30, 1986, was imputed to the State on that date. See also Cain v. State, 144 Ga.App. 249, 240 S.E.2d 750.
Having determined that the period of limitation commenced on May 30, 1986, we next turn to the State's contention that the period was tolled during the period that the earlier appeal in the case sub judice was pending before this Court. The sole...
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State v. Outen
...entered or, in the event the State seeks an appeal, from the time the appellate court issues the remittitur. ” See Duncan v. State, 193 Ga.App. 793, 794, 389 S.E.2d 365 (1989) (holding that an appeal does not toll the statute of limitations under OCGA § 17–3–2 because the pendency of an app......
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Pauley v. State
...offense. Thus, the knowledge of a victim of a crime or of a law enforcement officer is imputed to the State. Duncan v. State , 193 Ga. App. 793, 793-794, 389 S.E.2d 365 (1989) (citations omitted). Here, the State included language in the indictment with respect to the relevant counts explai......
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State v. Gerbert
...of the matter by the court before which the accused is brought...." OCGA § 40-13-1. It "contains an accusation." Duncan v. State, 193 Ga.App. 793, 794, 389 S.E.2d 365 (1989). It serves as authority for the requirement of bond in lieu of loss of liberty. OCGA § 40-13-55. It authorizes a comm......
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